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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 375-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

General Staff of the 5th Section
(German Air Force)
(Genstb. 5. Abteilung)
No. 28/38. TOP SECRET (G-2)
For Commanders only (CHEF-SACHE)

Berlin, 25 August 1938

THROUGH OFFICER COURIER ONLY

TOP SECRET

Subject: Extended Case Green (GRUEN - code for Czechoslovakia)
Estimate of the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.

A) Initial Political Situation:

1) The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the Case Green.

It is presumed that France will only decide upon war if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely assured.

2) The Soviet Union will probably side immediately with the Western Powers.

3) It is not expected for the moment that other states will intervene against Germany.

The Dutch-Belgian area assumes in this connection much more importance for the prevention of the war in Western Europe than during the World War. This mainly as an advanced base for the air war.

4) The United States of America will immediately support the fight of the Western Powers with strong ideological and economic means.

5) Italy, Nationalistic-Spain, Hungary and Japan are regarded as benevolent neutrals.

B) Initial Military Situation:

1) The French-Czechoslovakian treaty provides for military assistance only in the case of an unprovoked attack. At least an agreement of the French and British views as to the legal aspect has to be achieved. If only for political reasons we have to consider the 2nd day as the earliest possible day of war on a European scale. In case of a 24 hour ultimatum it would be the 3rd day.

2) It is further assumed that the actual commencement of hostilities will only take place after the French armed forces have been tactically deployed. That means within the fourth to eighteenth day. This to

a) use the deployment as a means of political pressure,
b) and to be able to deploy the troops undisturbed.

3) The war aim of the Entente Powers is to be considered as the overcoming of Germany through attacking its war economy. With other words through a long war.

4) The following are possible methods of operation for the French army:

a) to man and hold the Maginot-line,
b) to march into Belgium and the Netherlands at the beginning of the war with the aim of occupying the Ruhr-territory.

All suppositions support the first alternative.

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5) The French Air Force will probably attack both economic and German Air Force targets as well as military and communication objectives. Thus no concentrated effect will be achieved at any one place.

6) The French Navy will probably cooperate through operations with the British sea power to supplement the North Sea blockade. The aim will be the maintenance of naval predominance in the Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean.

7) The British Air Force is assumed to be committed from English bases against the Rhine-Westphalia industrial area and the North Sea ports. Sooner or later the Belgium-Dutch neutrality will be violated.

A camouflaged aircraft reporting network in Belgium and the Netherlands has to be taken into account from the first day of the war. No transfer to France on the part of the British Air Force need be expected at the beginning of the war. Equally it is held to be out of the question for any large parts of the British armed forces to be transferred to France.

8) Provision seems to have been made for the use of North French ground organizations during the course of the war at least by part of the attacking British Air Forces.

The existence of a relatively large number of civilian airfields in Belgium and the Netherlands seem to indicate the intention of moving advanced elements of the air defences of London (light fighters and reconnaissance aircraft) into this area after a while.

9) Thanks to the expected neutrality of Poland, the active participation of Soviet Russia will be largely restricted to the prosecution of the war in the Baltic.

Furthermore, air attacks against East Prussia and the Baltic coast are to be anticipated and occasional raids on Berlin are regarded as possible.

10) The basic assumption in respect to our own prosecution of the war is that two war plane air forces will be available in the West at the beginning of hostilities. There will be five war plane air forces in all after three to four weeks. The aim will be to bring about a decision by the defeat of the Western powers.

C) Task of the German Air Force:

The German Air Force has at present not all the forces necessary to seek a decision by attacking the enemy's war economy with the aid of the navy. The prime responsibility of the German Air Force in the present situation must be to help the armed forces immobilized opposite a fortified front to achieve operational freedom.

D) Enemy War Plane Forces:

1) The French Air Force will have on the 1st October some 640 war planes in the front line units on French home territory of which not more than 120 to 150 attain a modern standard of performance. Available reserves total about 320 obsolete war planes.

There are another 150 obsolete war planes in North Africa for use in colonial war or against Southern Italy.

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It is assumed that the French home war plane units will be deployed for the most part in the known areas of Eastern France at the beginning of the war. They will be employed against various targets (air force targets, industrial and communications targets, military installations, Army targets) in the operational area as well as in depth according to the capabilities of their personnel and equipments.

Any transfer of more than insignificant forces to Czechoslovakia is regarded as outside the range of practical possibilities, as is the concentrated commitment of large formations against the armies fighting in Czechoslovakia.

2) The British war plane force will consist of some 850 war planes on October 1st of which 300 to 350 can be regarded as modern. The majority of the front line aircraft as well as some 200 to 300 reserve aircraft can be described as only conditionally serviceable in the face of modern defences.

Due to their inadequate range the present British war plane formations are not in a position to carry on a vigorous air war from their home bases only without violating sovereign Dutch or Belgian territory.

Even if Dutch and Belgian neutrality is ignored only the modern war planes need be taken into account as a serious threat to the Ruhr.

A transfer of British Air Forces to Northern France is to be expected at the eatliest, after several weeks of war.

If the French Army Command decides to march through Belgium and the Netherlands the immediate influx of British fighters into this area becomes probable.

Heavy attacks against the North Sea ports by carrier based aircraft need not be reckoned with:

a) because the equipment and training of these aircraft is designed to fit them for specific naval tasks;
b) because aircraft carriers, due to their vulnerability, will be committed in the North Sea only for very pressing reasons, which do not exist in this instance.

On the other hand occasional attacks by coastal aircraft forces against targets on the North Sea coast are feasible and probable.

D) Enemy Aircraft Industries:

1) The first aircraft put into mass production as a result of the expansion of French military aircraft industry during the years 1934 to 1938 are at present rolling off the assembly lines. At the moment the aero-engine factories are lagging behind with deliveries.

In August 1938 forty single-engined and thirty twin-engined military aircraft were delivered to the French Air Forces. It must be assumed that these figures will be increased during the coming months to 100 aircraft a month, 50 single-engined and 50 twin-engined.

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A further moderate increase in production is possible and to be expected from spring 1939 on.

2) In Great Britain existing plants have been extended since 1936 with the aid of State funds and the effect on the armament situation will begin to make itself felt increasingly from 1939 on. If the present plans will be observed the program will be completely carried out by 1941.

Present production (August 1938) is estimated at some 200 aircraft of all types (Commercial and military aircraft) a month. It must be noted that the import of training aircraft and long-range reconniassance aircraft from the United States and Canada is intended.

3) North American aircraft industry (United States and Canada) is at the moment fully occupied. No notable expansion has yet taken place but is possible. A possible expansion would have no pratical effects in 1939.

250 aircraft of all types (commercial and military) a month for the home and foreign market may be stated as the present prodocution rate. Appreciably more aircraft engines are manufactured.

F) Position with regard to preparation of target data:

1) It is proposed to supply units on or before 5th October with the following target data for France:

a) Air Force (airfields, air parks and equipment depots, airforce fueldumps). About 90% of existing installations are included.

b) Fuel Supply.
100% of the refineries are included and 60% of the total storage capacity (including the above-mentioned Air Force fuel dumps).

c) Ammunition Supply.
An estimated 70% to 80% of the total productive capacity of explosive and gunpowder factories and 17 large supply dumps (main ammunition depots and ammunition depots, Army and Air Force) are included.

d) Power Supply.
All the large power plants are included.

e) Key Industries.
In particular the Paris aero-engine industry has been included.

f) Targets in the Paris area.

Further target data, particularly for essential industrial targets, are accumulating currently.

In addition, command authorities will receive maps of the tactical situation and of target groups on or before the above-mentioned date.

2) Basic target maps of British ground organization (airfields) are approximately 90% ready. They have been passed on to Air Force Group 2 for printing and for the adding of sectional excerpts of maps. They have been ordered to be ready by 15 September.

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As far as essential industrial targets are concerned, work has been carried out on the food and crude oil supply systems and docks in the London and Hull areas (basic target maps, sector maps, partially covered also by aerial and ground panoramas).

These will be reproduced after the ground organization targets have been printed. They cannot be expected to be ready before 20 October.

Tactical maps and target maps of London and Hull will be issued to the command authorities prior to the end of September.

3) The basic target maps of the Air Force objectives for Belgium and the Netherlands are ready for printing. Reproduction and distribution (including sector maps) will probably be possible only during October.

4) In general it must be emphasized that contrary to Czechoslovakia there are relatively very few aerial photographs of Western European targets available.

Recommandations for our own Prosecution of the Air War.

1) A negative answer must be given to the question as to whether it is appropriate to postpone the massed commitment of our striking power until the spring. The balance of force would probably have altered by that time to our disadvantage due to further progress of French and British aircraft industry and imports from North America.

2) From a climatological point of view the autumn offers our forces greater prospect of success than the enemy, due to our relatively good training in instrument flying.

3) As our forces must be regarded as small, even if we accept the figure of 5 air forces as a basis, the task can only be fulfilled by concentrated blows directed against the enemy's weakest points.

For this purpose choice of targets must be made with the greatest care and must be restricted to the decisive points.

4) As long as only 2 air forces are available prosecution of the war on the basis of gaining time is advisable. This is seen in attacks against the enemy air forces in the airfields where they are deployed in Eastern France, with a view to prevent complete aerial predominance by the enemy.

Attacks on Paris should only be carried out as a reprisal, especially as the air defences in and around Paris are strong. Such attacks must however be possible at all times.

Direct cooperation with the Army is only considered desirable if the enemy deploys or advances in such strength as to endanger the Western German fortifications by a break through or outglanking.

Support for the Army will be supplied in this case by attacks:

a) against transports, troop concentrations and movements,
b) against enemy war planes, should these cooperate with his armed forces in great numbers.

Should there be danger of a penetration of the Western fortifications, a further measure would be to concentrate fighter forces scattered in the West on the decisive ground front.

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Attacks against objectives in the British Isles are to be regarded as unjustifiable in view of the small numbers of our combat forces.

Should the enemy ramin on the defensive in the ground war and withdraw with his war plane forces to the West there will be no urgent reason for us to commit our own forces. In this case it would seem better to save our forces until reinforcements arrive.

5) As soon as strong forces are freed for the prosecution of the war in the West, operations in the air must be directed without delay at reaching a decision.

It would seem possible to achieve this end by attacking:

a) fuel refineries and dumps;
b) gunpowder and high explosive factories, main ammunition depots and ammunition depots;
c) the most important parks handling imports which are also centers for the transfer and reshipment of fuel and ammunition.

Thus the enemy's fuel and ammunition supply system for his ground and air forces would be paralyzed or at least curtailed to an intolerable degree.

Assuming that the individual groups of targets are one after the other successively attacked until eliminated it would appear that by the use of 5 air forces a sufficient measure of success could be achieved to enable the Army to break through the enemy's fortified front.

No large-scale operations against targets in the British Isles could be carried out in addition to this task.

Everything should however be prepared to make reprisal attacks against London possible at any time.

Considering the strength of the air defences in and around London success in such attacks is only likely if strong forces are committed.

In addition occasional harassing attacks against targets in South and Southeast England may be worthy of consideration, particularly if the weather enforces a lull in France. A secondary aim of such attacks would be to pin down strong defence forces in Great Britain.

6) Should still stronger war plane forces - at least 3 air forces - be available after the French targets had been successfully attacked, they might be committed to advantage in attacks against the food supply of Great Britain, notably of London. It must however be emphasized that it is only regarded as possible to achieve decisive successes if considerably stronger forces are committed and if the western ports are also subjected to air attacks.

:) Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy:

1) The use of the Condor Legion against the refineries in Bordeaux and possible against those in Marseilles would valuably supplement our attacks of the French fuel supply system.

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2) The ammunition situation has to be rendered precarious for the enemy as soon as possible. Therefore the armed forces should accompany the air attacks against the ammunition supplies with synchronized offensive thrusts. Special attention should be directed towards the ammunition supplies stored in the Maginot line itself and accessible to air attack.

3) The Navy should hamper imports through the French Atlantic ports to as great an extent as is compatible with its other tasks and the forces available. Especially for some 2-3 months at the beginning of the attack against the fuel supply of France.

4) Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out and how long it would take. In this case it would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great Britain.

signed: For: WOLTER

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Distribution:
Chief of German Air Force Operations Staff
General Staff/5th Section (Draft)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 375-PS

4 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf,O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 375-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.386-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berlin, 10 Nov 1937

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615 - 2030 hours

Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG
The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH
The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. RAEDER
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH
Oberst HOSZBACH

The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance, that its detailed discussion would certainly in other states take place before the Cabinet, in full session. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his 4½ years in Government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuehrer then stated:

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space.

The German nation comprises 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a homogeneous European racial body, the like of which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands of this racial body for living space then that is the result of historical development spread over several centuries and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation (Volkstum) at its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in AUSTRIA and in CZECHOSLOVAKIA is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in GERMANY itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1 - 3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for

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living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained:

1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is such more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats - possible.

B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 - 40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand and an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increased demand, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is NOT possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increase consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalisation is impossible in a Continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) as industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonisation; in JAPAN and ITALY economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive GERMANY to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permenent basis for an economic settlement,

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and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a pronounced military weakness in those States who base their existence on exports. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are dominated by BRITAIN, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavour which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in GENEVA and in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in EUROPE, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in EUROPE directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this prupose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times - Roman Empire British Empire - has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for GERMANY is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, ENGLAND, and FRANCE, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of EUROPE would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of GERMANY, both in EUROPE and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in EUROPE.

ENGLAND is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which ENGLAND has suffered owing to the transfer of ABYSSINIA to Italian ownership, a return of EAST AFRICA can no longer be expected. Any resistance on ENGLAND's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. ANGOLA. French favours would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when ENGLAND is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient ROME.

Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could ENGLAND alone, for example, defend CANADA against attack by AMERICA or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by JAPAN.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by poor politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect:

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a) IRELAND's struggle for independence

b) Constitutional disputes in INDIA where ENGLAND, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilise the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against BRITAIN.

c) The weakening of the British position in the FAR EAST by JAPAN.

d) The opposition in the MEDITERRANEAN to ITALY which - by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius - expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an inceasing extent. The outcome of the ABYSSINIAN War is a loss of prestige for BRITAIN whic ITALY is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the MOHAMMEDAN world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favorable than that of ENGLAND. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But FRANCE is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political consideration as power factors:

BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA and the adjoining smaller States.

The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of FREDERICK THE GREAT for SILESIA, and BISMARCK's wars against AUSTRIA and FRANCE had been a tremendous risk and the speed of PRUSSIAN action in 1870 had prevented AUSTRIA from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

Case 1. Period 1943-45 After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then , dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

What the actual position would be in the years 1943/45 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the ageing of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943/45. The necessity for action before 1943/45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2 Should the social tensions in FRANCE lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against GERMANY, thenthe time for action against CZECHOSLOVAKIA has come.

Case 3 It would be equally possible to act against CZECHOSLOVAKIA if FRANCE should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against GERMANY.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with FRANCE it would hardly be necessary to assume that CZECHOSLOVAKIA would declare war on the same day as FRANCE. However, CZECHOSLOVAKIA's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on SILESIA, either towards the North or the West.

Once CZECHOSLOVAKIA is conquered - and a mutual frontier, GERMANY-HUNGARY is obtained - then a neutral attitude by POLAND in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with POLAND remain valid only as long as GERMANY's strength remains unshakeable; should GERMANY have any setbacks then an attack by POLAND against EAST PRUSSIA, perhaps also against POMERANIA, and SILESIA, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943/45, then the behaviour of FRANCE, ENGLAND, POLAND and RUSSIA would probably have to be judged in the following manner:

The Fuehrer believes personally that in all probability ENGLAND and perhaps also FRANCE have already silently written off CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by GERMANY. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of ENGLAND in a war against GERMANY. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on FRANCE's attitude. An attack by FRANCE without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without ENGLAND's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by FRANCE through BELGIUM and HOLLAND, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with FRANCE, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of GREAT BRITAIN. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA. It must be taken into consideration here that CZECHOSLOVAKIA's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and thata consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of CZECHOSLOVAKIA in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from CZECHOSLOVAKIA and of 1 million from AUSTRIA could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to GERMANY militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to theremoval of CZECHOSLOVAKIA is expected on the part of ITALY; however, it cannot be judge today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the DUCE were alive at the time or not.

The measure and speed our our action would decide POLAND's attitude. POLAND will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious GERMANY, with RUSSIA in the rear.

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Military participation by RUSSIA must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this need to taken into consideration at all in view of JAPAN'S attitude.

Should Case 2 occur - paralysation of FRANCE by a Civil war - then the situation shoud be utilized at any time for operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA, as GERMANY's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN, and should it occur he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in SPAIN, the Fuehrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by FRANCE, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100 per cent victory by FRANCE is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN. Should FRANCO be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of ITALY on the BALEARIC ISLES. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in SPAIN, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen ITALY in her fight to hold on to the BALEARIC ISLES. However, solidification of Italian positions on the BALEARIC ISLES can NOT be tolerated either by FRANCE or by ENGLAND and could lead to a war by FRANCE and ENGLAND against ITALY, in which case SPAIN, if entirely in white (i.e. FRANCO's) hands, could participate on the side of ITALY's enemies. A subjugation of ITALY in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to ITALY via GERMANY. The Fuehrer believes that ITALY's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against FRANCE on the Western frontier and carry out operations against FRANCE from LIBYA against the North African French colonial possessions.

As a landing of Franch-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the ALPS to Upper ITALY would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to FRANCE, so that at its frontiers with ITALY and GERMANY, FRANCE will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.

If GERMANY profits from this war by disposing of the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN and the AUSTRIAN questions, the probability must be assumed that ENGLAND - being at war with ITALY - would not decide to commence operations against GERMANY. Without British support a warlike action by FRANCE against GERMANY is not to be anticipated.

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made independent on the course of the Italian-French-English war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete independence and by exploiting this unique favourable opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightening (blitzartig schnell)".

Fieldmarshall von BLOMBERG and Generaloberst von FRITSCH in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that ENGLAND and FRANCE must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with ITALY would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to Commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von FRITSCH estimated the French forces which would presumable be employed on the ALPINE frontier against ITALY to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the RHINELAND. We should consider the lead which FRANCE has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications - which was pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarschall von BLOMBERG - the

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Italian-English-French war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military agreements with Italy, but of full independence and, by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightning" (blitzartig schnell).

Feldmarshall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications - which was pointed out particularly by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg - the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Feldmarschall von Blomberg draw special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a Maginot line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuhrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to the remark by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that an Italian-English-French conflict be not as near as the Fuhrer appeared to assume, the Fuhrer stated that the date which appeared to him to be a possibility was summer 1938. In reply to statements by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France's attitude, the Fuhrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.

In view of the information given by the Fuhrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuhrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(Signed) HOSZBACH

.....

H1145 - 0015

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 386-PS

18 November 1945.

I, EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 386-PS.

EVE GLAZIER
P/O, W.R.N.S.
37371.

H1145 - 0016

H1145 - 0017

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

APPERTAINING TO WAR HISTORY

(pencil note)

S.O. Only

"FALL GRÜN"

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

H1145-0018

ITEM 1

- - - ? of the Fuehrer: (semi-illegible)

1). Does MUSSOLINI regard his work as completed or not.

a). if so, close future boundary of Czechoslovakia West then wait and see. "Return with the bag empty."

b). if not, then the "Empire" of Africa. Impossible without German help. Czechoslovakia is a preliminary condition. "Return with Czechoslovakia in the bag."

2). MUSSOLINI, who is no illusionist, can definitely assess Germany's military potentialities. Therefore he will suit timing of his aims with that.

3). Against France and England problem of Czechoslovakia can be settled only if still allied with Italy. France and England will not intervene. (Only to overcome the four-week re-grouping period.)

4). Living under a common fate. (Example, 1805 and 1806)

5). State of Armament: comparisons relative but in our favor:

a). Deliveries of ores: France -- 600,000 tons
Germany - 2 million tons.

b). Britain has been arming for 9 months. Launching not for 2 years.

c). Out of date air force equipment.

6). No general staff conferences of the various branches of the Armed Forces. Would have to retract permission to the Army. Only through Supreme Command. Very important that actual intentions be kept secret.

7). Arming progressing too slowly: Guns not only for constituted units, but also in reserve for replacement. Fortifications. Range of guns.

8). Replacement of officers doubtful.

* * *

Schm

(M. Schmundt's writing and initialled by him)

H1145 - 0019

ITEM 2

S.O. Only

Berlin, 22 April 1938

BASES OF THE DISSERTATION ON "GRUEN"

Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General KEITEL of 21 April:

A. Political Aspect

1). Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainl d.

2). Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.

3). Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration).

B. Military Conclusions

1). The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2) and 3). Case 2). is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.

2). The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail - which is unavoidable but should be cut down as far as possible - must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.

3). "Separate thrusts" are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, of targets, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.

The Air Force is to support the individual columns. (e.g. divebombers: sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)

4). Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize "Gruen".

Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army.(e.g. via Pi past Pr) (Pilsen, Prague).

5). If possible, separation of transport movement "Rot" from "Gruen". A simultaneous strategic concentration "Rot" can lead "Rot" to undesired measures. On the other hand it must be possible to put "Fall Rot" into operation at any time.

H1145 - 0020

ITEM 2

22 April

A). POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES

1). Sudden surprise attack out of clear sky not possible. World opinion can produce critical situation. Would be thinkable only for ultimate conflict without the threat of other opponents.

2). Action after a period of tension and constant aggravation of the situation.

3). Action as the result of an incident. (example)

B). MILITARY NECESSITIES

Cases 2 and 3 can be considered. In case 2 "security measures" will be taken. Duration of transporting by rail to be looked into.

1). Invasion by columns ready to march at points which lie in/a direction, strategically important. (Permanent fortifications must be known, columns assembled to suit particular situations, roads reconnoitred.) Simultaneous attack by Luftwaffe,,cooperation with Luftwaffe, isolation of garrisons of the fortifications, cutting of communications.)

2). "Dead Space" in first 4 days prior to actual operation must be avoided under all circumstance. Must be bridged through motorized army. Penetrating via PILSEN. Hamper mobilization.

3). Separation of transport movement "Rot" and "Gruen",

a). in order not to aggravate "Rot",

b). but also so as not to arrive late, if necessary.

Basic Principle : Create Accomplished Facts so that

a). help comes too late - other powers do not intervene

b). Allies take part (like wolves also want something out of it)

c). State collapses from within.

Propaganda: Directions to Germans
Threats to others

Submit: 1). Fortifications (strength in detail)

2). Distribution of nationalities within Wehrmacht.

H1145 - 0021

C. Propaganda

1). Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland).

2). Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).

Schm

Written by an officer

(initialled by Schmundt)

H1145 - 0022

ITEM 3

MOS 1 16/5 0925 -
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

ZEITZLER

Most Secret - 1) Which divisions on the "Gruen" frontiers ready to march within 12 hours, in the case of mobilization?

2) What is the final day of mobilization?

SCHMUNDT

MOS 1 1930 MELDAU MBZ

(the same also in Schmundt's handwriting)

- - - - - - - - -

MOS No. 2 1115 -

MBZ 02 16/5 1114 -

Major Schmundt, Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer -

Most Secret to Question 1

12 of them - in garrisons

to Question 2

Third day - Please state time of receipt. Teleprint left my room at 1110 - NN

ZEITZLER Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

- - - - - - - - -

MOS 03 16/5 1155

OKW for Oberst leutnant Zeitzler - Most Secret

1). Teleprint received 1115

2). Please send the numbers of the divisions.

Schmundt

(the same also in Schmundt's handwriting) 1159 MOS 03 Wagner?

- - - - - - - - -

MBZ 04 16/5 1302 -

Major Schmundt Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer -

Most Secret to message 1155 7, 17, 10, 24, 4, 14, 3, 18, 28, 8, armored and mountain.

Zeitzler Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.

H1145 - 0023

ITEM 4

MBZ 05 17/5 1505

TO MAJOR SCHMUNDT ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT TO THE FUEHRER - MOST SECRET

IN ANSWER TO OBERST LEUTNANT ZEITZLER AND WITH REGARD TO MAP OF FORTIFICATIONS:

FORTIFIED CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS AS WELL AS LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS TO CLOSE GAPS BETWEEN FORTIFICATIONS. NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS VARIES FROM ONE TO NINE PER KILOMETER. POSITIONS CONSTRUCTED CONSIST OF LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AND AN OCCASIONAL STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATION IN BETWEEN. NUMBER OF MG EMPLACEMENTS VARIES FROM TWO TO NINE PER KILOMETER. BLOCK CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF LIGHT, SOMETIMES MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AT MAIN ROADS AND THOROUGHFARES. DEFENSIVE POTENTIALITIES: STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL KNOWN CALIBRES. LIGHT MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., MEDIUM MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENT BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 21.00 CM., SOMETIMES AGAINST THE LARGEST CALIBRES.

ZEITZLER OBERSTLEUTNANT ON THE GENERAL STAFF

H1145 - 0024

ITEM 5

MOST SECRET

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
L Ia No. 38/38 S.O. Only

Berlin, 20 May 1938
Tirpitzufer 72.76

S.O. Only
access only through Officer

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

My Fuehrer!

Effective 1 October 1938 (beginning of the new mobilization year for the army) new strategic directives must be issued, whose political bases and stipulations you, my Fuehrer, yourself intend to make.

For the meantime, however, it is necessary that the "Gruen" section of the strategic directives be replaced by a new version that takes into account the situation which has arisen as a result of the incorporation of Austria into the Reich and the newly-suspected intentions of the Czech General Staff.

A draft of this kind is attached. It has not yet been discussed with the Commanders in Chief. I intend to do this only after this draft in its fundamental ideas has been approved by you my Fuehrer, so that it can then be resubmitted to be signed.

Heil, my Fuehrer

(signed) Keitel

H1145-0025

ITEM 5 written by an officer

L Ia to No. 38/38 S.O. Only Berlin, 20 May 1938

MOST SECRET
S. O. Only
access only through officer

DRAFT

for

3 Copies
1st Copy

(Provisional) - pencil note

THE NEW DIRECTIVE "GRUEN"

1). Political Prerequisites:

It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia without provocation, in the near future through military action. Therefore inevitable political developments within Czechoslovakia must force the issue, or political events in Europe create an especially favorable opportunity and one which may never come again.

2). Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action:

An invasion without suitable obvious cause and without sufficient political justification cannot be considered with reference to the possible consequences of such an action in the present situation.

Rather will the action be initiated either:

a). after a period of increasing diplomatic clashes and tension, which is coupled with military preparations and is made use of to push the war-guilt onto the enemy. Even such a period of tension preceding the war however will terminate in sudden military action on our part, which must come with all possible surprise as to time and extent, or

b). by lightning-swift action as a result of a serious incident, through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way and for which at least part of the world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

b). is militarily and politically the more favorable.

3). Conclusions for the Preparations of "Fall Gruen";
which must take into account the possibilities mentioned in 2 a). and 2 b)..

a) For Armed War it is essential to create-- already in the first 4 days - a military situation which plainly proves to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation, and gives the nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to immediate intervention against Czechoslovakia. In such a case the intervention of Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia can be expected, especially if France, due to Italy's clearly pro-German attitude fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by her intervention against Germany.

It is very probable that attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved as a result of the ground operations during the first few days, a European crisis will certainly arise.

b). The Propaganda War must, on one hand, intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and reduce her power of resistance, on the other hand,

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give instructions to the national minorities for supporting the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking.

c). The Economic War has the task of employing all means at the disposal of economy to hasten the final collapse of Czechoslovakia.

The opening of the Economic and Propaganda war can precede the Armed War. I myself will determine the date.

Z (initialled at end by Zeitzler)

For paragraphs 4)., 5)., and 6). see under ITEM 11

H1145 - 0027

ITEM 6

Questions on "Gruen"

1). Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

2). Strength of mobile divisions.

3). Composition of 2nd Armored Division in the case of mobilization.

4). Strength, possibilit s and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) to be used for independent thrust.

5). When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?

6). What calibres andhow large a number of artillery pieces are available for combatting fortifications suchas fortresses?

H1145 - 0028

ITEM 6

L Ia

Berlin, 23 May
MOST SECRET

Questionnaire of 23 May

1). Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

Strength of a peacetime division : 14,000 men
Strength of a division made ready to march: 14,000 men
(but composition is different from that of a peacetime division, i.e. some men are left out and others included).

2). Strength of mobile divisions.

Strength of a mobile division : 17,000 men

3). Composition of the 2nd Armored Division in the case of Mobilization.

In the case of mobilization the 2nd Armored Division is composed of 1 rifle brigade, one tank brigade and divisional troops.

The rifle brigade has one Infantry regiment motorized of 2 battalions and one motorcycle rifle Battalion.

The tank brigade has two tank regiments of two battalions.

The Divisional Troops will include 1 Artillery Regiment motorized of 2 light Battalions, 1 Reconnaissance Battalion motorized, 1 Anti-Tank Battalion, 1 Engineer Battalion motorized, and 1 Signal Battalion motorized.

Altogether the 2nd Armored Division (mobile) has 807 light Machine guns, 250 heavy Machine guns, 18 light mortars, 12 heavy mortars, 8 light Infantry howitzers, 48 Anti-Tank guns, 122 2 cm. guns. 16 37 cm. guns, 16 7.5 cm. guns and 24 light field howitzers.

4). Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) for independent thrust.

In the case of mobilization, C-in-C Army is in command of the motorized units. C-in-C Army must therefore be questioned as regards any new employment.

Altogether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions (rapid march readiness is intended) 4 motorized divisions and the light division (for the moment not yet intended for rapid march readiness; presumably from 1 October).

5). When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?

Mobilization of the infantry guns (= 15 cm. mortars) planned only for the fall, as ammunition for them will only then be available. For training purposes nearly all corps except the 3 corps have the heavy infantry guns at the moment without live ammunition, however.

6). What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are available for combatting fortifications such as fortresses?

Only 21 cm. howitzers. Altogether 23 (of which 8 are in East Prussia)

H1145 - 0029

with 16,000 rounds (of which 4,000 in East Prussia).

(In Schmundt writing): In general, single experimental artillery piece (guns).

Z (initialled by Zeitzler)

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On next page the questions are put again plus, the following additional questions):

7). What do the individual types of Czechoslovakian permanent frontier fortifications look like? Profile?

8). Is cooperation between infantry and bombers assured for attacks against enemy strongpoints etc.?

9). Can the construction of fortifications in the West, in the form of MG strong points and road blocks, be hastened by the employment of work columns of the Inspector of Road Construction?

10). What progress has been made in the howitzer (Moerser) programme? What progress has been made in the coversion of heavy naval guns?

* * *

(Next three pages contain the first 6 questions above and answers to them in a teleprint message, beginning: "I am answering several questions which the Fuehrer put to me during conferences. I request that you report the answers to the Fuehrer."

H1145 - 0030

ITEM 8

1). INFORM GENERAL KEITEL: THE FUEHRER IS GOING INTO "GRUEN" IN DETAIL. BASIC IDEAS NOT CHANGED. SURPRISE ELEMENT TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. CONFERENCE WITH PARTICIPANTS WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER RETURN, AT THE LATEST. CONFERENCE HERE NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. RETURN PROBABLY BEGINNING NEXT WEEK.

2). INFORM COLONEL GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH AND GENERAL KEITEL:

A). THE FUEHRER; IN CONNECTION WITH HIS CONSIDERATIONS ON 1), HIMSELF SUGGESTED THE HOLDING OF MANOEUVERS TO PRACTISE TAKING FORTIFICATIONS BY SURPRISE ATTACK. I THEN REPORTED THAT C-IN-C ARMY WAS PLANNING A CORRESPONDING TRAINING EXERCISE FOR SEPTEMBER. THE FUEHRER THINKS THAT MOMENT TOO LATE. HE HIMSELF WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH C-IN-C ARMY.

B). THE FUEHRER REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF PRESSING FORWARD GREATLY THE FORTIFICATION WORK IN THE WEST

(NOTE FOR K KPT V PUTTKAMER: PLEASE DESTROY TEXT OF 1). AND 2). AFTER USE)

H1145 - 0031

ITEM 9

REICH WAR MINISTRY/ NAVAL SIGNAL SERVICE

MOST SECRET

CANARIS REPORTS ON EVENTS OF THE NIGHT: NO SPECIAL OCCURRENCES. THE MOBILIZATION MEASURES ORDERED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUE. THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN DRAFTED: CLASSES 1913 AND 1914 COMPLETE AND SPECIALISTS ONLY FROM CLASSES 1894 TO 1911 LEAVING OUT CLASSES 04, 06, 09. I SHALL KEEP YOU FURTHER CONTINUALLY INFORMED. I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT THE FUEHRER INFORM HIS C'S-IN-C OF HIS INTENTIONS SOON. HAVE YOU ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

H1145 - 0032

ITEM 10

ILLEGIBLE

H1145-0033

ITEM 11

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L I

Berlin, 30 May 1938
Copy of the 4th Copy

S.O. Only

3 Copies
1st Copy

Access only through Officer

Written by an Officer

By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, Section II of the directive on the unified preparations for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937 (Ob.d.W. No. 55/37 g.kdos Chefsache L Ia) ("Two-Front-War with main effort in the South-East - strategic concentration 'Gruen'") is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution must be assured as from 1 October 38 at the latest.

Alterations in the other parts of the directivesmust be expected during the next few weeks.

by order

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

1 Appendix

sgd. Keitel

To: C-in-C Army — Copy 1
C-in-C Navy — Copy 2
C-in-C Air Force — Copy 3
OKW Section L — Copy 4 - 5

Certified a true copy

Zeitzler

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

H1145-0034

ITEM 11

MOST SECRET

Appendix to: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S. O. Only L Ia
dated 30.5.38.

Copy of the 4th Copy

Written by an Officer

3 Copies
1st Copy

S.O. Only

Access only through Officer

II. Two front war with main effort in the South East
(strategic concentration "Gruen")

1). Political Prerequisites.

It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment.

An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorabe opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take early action.

The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.

2). Political Possibilites for the Commencement of the Action.

The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion:

a). suitable obvious cause and, with it
b). sufficient political justification,
c). action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him prepared to the least possible degree.

From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

But even a period of tension, more or less preceeding a war, must terminate in sudden action on our part - which must have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent - before the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.

3). Conclusions for the Preparation of "Fall Gruen".

a). For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise element as the most important factor contributing to success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland

H1145-0035

ITEM 11

and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially if France - due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy - fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within the first few days, a European crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.

b). The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the date.

4). Tasks of the Armed Forces.

Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following basis:

a). The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia.

b). For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be watched.

c). The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force the fontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time at the same time as the penetration by the Air Force* before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization.*

For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for approval.

5). Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces

a). Army: The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns - the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time - must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or

(* - * passages between asterisks occur only in this version not in Item 5)

H1145 - 0036

ITEM 11 (cont.)

airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of *frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, of forcing a battle,* of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest possible motorized and armored units using to the full the first successes of the Assault columns and the effects of the Air Force operations. The rear cover provided for the West must be limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held back for the time being will be decided in my special order. Preparations must however, be made to enable security detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during the strategic concentration "Gruen". *Independent of this, a first security garison must be improvized from the engineers at present employed in constructing fortifications and from formations of the Labor Corps. The remaining frontiers as well as East Prussia, are to be Reichly weakly protected. But, alway depending on the political situation, the transfers by sea, of a part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into the Reich must be taken into account.

b). Air Force. While leaving a minimum of defensive forces in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first section of the army. (see 5a) The most important task of the Air Force is the destruction of the Czechoslovakian Air Force and their supply bases within the shortest possible time, in order to eliminate the possibility of its employment as well as that of Russian and French air forces, should the occasion arise, against the strategic concentration and penetration of the German army and agains the German "Lebensraum." Next to this the crippling of enemy mobilization, of the government and armed forces, as well as the delaying of the strategic concentration of the Czech Army by attacks on communication installations, mobilization and government centers can be of considerable importance to the initial successes of the army. At points in the frontier area where stronger sections of the Czechoslovakian Army *or the depth of the defensive system* might make the success of the sudden breakthrough of the German Land-attack questionable, the employment of adequate bomber forces must be assured. Czechoslovakian industrial installations are to be spared as far as the course of operations permits. Retaliatory attacks against the population will be carried out only with my permission. Centers of air defense are to be created throughout BERLIN, the central German industrial area and the RUHR area,* and gradually prepared even now in an inconspicuous fashion.*

c). Navy. The Navy will assist the army operations by employing the DANUBE-flotilla. For this purpose the flotilla will be under the orders of C-in-C Army. As regards the conduct of naval warfare at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. These measures must be confined to the absolutely necessary extent. Their inconspicuousness must be guaranteed. It

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in ITEM 5)

H1145 - 0037

ITEM 11 (cont.)

is of decisive importance that all actions, which might influence the political attitude of the European Great Powers unfavorably, be avoided.

6). Tasks of the War Economy:

In war economy it is essential that in the field of the armament industry a maximum-deployment of forces is made possible through increased supples. In the course of operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of the total war- economic strength - by rapidly reconnoitring and restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works instalations - insofar as military operations permit - can be of decisive importance to us.

7). *All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force.*

signed ADOLF HITLER

Certified copy

signed Zeitzler

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in ITEM 5)

H1145 - 0038

ITEM 12

L I a H

Berlin, 9 June 1938.

SHORT SURVEY OF ARMAMENT OF THE CZECH ARMY

1. SMALL ARMS

Armed uniformly with Mauser Rifle, Model 24, calibre 7.92 mm (similar to German Rifle 98). Also grenade launcher for rifle grenades is attached to the rifle.

2. MACHINE GUNS

Light MG Z.B. 26, wieht 9 Kg, 20 round magazine.

Heavy MG, temporarily the MG "Schwarzlose" which has been improved in range. Super-heavy MG, 20 mm MG, Oerlikon system has been introduced (especially for active air defence), other models are being tested.

3. MORTARS

8.1cm Stokes-Brandt, range 3000 m.

9cm light Skoda mortar, model 17, range 1200 m.

14cm medium mortar, model 18, range 2500 m.

26cm heavy mortar, model 17, range 2700 m.

4. INFANTRY GUNS FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK DEFENSE

Several models are being tested, some of them twin barrel guns.

Calibre 37 - 40 mm and/or 66 - 70 mm.

5. ARTILLERY PIECES

a. Light and Mountain Artillery:

8cm field gun, model 17, range 10 km

8cm field gun, model 30, range 13.5 km (can also be used as an AA gun)

10cm light field howitzer, model 14/19, range 10 km.

7.5 Mountain gun, model 15, range 7 km.

10cm Mountain howitzer, model 16/19, range 10 km.

b. Heavy Artillery:

10.5cm gun, model 35, range 18 km.

15cm howitzer, model 14/16, range 8 km.

ITEM 12

15cm howitzer, model 25, range 12 km.

15cm gun, model 15/16, range 20 km.

24cm gun, model 16, range 36 km.

21cm howitzer (Mörser) gun, model 18, range 10 km.

30.5cm howitzer (Mörser) gun, model 16, range 12.4 km.

Also in use are French 15.5cm howitzers.

c. A A Artillery

9cm AA-gun, model 12/20 (stationary), range 12 km.

8.35 cm AA-gun, model 22/24 horizontal range 18 km, vertical range 12 km.

7.65cm AA-gun, model 35, horizontal range 16 km, vertical range 11 km.

6.6cm AA-gun, model is being tested.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

H1145 - 0039

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

FUEHRER'S QUESTIONS ON 9 JUNE 1938

H1145 – 0040

H1145 - 0041

ITEM 13

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

2 copies

1st copy

Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army?

Answer:

Arming and equipping of the Army with new means of war is progressing, thanks to the excellent production capacity of the Czech armament industry.

The armament was built up from the weapons of the old Austrian Army. It is slowly and steadily being modernized.

In Detail:

Artillery: Light field artillery. At present the old armament from the Austrian Army predominates.
Mountain Artillery: the same.
Medium artillery. New armament predominates.
Heavy artillery, old armament predominates.
Infantry Weapons: The following are available:
a uniform new infantry rifle; a uniform new light MG;
a uniform old improved heavy MG.
Equipment of heavy infantry weapons (AT-guns, Infantry Howitzers, Mortars) and tanks is modern, but still incomplete.

A new modern AA-gun has been introduced, but is not yet available in sufficient numbers.

Reserves of weapons and ammunition seem to be guaranteed.

SUMMARY: The Czech Army must be considered up to date as far as armament and equipment are concerned.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

H1145 - 0042

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS.
(Cont'd)

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

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Question 2: How many battalions, etc. are employed in the West for the construction of emplacements?

Answer:

Up to now the following have been employed on fortifications:

The 36th Infantry Battalion

The 10th Infantry Howitzer Company

The 12th Anti-Tank Company

The 10th Battery

The 30th 1/3 Engineer Battalions

In addition:

The 78th German Labor Service Battalion , and later the 190th German Labour Corps battalion.

In addition, the Commander of Army Group 2 (General Adam) has the authority to draw still further troops from his 4th Corps for the construction of emplacements if he deems it necessary.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

(Pencilled notes by Sehmundt):

Number of troops

Production possibilities

H1145-0043

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

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Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czecho Slovakia still occupied in unreduced strength?

Answer:

The troops have been withdrawn to some extent from the fortifications and are housed in local billets. The fortifications themselves are guarded. The barriers at the frontiers are opened.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

H1145-0044

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

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Question 4: Frontier protection in the West?

Answer:

In the West as at the other frontiers, the first frontier protection is undertaken by the VGAD, then the Frontier Guard. This protection by the Frontier Guard is directly at the frontier. At the same time as the Frontier Guard at the frontier, the fortification installations, which lie further back, receive security garrisons (reserve personnel).

Strength of the Frontier Guard on the Western Frontier:

15,200 men with 1,250 light MG's.

For further details on the frontier guard see appendix.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

ITEM 14

L I a

Berlin, 18 June 1938

S. O. Only

Access only through Officer

1. DRAFT FOR THE NEW DIRECTIVE

(1st copy)

In three parts.

H1145 - 0045

H1145-0046

ITEM 14 MOST SECRET 4 copies
1st copy

Written by an officer.

S. O. Only

Access only through Officer

Part 1

GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. There is no danger of a preventive war by foreign states against Germany.

Germany has not committed herself to any military alliances which would automatically force Germany into a warlike conflict of foreign powers.

The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.

Thereby, friends, interested parties and enemies can be called upon to take part in this scheme and other powers can remain indifferent even though they could not be previously placed with absolute certainty in one of these categories.

However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.

2. The preparations of the Armed Forces must cover:

a) thorough preparation of the action against Czechoslovakia ("Fall Gruen"). See Part 2.

b) Maintenance of the previous "Fall Rot" (strategic concentration with the main effort against the West.) See Part 2.

c) Special preparations, mainly in the form of studies and deliberations within the Supreme Commands. See part 3.

d) Preparatory measures, in case German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power. See number 3.

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ITEM 14

3. If in the midst of peace, German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power, armed resistance will be offered without any special order.

Therefore, the branches of the Armed Forces must empower their competent Commanders on the frontier or on the coast to take on their own authority, all measures necessary to repulse the enemy attack should such a case occur. (See Reich Defense Law (RVG) para. 2).

In no event, however, may the German Reich frontier be crossed by troops or aircraft, nor any foreign territory violated, without my order.

It will not be considered a violation of German territory (see 1st sentence of this number) if single sentries or patrols cross the frontier unintentionally and accidentally or through the overeagerness of a subordinate commander, or if aircraft fly over the frontier due to faulty navigation, or warships sail in our German territorial waters with obviously no hostile intentions.

4. This directive concerns the uniform preparation for war and the general strategic considerations applying to the outbreak of the war. It will be augmented as necessitated by the various strategic concentrations by regulations dealing with matters of Special Administration and War Economy.

The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be issued by me from time to time.

K (Initialled by Keitel)

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

H1145 - 0048

ITEM 14

Written by an officer MOST SECRET 4 copies
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S. O. only

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Part 2

STRATEGIC CONCENTRATIONS

1. Action against Czecho-Slovakia ("Fall Gruen")

The directive, issued as OKW Nr 42/38 Most ~~Secret~~ S. O. only L I dated 30 May 1938, remains in force. Regulations ~~dealing~~ with special matters, Administration and War Economy relative to "Fall Gruen" are still to be issued.

2. Two Front War with the main effort in the West ("Fall Rot")

Since even a war against us started by the Western Nations must, in view of the situation today, begin with the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, the preparation of strategic concentration for a war with the main effort by the Army and Air Force against the West, is no longer of primary importance.

The preparations made to date for the event ("Rot"), however, remain in effect. They contribute, as far as the Army is concerned, towards camouflaging and screening the other strategic concentration and serve, in the case of the Luftwaffe, as a preparation for the shifting of the main effort from the East to the West, which may, under certain circumstances, suddenly become necessary. They also serve as preliminary work for future possibilities of war in the West.

It is left to C in C Army to decide how far the Army strategic concentration "Rot", prepared by OKH for the beginning of the new mobilization year 38/39, will be issued to subordinates.

The tasks which arise for the Navy in "Fall Rot" will be the same as those should "Fall Gruen" be extended to include the Western European nations. The naval preparations are therefore to be continued with the previous objective.

J

K (Initialled by Keitel and Jodl)

H1145 - 0049

ITEM 14

Written by an officer

2. DRAFT

MOST SECRET Berlin, 7 July 38

2 copies
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Part 3

CONSIDERATIONS

I. In connection with "Gruen".

How the political situation will develop during the execution or after the conclusion of "Gruen" cannot be predicted. Therefore the Armed Forces will confine themselves to the preparation of the measures given in Part I, Number 3, to "Fall Gruen" and "Fall Rot". However, it seems expedient to make at least theoretical considerations and calculations for several possible eventualities, to avoid being mentally unprepared. These considerations would have to cover:

a) What would have to be done if other nations intervened against us during the execution of "Gruen" - contrary to our expectations.

b) What should be done after the conclusion of "Gruen".

To a)

If, during the execution of "Gruen", France intervenes against us, the measures provided in "Fall Gruen" come into force. The primary essential in this connection is to hold the Western fortifications, until the execution of the action "Gruen" permits forces to be freed. Should France be supported by England, in this it will have small effect at first on the land-war. It is the duty of the Air Force, the Navy, and the OKW (War Economy Staff, Defense, Armed Forces Communications), however, to carry out farsighted deliberations in their sphere.

Among the Eastern powers, Russia is the most likely to intervene. This, in the beginning at any rate, will probably consist of reinforcement of the Czech Air Force and Armament. However, the decision must not be neglected concerning what measures are to be taken if Russia were to come to the point of starting a Naval and Air war against us or even wish to penetrate into East Prussia, through the border states.

In the case of a penetration by Poland, we must hold the Eastern fortifications and East Prussia, using the Frontier Guard and other formations, until the conclusion of the action "Gruen" once more gives us freedom of movement.

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To b) If the action "Gruen" takes place still during this Mobilization year, we must be in the position after the conclusion of "Gruen" to put a provisional strategic concentration quickly into force.

In connection with the latter, further to what was said in part 1, number 3, it is of primary importance to safeguard the German frontiers, including the new addition by the Armed Forces, and still have the bulk of the Field Forces and the Air Force at our disposal. It would have to be possible to put such a future strategic concentration, "Frontier Protection," into force separately for the various frontiers.

II. Independent of "Fall Gruen"

Germany will not refrain from occupying the Memel-territory by a lightning blow in the case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict occurring. The deliberations on this eventuality must cancel the directive issued 18 March 1938 (OKW Nr 472/38 g. Kdos L Ia).

III. General

The branches of the Armed Forces are still allowed to deliberate further on the matter contained in Section I) and II). These however, may be carried out only as theoretical studies within the Supreme Commands without the participation of subordinate authorities.

Z

K (Initialled by Keitel and Zeitzler)

H1145 - 0051

ITEM 16

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 1233/38 Most Secret L Ia

Berlin, 22 July 1938

MOST SECRET

2 Copies
1st Copy

To:

Major Schmundt or deputy

I enclose a conference report. Your attention is requested.(e.g. the remark of Chief OKW).

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

by order

signed Zeitzler

Submitted to the Fuehrer on 1.8.

Schm (pencil note by Schmundt)

Stamp:
Adjutants' Office of the
Armed Forces to the Fuehrer
and Reich Chancellor
Recd. 26? July 1938 App. 1
No. 82/38 Most Secret

H1145 - 0052

ITEM 16 pencil note: Maj. Schmundt
1 copy 3rd
report to
Fuehrer

L Ia
to L No. 1233/38 Most Secret

Berlin, 12 July 1938

2 Copies
1st Copy

Conference Notes

K (initialled
by Keitel)

MOST SECRET

OKH issues new manoeuvre intentions for 1938. Reason for alteration: development of the Western fortifications and spreading of the foot-and-mouth-disease.

Details:

1). Of the previously intended training manoeuvres, the following remain:

Fall exercise for the I Army Corps
Training exercise for the XI Army Corps
Fortress warfare exercise for the 1st Army Group Command

2). New training manoeuvres:

a). Fighting for fortifications

b). Coordination with the Air Force

c). Cooperation between ground attack, airplanes and field units commencing 1 August in the exercise area

d). Mobilization exercises for the Staffs

e). Supply and communications control

f). Chemical defense and cleansing of contaminated areas

3). Training Manoeuvres for armored divisions:

1st Armored Division up to 24 October at GRAFENWOHR, Corps HQ of the XVI Army Corps will also be there

2nd Armored Division remains in Austria

3rd Armored Division up to 24 September in KOENIGSBRUECK, from 25 September near BRESLAU West of the ODER

4). Training Manoeuvres for motorized divisions ready to march:

2nd motorized Division in/area A, from 28 September, in NEUHAMMER exercise

29th motorized Division in exercise area B

20th motorized Division in exercise area C

13th motorized Division in exercise area D

1st light Division in exercise area E

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ITEM 16 (cont'd)

Commencement of the exercises not before 12 September, the end 24 November.

5). Terrain exercises for units ready to march:

These take place in the following Wehrkreise:

II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XVII,

commencement of Terrain exercises: 20 September

6). Training manoeuvres for the mountain divisions composed as on mobilization:

2nd Mountain Division in area STEYR - PICHL - WEGER
3rd Mountain Division in area SEMMERING - BRUCK
commencement of exercises: 26 September, End: 24 November

7). Training Manoeuvres for Training Divisions (Reserve Divisions):

a). 15 August to 13 September:
Training Division VII Army Corps (69th Division) Field units
Exercise Area NEUHAMMER,
Training Division IX Army Corps (52nd Division) Field units
Exercise Area GROSSBORN,
Training Division III Army Corps (68th Division) Field units
Exercise Area JUETERBOG.

b). 9 September to 24 November:
Training Division IV Army Corps (56th Division) Field units
Exercise Area OHRDRUF
Training Division VIII Army Corps (62nd Division) Field units
Exercise Area SENNE
Training Division XIII Army Corps (73rd Division) Field units
Exercise Area MUENDINGEN
Training Division XII Army Corps (79th Division) Field units
Exercise Area WAHN
From about 24 September these 4 divisions will train West of the RHINE.

8). New dispositions:

a). Truck Regiment 616, 20 September to 24 October disposition by III Army Corps.

b). Army Artillery:

6 battalions: 15 August to 3 September disposition and training.
11 battalions: 9 September to 24 October disposition and training.

Of these, beginning 24 September:

5 battalions, to Reserve divisions West of the RHINE
6 battalions to Terrain exercises of troops "ready to march"

c). Engineer Battalions:

3 Engineer Battalions, 9 September to 24 October, disposition and training.

H1145-0054

ITEM 16 (cont'd)

of these 2 battalions, 20 September, to terrain training of troops "ready to march"
1 battalion, from 20 September to Reserve Division West of the Rhine.

d). Artillery Intelligence Regiments:

4 battalions and 2 Telephone communications companies (motorized)
9 September to 24 November.

Disposition and training; from 28 September, the battalions will be situated in the neighborhood of BRESLAU, GRAFENWOEHR , NEWHAMMER, INGOLSTADT.

9). Employment of Engineer Battalions on the Western fortifications:

Employment of Engineer Battalions extended for no longer than 3 weeks, also 7 Engineer battalions will be added.

10). Reich Party Rally and Harvest Festival:

Participation remains as intended.

11). Foreign Military Delegations:

The foreign Military Delegations as well as foreign military attaches will be invited to attend the fall exercises of the I Army Corps.

Z (initialled by ZEITZLER)

H1145 - 0055

ITEM 17

Chief Section L — Written by General Staff Officer

MOST SECRET

S.O. Only — Berlin, 24 August 1938

access only through Officer

1 Copy

TIMING OF THE X- ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES

The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

The army's efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands that the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 1.

To this the following must be said:

Operation (aktion) Gruen will be set in motion by means of an "incident" in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provcation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance.

It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.

It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.

On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.

If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.

For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous manoeuvres and exercises.

Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in PRAGUE is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)

H1145 - 0056

ITEM 17 (cont'd)

If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.

In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall)

It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time - insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.

I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points.

J 26/8

Notes:

Submitted on 30.8

The Fuehrer will act on these lines.

On 31.8 Col. v. S. Jodl notified. Schm 31.8 Col. Jodl

(initialled by Jodl)

H1145 - 0057

ITEM 18

CONFERENCE

on 3 September 38
at the BERGHOF

Present: The Fuhrer
Generaloberet v. Brauchitsch
General of Artillery Keitel
Major Schmundt

I.

Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch — Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to "exercise areas" for "Gruen". Field units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From here will then be ready for action. When X Day becomes known, field units carry out exercises in opposite directions.

Fuhrer — Has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march away. Carry out camoflage exercises everywhere.

? — OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27 September.

II.

The Fuhrer — Expresses different opinion on employment of troops for "Gruen". Aspects for the 2nd Army (OS) are smallest. Strongest Cz. fortifications there. Waste of troops; thrust in the 10th Army area, however, is promising. Roadblocks prepared everywhere in addition also in 2nd Army area. No reason for hinderance. The Czechs will stop opposite 2nd army and keep assault army ready east of PRAGUE. A thrust against it into the heart of Cz. is to be made. Thrust in the 14th army area will fail because of means of transport. Therefore assemble all mot. and arm'd divisions with 10th army and employ in the thrust. Once we are through there, the South front, which is built up opposite our 12th army in 3 defense lines, will collapse. An army in the heart of BOHEMIA will bring about the decision. Possible repetition of VERDUN in case of 2nd army. An attack there would mean bleeding to death for a task which cannot be accomplished.

v. Brauchitsch — Has objections because of the state of the mot. divisions, supply and untrained leaders.

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ITEM 18

The Fuhrer: The course now planned corresponds to Cz. expectations. Opposite the 10th Army the enemy is not always in concrete emplacements. Possibility here of drawing in the Henlein people (uniforms). The line here is very far back. Cooperation between 10th and 12th armies. We must add motorized units to army. As formerly the "Prussian Cavalry." How else can we gather experiences? Decisive is the coordination of equal speeds. Breakthrough in sector of 2nd army not so rapid, so that a tactical success can be turned into a strategic one. The Fuhrer gives orders for the development of the Western fortifications: improvement of advance positions around AACHEN and SAARBRUCKEN. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.

Certified.

SCHMUNDT, Major on the General Staff

BERGHOF, 4 Sept 1938

* * *

(In Schmundt's writing)

H1145 - 0059

ITEM 19

S. O. Only

MOST SECRET

DISCUSSION

Nuremberg, 9 Sept to 10 Sept, 2200 to 0330.

Present: Fuhrer
General oberst v. Brauchitsch
General Halder
General Keitel
Major Schmundt
Hauptmann Engel
Hauptmann v. Below (?)

General Halder states reasons for operational plan "Gruen". Mission: to prevent retreat of Cz. Army from Moravia - Bohemia area. To beat army. To bring about rapid decision. Mission can be accomplished by pincer attack in the direction of OLUMUTZ and BRUUN to be undertaken by 2nd and 14th Armies. Difficult transport situation in Austria. Therefore main effort in 2nd Army area. Cz. frontier can only be lightly held. Withdrawal certain on part of Cz forces. Several defensive lines favorable by terrain will delay second thrusts and allow time to be gained for a Cz retreat, and so retain a rear position. This is to be avoided. The Bohemian Morávian heights which will confront the attacker in the last phase will favor probable Cz line of action. The pincer attack makes a "rear attack" from behind these heights possible. This operation will definitely succeed. Reserves at first mainly local. Further reserves near and south of Prague. Opponent won't have time to form further reserves. Opponent does not possess closed armoured forces. They are distributed and consist of light units.

2nd Army. Weaknesses opposite its sector recognized. Installations only partly completed. Mostly lack armd cupolas. There are great gaps. Olumutz will be reached on the second day. OPPA is no obstacle, can be crossed by tanks as well as Inf. No armd forces opposing. FREUDENTAL only 35 men garrison? So-called light motorized forces on right flank are no danger. Consist party of Mounted units and will be engaged by adjoining Army. Were the attack, against expectations, to fail, then under no circumstances "bleed to death" before the position. Strategic concentration to be flexible. Rear sections will then be brought up to the points where success has been achieved. Cz fears the GLAZ mountain area. Only demonstrations to be staged in this area; there will be a tie up of Cz forces. To provide cover eastwards tanks will be valuable.

On the rest of the mountain front: 4th (9 ?) Corps, and in the frontier sector demonstrations must be staged to tie up forces.

12th and 14th Armies will work together. Their columns must necessarily support one another during the thrust and cause the front to collapse. Bohemia only weakly occupied at frontier: 1 Division to 120 kms. Operation therefore promising. After the thrust in a northerly direction 12 Army forces east and "races" for Brunn. The enemy will not be able to employ reserves according to plan.

10th Army faces PILSEN RIEGEL which is strongly fortified. Bad roads. Tanks must break through here and establish bridgeheads for following up forces. Forces of the next wave will be brought up by truck units. After the 3rd and 4th Mobilization day 6 further divisions will be brought up to the 2nd and 3rd line and can be employed where success is in the balance.

H1145 - 0060

ITEM 19

The Fuhrer: We should not plan the action on the operations as we desire them, but take into consideration the probable course of action pursued by the enemy. With regard to his course of action two factors are decisive:
1. At the time of our rearmament between 1934 and 1938 our opponent must have endeavoured to secure himself against a tearing of the East-West Communication, in his case probably between TRAPPAU and NIKOLSBURG. Against us this would imply the building of fortifications on the Upper Silesian frontier. In the South an agreement with Austria would achieve a defense north of the Danube, or an advance to the DANUBE to protect the Southern flank.
2. The latter is no longer possible. Therefore, as a result of the situation created in March 1938, it is all the more probable that they have increased their fortifications opposite our 2nd army. The enemy must hold there - otherwise there is no sense in holding the remaining front. Hence here the best regiments and fortifications are to be expected. Holding of the front facing the 2nd Army will decide the "To be or Not to be" of Cz. There is no doubt that the planned pincer movement is the most desirable solution and should take place. But its success is nevertheless too uncertain for it to be depended on. Especially as a rapid success is necessary from a political point of view. The first 8 days are politically decisive, within that week a far-reaching territorial gain must be achieved. Our artillery (21©cm Howitzers) not adequate against fortifications. Where an attack is expected the element of surprise is ruled out. Besides from experience difficult to refrain from an action that achieves only part-success. More and more units are thrown into breaks and bleeding-to-death which one wanted to avoid, sets in (VERDUN!!) Tanks are used up and are not available for the subsequent territory-gaining operation. The consequence is that motorized divisions have to advance without tanks. ("Tables Turned")
Also the objectives of the motorized units are not too far-removed and can be gained without fighting, so that they could be equally well gained by infantry troops. The motorized divisions will not be able to influence a decision to any extent. It is the task of motorized forces to bridge areas free of the enemy. Where an attack opens up a large, free space the commitment of motorized forces is justified. Compare with the use of army cavalry at the beginning of the 1914 war. It is catastrophic for tanks to have to stop and wait for infantry. This contradicts all laws of logic. In the 14th army sector fortifications can only have been begun since March. Hence, thrust toward BRUNN will be easier. 2nd Pz Div can therefore be left there. However, this division should operate with the 29th motorized division. Therefore the 29th must not arrive on the evening of the 2nd day. The 2nd Pz must constitute the advance column of the 29th Div (Mot.) Are the road conditions suitable for the 29th? The 13th Division, which has no prospects of success as a Mot. division with the 12th Army, is to be transferred to the REICHENAU Army together with 2nd Motorized Div. Thus 2 chances for victory will be created.
If pincer movement has no success, 10th Army will open way for 12th Army, bringing strong forces into the heart of the country. If both operations are successful, this means the end of Cz. In place of the two motorized divisions it is preferable to mobilize two further divisions which are to be brought up in trucks and buses. For the 10th Army the turn Northeast toward PRAGUE may become necessary.

General Oberst v. BRAUCHITSCH: Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divs. (ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of Sept., if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23rd, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.

ITEM 19.

The Fuhrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.

General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled.

v. Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.

Fuhrer: Trained men should be distributed among newly formed divisions on 2nd line.

BRAUCHITSCH: Will be investigated. Implies change of mobilization orders if war orders already in the hands of the people.

General Construction Inspector Dr. Todt(late brought into the conference): Delays in unloading of material through slow changeover in timetable of RRs only from 15 September. Transports must be in their appointed positions by X minus 11. Air zone to take 2nd place to the Infantry zone. Build battery positions.

Certified

/s/ SCHMUNDT

Major on Gen. Staff

H1145-0061

H1145-0062

ITEM 20

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

Nuremberg, 10 September 1938

Stamp
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer Reich Chancellor
Received 19 September 1938

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

TOP SECRET

1). The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.

2). The Chief of OKW decides on the First commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competeney he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.

3). For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

(signed) ADOLF HITLER

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2038/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc

T 9.9

Distribution:

C-in-C of the Army
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force
C-in-C of the Navy
Reichsminister of the Interior
for the attention of Ministerial Director Dr. Danchwerts
Head of Reich Labor Service through Adwin Office (VOA)

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H1145 - 0063

ITEM 21

Berlin, 14 September 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2044/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc

12 Copies

Stamp
Office of the Adjutant of the Armed Forces attached to the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Received 19 Sept. 1938
Reg. No. 198/35
Despatched Schm
Clerk (initialled by Schmundt)

SUBJECT: Employment of Reich Labor Service for Manoeuvres with Wehrmacht.

I. Effective 15 September the following units will be under command of the C-in-C of the Army

1). The RAD forces or the light road construction battalions.

2). Those parent units of construction troops which are to be formed from personnel from 2 Gau Commands, 21 RAD Group Commands, and 91 RAD Battalions of Wehrkreis. HQs VII, IX and XIII, and set up at Army Group HQ 2 (Heeresgruppenkommando) for the purpose of carrying out exercises within the areas of Wehrkreis HQs V and XII.

3). a). The staff of Labor Gau W (Arbeitsgaustab) and the section and group staffs of the RAD employed on the construction of the Western fortifications and also RAD Battalions with the exception of those branches of the RAD attached to the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force (compare Section 8).

b). Labor Gaus XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXII come under the Supreme Command of the Army only in matters affecting the defence of the country. Those RAD units from these Labor Gaus employed at the moment for purposes of the Country's Kultur etc. will retain these tasks for the time being, Labor Service for Girls (AWJ) is excepted from coming under the control of the Supreme Command of the Army.

c). It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks to those sections of the RAD named in a). and b). above, that in accordance with Appendix 7 to the Army Mobilization Plan for Deputy Gau Commands, Deputy Group Commands and Guard Units will remain with the RAD if and when mobilization takes place.

4). The C-in-C of the Army and Reichs Labor Leader are requested to discuss all details under 1 and 3 direct.

II). 5). Light road construction battalions are training-units of the Army. Their members are regarded as having been drafted into the Armed Forces for manoeuvre purposes and are soldiers.

6). The members of remaining formations as per 2 and 3 who have been taken exclusively from the RAD will remain RAD leaders or men until mobilization.

But it is possible that they will have to be attached to the Army for administration or that the army must furnish money if difficulties are encountered in prompt payment of the men.

The C-in-C of the Army and the Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle details by direct agreement.

H1145-0064

ITEM 21 (cont'd)

7). In case of mobilization the regulations laid down in Appendix 7 of the plan for the mobilization of the army come into effect automatically and apply also to those exercise formations for which there have up to now been restrictive regulations with regard to their coming fully under the command of the Army.

III). 8). Those RAD staffs and Battalions made over to the Luftwaffe, in the Limes area will be under command of the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force beginning September 15. The same regulations apply in essence to them.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

By Order

Signed Keitel

Distribution:

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HOFMANN

Oberst (Reserve)

H1145-0065

ITEM 22

MOST SECRET

Berlin, 16 September 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA No. 194/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L Ia

7 Copies
5th Copy

S.O. Only

19.9.38
Schm

Access only through Officer

Subject: Preparations on part of Reichsbahn etc.

The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.

Therefore the train-loads for the LIMES-job will have to be cut down after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.

The Supreme Command of the Army (5th Division of the Army General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with the authorities concerned.

However, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible even after 20th September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work on the Limes.

Reports should be submitted on what can be done in this direction.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed Keitel

Distribution:

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General Inspector for Roads	1 (Copy 3)	Oberest on the General Staff

Major Schmundt

5

H1145 - 0066

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont'd)

ITEM 24

Berlin, September 16, 1939

MOST SECRET

30 Copies
4th Copy

T 9.9

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2120/38 Most Secret WFA/ L IIc

Stamp
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Rec. 19th Sept. 1938,
Enclosures
Reg. No. 199138
Despatched
Clerk

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

Subject: Employment of the Reich Labor Service (RAD)

1). The following RAD forces will receive military training; in accordance with the instructions of the C-in-C of the Army:

From the area of the IInd Army Korps (AKs)	7 Battalions
IIIrd	2 Battalions
IVth	31 Battalions
Vth	1 Battalion
VIth	78 Battalions
VIIth	1 Battalion
IXth	65 Battalions
Xth	84 Battalions
XIth	33 Battalions

For the time being these battalions are still part of the RAD in matters regarding personnel, administration, and discipline.

2). The C-in-C of the Army and Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle all details by direct agreement.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

By Order

Jodl

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H1145 - 0067

ITEM 25

(Handwritten note) MOST SECRET S. O. ONLY

LAST NIGHT CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN FUHRER AND OBERSTLEUTNANT KOECHLING. DURATION OF CONFERENCE 7 MINUTES. LT. COL KOECHLING REMAINS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO OKW. HE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO KONRAD HENLEIN IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. HE RECEIVED FAR-REACHING MILITARY PLENARY POWERS FROM THE FUHRER. THE SUDETEN GERMAN FREE CORPS REMAINS RESPONSIBLE TO KONRAD HENLEIN ALONE. PURPOSE: PROTECTION OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS AND MAINTENANCE OF DISTURBANCES AND CLASHES.
THE FREE CORPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY. ARMAMENT ONLY WITH AUSTRIAN WEAPONS. ACTIVITIES OF FREE CORPS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(Pencil Note) 1045, 18 Sept 38
radioed to Capt.
Engel, Berlin.

H1145-0068

ITEM 26

(Handwritten note) MOST SECRET S. O. ONLY

(In ink)
18.9
38
1030
vb

GERMAN 2nd ARMY - COSEL - 7 Inf. Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, 1 Light Div, of these the following arrive on 1st X day: Two-thirds of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, and 1 Inf Div on trucks.

On 2nd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div.
On 3rd X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 5th X Day: 2 Inf Divs from 7th day on 1 Inf Div and one light Div.

8th Army: - FREIBURG - 4 Inf Divs. The following is the timetable for arrival:
On 2nd X Day: two-thirds of one Inf Div
On 3rd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div
On 4th and 5th X-Day: One Inf Div each day.
4th Army Corps - Herrenhut. 2 Inf Divs of which one will arrive on the 1st day, the other on the 3rd day.

10th Army:- SCHWANDORF - 3 Inf Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 3 Mot Inf Divs. They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div and 1 Armd Div. 1 Light Div, 2 Mot Inf Divs.
On 2nd X Day: 1 Inf Div., 1 Mot Inf Div.
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

12th Army:- PASSAU - 7 Inf Div's, 1 Mountain Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, Regt. They arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div, 1 Mountain Div.
On 2nd X-Day: 2 Inf Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks
On 4th X Day: 2 Inf Div's.
On 7th X Day: 1 Inf Div.
On 8th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

14th Army: - VIENNA - 1 Inf Div, 2 Mountain Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 1 Mot Inf Div. N N Mot (?) They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: one-third of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, 1 Mot. Div.
On 2nd X Day: 2/3 of one Inf Div, 1 Light Div.
On 3rd X Day: 2 Mountain Divs.

END

Reich War Ministry / Naval Communication Service

MOST SECRET 18.9

Renewed attention is called to strictest observance of secrecy regarding following message. Noted. Message begins -
(There follows a repetition of the above telegram in its exact form.)

Any questions?

H1145 - 0069

ITEM 27

Army Appointments Held

Army Group Command:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf Adam CofS : Gen. of Inf Wietersheim G-3 : Lt. Co. Muller
1st Army HQ:	C-in-C: Ge. of Arty Beck CofS : Maj. Gen. v. Apell G-3 : Col. v. Greiffenberg
2nd Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. v. Rundstedt CofS : BrigGen v. Salmuth G-3 : Lt.Col.Hasse
3rd Army HQ:	C-in-C: Ge.Arty v. Kuechler CofS : Brig.Gen.Hollidt G-3 : Lt.Col.Wagner
4th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. (for special duties) v. Hamerstein CofS : Maj.Gen. Viebahn G-3 : Lieut.Col. Metz
5th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf Liebmann CofS : Brig. Gen. v. Sodenstern G-3 : Col. Duvert
7th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf (for special duties) Baron Zeutter v. Lotzen CofS : Brig. Gen. Modl G-3 : Col. v. Witzleben
8th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. v. Bock CofS : Brig. Gen. Felber G-3 : Col. Hauffe
10th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. Reichenau CofS : Brig. Gen. Bernard G-3 : Col. Dostler
12th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. Ritter (for special duties) v. Leeb CofS : Maj Gen. v. Lewinsky, known as v. Manstein G-3 : Lt. Col. Blumentritt
14th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf List CofS : Maj Gen. Ruoff G-3 : Col. Wohler

ITEM 29

Chief, OKW — Berlin, 21 Sept 1938

If the Czech Government accepts terms:

a. Cession of Sudeten German territory

b. Plebiscite in Czech-German territories,

The following military measures are to be considered:

1. The withdrawal by the Czechs from this territory of troops, police and Gendarmerie and other military units.
2. The immediate surrender of arms in these territories.
3. The immediate surrender of all fortifications in the areas with all arms and equipment.
4. The immediate evacuation of fortifications by the military outside the above territories.
5. The withdrawal of all military power behind a security line, which will include the fortifications under (4).
6. The right of the German Wehrmacht to use all public transportation and communications, especially the railroads, for military purposes.
7. The right to fly over the above territories and to maintain Air security up to the security line.
8. The occupation of territories to be ceded including the adjoining railroad junctions, communications installations, towns, airfields, etc. inland beyond the last fortification line.
9. Pacification and security of the Plebiscite Areas by:
   a. German Police (originally)
   b. International Police (later for plebiscite)
10. Demobilization of the entire Czech armed forces in the remaining area of the country, discharge of all reserves, etc.
11. Immediate discharge of all Sudeten-Germans in the armed forces from the whole of Czechoslovakia to be sent home into Sudeten-Germany.
12. Closing down of entire armament industry until after the end of all negotiations.

H1145-0070

H1145-0071

ITEM 29

13. a. Prohibition of any new fortifications and field fortifications opposite the security line.

    b. Destruction of all existing fortifications which are situated beyond the future German borders.

14. Demand further cession of territory on military grounds, namely the Pressburg bridgehead, the area northwest of Pilsen, the Eger sector west of the Elbe to Laun.

15. Security line must be 25 km from the territory being ceded to Germany or the territory being put to the vote. (See number 5).

16. Cessation, immediately, of all military Intelligence work against Germany. Violation will be considered breach of neutrality.

17. Immediate pardon and release of all Germans and Sudeten-Germans, convicted of espionage.

18. Transfer of all Czech Air Force personnel to their peace time garrisons and prohibiting of all military flying operations.

19. Prohibition of destruction or sabotage of any military installations, including ground installations of the Air Force, in the territories to be ceded.

20. The closing down and handing over to the German armed forces of all radio transmitters of a military, official or private nature in the areas to be ceded.

21. The handing over of all Railroad networks including rolling stock , undamaged.

22. The handing over of all Public Utilities (power houses, gas works, etc.) undamaged.

23. No materials of any kind to be transferred (such as raw materials, provisions, livestock, etc.)

24. Prohibition of import of war equipment of any kind.

25. Demobilization of Danube patrol and security vessels.

H1145-0072

ITEM 30

Bayreuth 134

Pencil Note: Written by Schmundt: Not sent off. Sehm

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUDETEN-GERMAN FREE CORPS

Herr Benesch has dissolved the Sudeten-German Party and believes that he will thus be able to destroy the unity of the Sudeten-German radical group and to deal the death blow to the Sudeten-Germans. Konrad Henlein knew the answer to this. He issued a call on 17.9.38 for the formation of a Sudeten-German Free Corps. Within a few hours, thousands of Sudeten-Germans had already rallied to the colors all along the border. Thousands who were burning to fight for their tortured homeland were forced, to their great disappointment, to remain at their places of work, because it was impossible, in such a short period of time, to induct, equip and arm the masses of enthusiastic volunteers. For even in the first few hours after the appeal, (probably the first instance in the History of the Free Corps) shock troops of the Free Corps began, in extremely daring operations, to secure the escape of their countrymen who had been hounded out of their homeland by their torturers.

Since 19 Sept. - in more than 300 missions - the Free Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack (defense)* and with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities: more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG's and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from serious loses in dead and wounded suffered by the enemy (The Czech Terrorists)*.

Thousands of members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps stand shoulder to shoulder on the frontiers of Germany. They are inspired by but one desire: The freedom of the homeland within Adolf Hitler's Greater Germany.

For Konrad Henlein

The Chief of Staff

*The superimposed corrections represent actual ink corrections on the original manuscript.

H1145 - 0073

Adj to the Fuhrer

(Note in pencil)

28/7
Schm.

Item 31

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin 27.9.1938

MOST SECRET — 1920 hours.

WFA/L No. 2305/38 Most Secret II — 45 copies
16th copy

The Fuhrer has approved the mobilization without warning of the five regular west divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 32, and 35th). The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by workers of the TODT organization.

It is left to the OKH -- to assemble as far as possible first of all the sections ready to march and subsequently the remaining sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the western fortifications.

CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE ARMED FORCES.

Signed. Keitel

Distribution: II.

C 000473

H1145-0074

Stamp:
Office of the Armed Forces
Adjutant attached
To the Führer and
Reich Chancellor
Recd. 3 Oct 1938
Reg. No. 259/38 Most Secret

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388 PS
cont.

pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuehrer

Item 32

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2288/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

Berlin 27 Sept 1938

Subject: Mobilization Measures:

Most Secret

To : The Deputy Führer via Administrative Offices (J)
The Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of German Police Express
attn: S.S. Oberführer. 47 copies
18th copy

As a result of the political situation the Fuhrer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.

Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organisations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.

The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.

OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.

Following are several examples of cases where previous mobilization measures were delayed and a recurrence of which might seriously endanger the mobilization of the Armed Forces:

1) The SA in Wehrkreis XI refused to give up equipment requisitioned by the Armed Forces in accordance with mobilization regulations, because mobilization has not yet taken place.

2) Billets which were prepared for troops under mobilization regulations were not evacuated because mobilization has not taken place. (NSKK-School KREISCHWITZ - SILESIA).

3) Police authorities refused to give up Police Radio Stations for the A/C reporting network, although the A/C reporting service had already been called up.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken by Party Organisations or Police units as a result of the political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in practice.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

KEITEL

Further:
Distribution II

H1145 - 0075

28.9.38

Item 33

MOST SECRET

MEMORANDUM

At 1300 September 27 the Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.

The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against "Grün" on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.

This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt. (pencil note by Schmundt)

H1145 - 0076

TRANSLATION OF DOC.NO. 388-PS
Continued

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant initialed Schm.
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 October 1938

Req. No.: 261/38 Most Secret

Item 34

Adj. to the Führer

Berlin, 28 Sept 38

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
No. 2310/38 Most Secret L I a

45 copies
16th copy.

MOST SECRET

To define spheres of responsibility on the Cz-German frontier, the following orders are issued:

Through mobilization of the frontier guard (Grenzwacht) responsibility has shifted entirely onto the army, that is onto the competent general staff corps. All the units operating on the frontier are subordinate to them.

No new units of police, customs or party may be shifted into the immediate frontier area without the knowledge of the army headquarters concerned, nor may units already in the area be reinforced without such knowledge. In addition no one may cross the frontier without the knowledge of the army headquarters.

For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuhrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier.

Those units remaining forward of the frontier should -- in their own interests -- get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible.

As soon as the army crosses the Cz border the Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.

H1145-0077

The frontier guard has orders only to protect the German frontier, and not to take part in operations on the other side of the border. Any support to the Free Corps by the frontier guards anywhere over the frontier is prohibited.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

Keitel

Distribution II
plus:
Reich Minister of the Interior
Reich Finance Minister
Deputy of the Fuhrer
S.A. Hqs.
Reichsführer SS
Reich Labour Service

Volunteer Corps Henlein (Oberstlt Köchling)

(The following 2 pages are an exact duplicate: Copy 33

H1145-0078

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 October 1938 (pencil noted: Adjutant to the Fuehrer)

Req. No: 262/39 Most Secret

Item 35 Berlin, Sept 28, 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2315/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

MOST SECRET.

Re: Advance Measures Pertaining to Mobilization Plan (Army) Special Appendix 5

Following advance measures may be carried out:
On the Franco-German border (WEHRKREIS V and XII)

1. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9148 -- preparation of organization for the reception of refugees.
2. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9145 -- Preparation of employment of district offices and staffs of collecting areas for the discharging of reservists.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

(Signed) Keitel

Distribution II

H1145 - 0079

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 Oct. 1938 pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuehrer

Req. No: 260/38 Secret Schm.

Item 36

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin, Sept 28, 1938
No. 2335/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

45 copies
16th copy

Subject: 4 SS-Totenkopf Batallions subordinate to the C in C Army.

To : Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of the German Police. MOST SECRET
(SS Central Office) (36 copies)

By order of the Supreme Command of the armed forces the following Bn's of the SS Deaths Head organization will be under the command of the C in C Army with immediate effect.

II and III Bn. of the 2nd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Brandenburg at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia)

I and II Bn. of the 3rd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Thuringia at present in Radebeul and Kotzenbroda near Dresden.

C in C Army is requested to deploy these Bn's for the West, (Upper Rhine) according to the Fuhrer's instructions.

These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Cz. frontier.

It is requested that all further arrangements be made between C in C Army and Reichsfuhrer-SS. (SS Central Office)

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Jodl

Further:

Distribution II

H1145 - 0080

L II b

Item 37

28.9.38.

MEMORANDUM

SA-General Herzog answers question of Adjutant's Office, Chief of Staff of the SA, 1600:

Reichsfuhrer SS, on the 26th of Sept., issued order to Chief of Staff of Sudeten German Free Corps Ref. Diary 38/Most Secret according to which the Volunteer Corps would come under the command of the Reichsfuhrer SS in case of German invasion of the Sudeten German territory.

The order was signed by Berger, SS-Colonel.

J. (initialled by Jodl)

ITEM 38

Stamp = as usual
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No. 263/38 MOST SECRET

Adjutant to the Führer

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2385/38. Most Secret. L I a

Berlin 30.9.38
1600 hrs

12o Copies
16th copy

MOST SECRET

Subject: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 2371/38 Most Secret. OKW/WFA L I a dated 30.9.38

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 2 TO DIRECTIVE NO I.

1. Attachment of Henlein Free Corps:

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsführer-SS and the Chief of German Police.

It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsführer SS.

The instructions OKW No. 2310/38 Most Secret of the 28th Sept (last paragraph but one) and OKW No. 2371/38 Most Secret of Sept 30 are amended accordingly.

2. Rate of Exchange for the Cz.Krone:

The following rate of exchange will apply for all translations and payments: 100 Cz.Kronen = 10.00 Marks (1 Cz.Krone = 10 Rpfg)

THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE ARMED FORCES

Distribution III
and Special Distribution
(including Henlein Volunteer
Corps and Reichsführer SS
through OKW/L II)

Keitel

H1145-0081

H1145 - 0082

ITEM 39

Stamp:
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No 265/38 Most Secret

Adj. to the Fuhrer

Berlin, 30 Sept 1938

The fuhrer and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces

OKW No. 2367/38 Most Secret
WFA/L I A

Most Secret
60 copies
16th copy

DIRECTIVE #1

Subject: Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia.

1. The sectors separated from Cz will be occupied by the Armed Forces as follows:

The sector marked I to be occupied on the 1st and 2nd of Oct, the sector marked II on Oct 2 and 3rd, the sector marked III on Oct. 3, 4 and 5, the sector marked IV on Oct. 6 and 7th. The remaining area up to Oct 10.

The extent of the area I-IV is shown on the attached map. The extent of the remaining areas will be announced later.

2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:

The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West, Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over.

The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation "Grun".

The depth of the territories to be occupied daily depends on the details of the evacuation, which are being settled by the international committee.

a. Army: First of all the following units are available for the invasion:
Training Bn's.
Motorized and Armoured Units
Adolf Hitler 35 Bodyguard Regiment
I and II Bn's of SS Deaths Head Regiment (Oberbayen)
Henlein Free Corps
All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.

b. Air Force:
Those ground installations (including supply and signal installations) situated in the separated areas are to be occupied immediately and prepared for the use of our own units. Flying units can be transferred if this becomes necessary for the air defense of the territory yielded or for the possible switch to "Fall Grun", in accordance with fig. 2. Flights over territory not yet cleared for occupation by German troops must be avoided at all costs. Flak must be assigned to those objectives which cannot be protected by Flak under the command of the Army.

H1145 - 0083

ITEM 39

3. Those units of the Armed Forces intended for the occupation of sector I must cross the former Czech-German frontier by 1200 noon Oct 1st.

4. Armed resistance in the area cleared for occupation must be broken. Czech soldiers and other armed personnel found within the sector are to be disarmed and taken prisoner. The boundary of the sector against the Czechs is not to be crossed under any circumstances. Hostile action against the Czechs on or beyond this boundary is to be avoided.

5. The conduct of the field units must be based on the realization that they are occupying a territory whose population, after being harrassed for years, looks upon the German Armed Forces as Liberators.

6. The German frontier guard will remain on the former German-Czech frontier, as before.

7. The securing of the boundaries of the sectors against the area still in Czech hands is sole responsibility of the army.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

KEITEL

Distribution: III

H1145 - 0084

ITEM 40

Stamp:
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No 264/38 Most Secret

Adj. to the Fuhrer

Berlin, 30 Sept 1938

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 2371/38, Most Secret, WFA/L I a

Most Secret

Special Orders No. 1 to Directive No. 1

Subject: Occupation of territory ceded by Cz.

1. Operational Area of the Army:

The area to be newly occupied will be at first an operational area of the Army. In it the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will have full powers and authority to delegate these powers to the C-in-C's of the armies.

The Commanders exercising these full powers can publish laws, institute special courts and issue directives to offices valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities, the highest offices of the State of Prussia, and the executive board of the NSDAP. This authority to issue regulations has priority over regulations issued by other Superior authorities.

2. Units under Command of Army:

a. The units of the military SS and SS Totenkopf Regiment intended for the occupation of the sector remain under OKH control.

b. The Sudeten German Volunteer Corps comes under the control of OKH. The Bn's of the Volunteer Corps are to be employed in the direction of their native territory wherever possible. They retain their present armament. Provisioning to be guaranteed through the army Hqs. Members of the Free Corps do not come under the military penal code. The Hqs of the Free Corps after occupation of territory III, is to be transferred from Bayreuth to Eger.

c. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, in cooperation with Reichsfuhrer SS and at the request of Army Hqs will direct Police Forces and Gestapo forces for the support of Secret Field Police forces in the occupied areas. As required for Military Police duties, the Special Police (SdP) will be drawn in as much as possible.

3. Taking over of Military Accommodation and RR Installations:

a. All military installations, barracks and property will be turned over in the occupied Sudeten German territories by OKH in so far as they were up to now the property of the Cz. army. By OKL if they were property of the Cz. Air Force (including civil aviation.)

b. The Chief of Transport System will make arrangements with the Reich RR's regarding the taking over of rail installations.

4. Signal Communications:

a. The Army will be at liberty to use the postal communication facilities within the area to be occupied. Requirements of the Luftwaffe are to be assured through the Field Signal Units under the command of the OKH attached to the Army Hqs. Depending on the situation, the most important communication installations are to be put into operation as soon as possible, secured and screened against Cz.

H1145-0085

ITEM 40

Special emphasis must be laid on the effective silencing and confiscation of all transmitting installations. Official, private and permanent radio installations of the Cz army are to be secured through OKH, those of the Cz Air Force through OKL.

5. Customs Frontier Guard

After the crossing of the Reich frontier by the troops, the securing of the old frontier is the responsibility of the Customs Frontier Guard (Zollgrenzschutz); the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will put the necessary personnel from the Frontier Guard at their disposal.

The customs regulation of the forward line of the area to be occupied, will be determined by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in conjunction with the Inspector General of Customs. Liaison officials are still at the disposal of Corps Headquarters acc. to #16 of the regulations governing the VGAD. Shipments to Wehrmacht offices as well as members of the Wehrmacht are not subject to customs regulations.

H1145 - 0086

6. Application of Laws:

a. Compensation laws are to be employed on both sides of the border. Public buildings are to be used mainly for billets. Requisitioned articles do not become the property of the armed forces. Compensation for services rendered in cash (German currency)

b. Special regulations will be issued with regard to the introduction of the German Penal Code in the occupied areas.

7. Mobilization Measures among Civilian Population:

Mobilization measures will not be taken among civilian personnel. But all authorities have been asked to carry out quickly demands made by armed force authorities.

The following measures are especially requested in order to guarantee the tasks of the armed forces.

a. Reichs Postal Ministry

Securing of direct tele-communications in the areas BRESLAU, DRESDEN, WÜRZBURG, NURNBERG, MUNCHEN, VIENNA, BERLIN. Establishing of Special Emergency networks. Furnishing of items to the armed forces to whatever degree they may be required. (Compare, Mobilization Book (Z) Section IX No. 3501, 3503, 3532). Fulfilling staff requirements as regards the restoring of signal networks in occupied areas.

b. Ministry of Propoganda:

Dispatch of commissioners to the chiefs of civil administration in the operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press (compare Mobilization Book (Z) Part V No. 1758 - and 1600)

8. Organisations of the Party:

The Fuhrer's Deputy has been asked to inform the party organisations that OKH must furnish permission if party units are to be brought into the Sudeten area.

9. Economic Directives:

Any confiscation of values or balances at credit institutions (Kredit instituten) in the Sudeten German area is prohibited. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Suppling of the armed forces with food, forage and fuel is to be carried out from the Reich. The following rate of exchange applies for all transactions and payments: 100 cz. krones=9,00 RM (1 Cz. Kr = 9 Rpfg) (the underlined crossed out!)

(pencil note: will be published this afternoon)

10. Payment of the armed forces

For the parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peacetime regulations for large-scale maneuvers will go into effect after leaving garrisons or assembly areas. All additional costs arising through the operation are to be deleted under chapter VIII E 20 (OKW Treasury)

11. Administrative Directives:

The army hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibility. The C D Z with their special staffs are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (compare H. Dv. 90. No. 20 etc.)

H1145-0087

12. Supply Installations:

For the maintenance and putting into operation of supply installations OKW Admin.Staff will attach the following to the Army/H.Q.'s

Army H.Q.	Tech Hq	To	App	Time of Arrival
12	13	LANDAU/ISAR	10.1	2000
10	4	PLAUEN	10.2	2000
8	3	GORLITZ	10.1	2000
2	8	LAMSDORF(SW/OPPELN)	10.5	2000

13. Propaganda Companies:

Propaganda companies are to be used. Amendments as regards attachment made necessary through the peaceful entry will be conveyed verbally.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

KEITEL

DISTRIBUTION: III
and Special Distribution

H1145 - 0088

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuhrer and Reichs Chancellor

pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuhrer

Recd: 3 Oct. 1938

Req.No: 266/38 Most Secret

Item 41

Berlin 30.9.38

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/L No. 2150/38 Most Secret IV a.

200 copies
153rd copy

MOST SECRET

Subject: OCCUPATION OF SUDETEN-GERMAN TERRITORY

1. The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor has ordered that Sections of the Armed Forces march into the Sudeten-German territory, beginning 1 October, 1938. There will be no general mobilization of the Armed Forces (OR case "X"). Units already mobilized, will, for the timebeing, remain at their present posts.

2. Coincident with the crossing of the Reich frontier, the Commander in Chief of the Army will assume full powers in the territory to be occupied together with authority to transfer this power to the C's in C of the Armies.

The Commander in Chief can, exercise these powers, and pass laws, install special courts, and give directives to the appropriate departments and offices functioning in the area of operations, valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities or officers of the State of Prussia and the Executive Board of the NSDAP. In all other cases, the right of issuing directives has priority over directives from higher superior authorities. The area of operations will be extended forward according to the area to be occupied. The shifting of the rear frontier of the operational area will be ordered separately.

3. Mobilization measures will not be enforced in the civil sphere. However, all authorities are requested to carry out immediately the demands of the armed force authorities. To guarantee completion of the tasks of the armed forces the following measures are especially desired:

H1145 - 0089

a. Reich Postal Ministry

Securing of direct tele-communications in the districts of the Communications Hqs, Breslau, Dresden, Wuerzburg, Nuernberg, Muenchen, Vienna and Berlin.

Establishing of Special Communications networks. Furnishing of equipment to armed forces in whatever degree may be required (see Mob. Book (Z) Part IX, No. 3501-03-32).

Furthermore it is requested that staff requirements as regards restoring communication networks in the occupied area, be met.

b. Propaganda Ministry:

Dispatch of commissioners to the Chiefs of Civil on the administration operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part V, 1758 & 1600)

c. Reichsbank:

Issue of Mobilization money supplies without fiduciary monetary tender is authorized. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part XVIII, Nr 8031)

4. Application of Laws:

a. There will be a special directive as to the introduction of the German Criminal Code into the occupied territory.

b. The Army Compensation Law (Wehrleistungsgestz) will be in force on both sides of the frontier. Public buildings will be used as billets primarily. Requisitioned articles will not become property of the armed forces. Payment for services rendered will be made in cash (German currency)

5. Economic Directives:

Any confiscation of valuables or balances at Credit Institutions (Kredit Instituten) is prohibited in the Sudeten-German area. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplies of food, forage and fuel for the armed forces will be drawn from the Reich. The following rate of exchange is effective for all transactions and payments:

100 Czech kronen - 10.00 RM (1 Czech krone -- 10 Pfg)

H1145-0090

Item 41

6. Payment of the Armed Forces:

For parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peace-time regulations for large-scale maneuvers, effective from time of departure from areas or garrisons.

7. Customs Frontier Guard

After the crossing of the Reich Frontier by the troops, the security of the old frontier will be taken over by the Customs-Frontier Guard at whose disposal the supreme commander of the armed forces will put the necessary personnel.

The supreme command of the armed forces will arrange the guarding of the front lines of the area to be occupied (as to collection of duties) with the Inspector General of Customs. The Liaison officials according to Nr 15 of the regulations pertaining to the VGAD will continue to be at the disposal of the Corps Hqs.

Shipments to armed forces authorities as well as members of the armed forces are not subject to customs inspection.

8. Administrative Directives:

The armed Hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibilities. The CdZ with their staff of experts are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (see H. Dv 90, Nr 20 etc). In all matters of a police nature, the Reichsfuehrer SS is to be consulted.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

(signed) Keitel

Distribution: Overleaf

H1145 - 0091

ITEM 41

DISTRIBUTION

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H1145-0092

ITEM 41

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H1145 - 0093

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Item 42

200 copies
153rd copy

Berlin, 30.9.38

(STAMP-)
Office of the Armed Forces
Adjutant attached to the
Führer & Reich Chancellor
Rec. 3 Oct 1938

Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces
L. No. 2385/38 Most Secret IVA

Subject: Occupation of the
Sudeten-German area.

Enclosures: Reg.No. 267138
Dispatched -
Clerk

1. By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the occupation of the Sudeten-German areas by the Armed Forces will be executed in a manner which will allow a changeover to military operations at any time.

   For the advance of the troops to coincide with the withdrawal of the Czechs, particularly in the fortified zones, and on account of the possibility of local resistance, it is necessary for the march in to be arranged in a way suited to the conduct of military operations.

2. The military occupation also necessitates the settling of economic conditions in the Sudeten-German area. Assimilation can only be brought about gradually. For this transition period the rate of exchange has been fixed at 100 Czech crowns to 10.00 ReichMarks so as to enable the retail trade to function. It is a pre-condition of this temporary settlement, however, that, until a final settlement is made with regard to economics and currency, and in order to avoid placing the Sudeten-German population at a disadvantage, only those things are bought in the open market which come in the category of goods which fill the immediate needs of life. Any exploitation of the present economic situation is a serious offense.

3. For the above stated reasons, travel into the Sudetenland from the old Reich will be confined to those officials and authorities who have been given specific tasks in the Sudeten-German area. It is requested that all civil authorities and all organizations of the Party be instructed without delay that it is essential to obtain the previous approval of the military authorities charged with the exercise of executive power (C-in-C of the Army, Army HQ) for the transfer of departments and units of any kind into the Sudeten-German area which is under military authorities.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

Keitel

(Distribution for Item 42 identical to that of Item 41)

Item 43 is handwritten notes too illegible to translate.

H1145 – 0094

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Item 44

Berlin, 1st October 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2400/38 Most Secret LIa

150 copies
18th copy

Top Secret

(Stamp-)

Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Führer & Reich Chancellor.
Rec. Oct.3rd 1938, Encl.2-30
Reg.No. 268338 Secret
Dispatched -
Check -

MOST SECRET

SPECIAL ORDERS NO.3 to DIRECTIVE No.1

Parts of the Army Employed.

In addition to the Sections of the Army whose employment has been approved (See Directive 1, Section 2a), the following units will also be used for the occupation:

Command (Generalkommando) III

10th Inf Regiment (4th Inf Div)

The Chief of Supreme Command of the Army
By direction
Jodl

Distribution: III
and special distribution

Item 45

Army Teleprint Network

	Received from	Pass to	Date	Time	Re.No.	by
Teleprint Office Notes	HDZG 9.10	Dept Klimisch (?)	9.10			Schm.(?)

by Joe (?)

Delay notes:

Telegram HBZG 12 9110 1304 Priority notes:
Tel.No. of Sender:

TO LT. COL. SCHMUNDT * FUHRER'S TRAIN * (FUHRERZUG)

1. IF THE OCCUPATION OF ZONE 5 IS CARRIED OUT TODAY ACCORDING TO PLAN AND WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO DISSOLVE V.G.A.D. IN THE WEST AS FROM 10.10 AND TO BRING THE 5 SERVING DIVISIONS BACK TO THEIR HOME STATIONS...

2. ACCORDING TO TELEGRAM RECEIVED HERE POPULATION OF IGLAU VERY WORRIED AND EXCITED. COMMUNISTS THERE ARE ARMED. FOREIGN OFFICE HAS BEEN INFORMED. OKW SUGGESTS EMPLOYMENT OF ENGLISH LEGION, IF IT IS BROUGHT UP IN THIS AREA , FOR PROTECTION OF THE GERMANS... FUHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED FOR 1 AND 2 ....

signed KEITEL

(Ink Notes:-) Telephoned this from Opera House in Saarbrucken at 2100 10.9 to Capt. Deyle. Fuhrer agreed to points 1 and 2. In connection with 2: if the lives of Germans threatened, troops to march in after short warning.

SCHMUNDT
Lt.Col.

H1145 - 0095

Item 46

TRANSLATION OF DOC. 388 PS cont.

The C-in-C of the Army

Berlin W 35 October 10th, 38

Tirpitzufer 72-76
Tel.

11.10.38

1800 hours Schm.

My Fuhrer!

I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation line as ordered, by this evening. In so far as further military operations are not required, the order for the occupation of the country which was given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The guarding of the new frontier line will be taken over by the reinforced frontier supervision service (Grenzaufsichtsdienst) in the next few days.

It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the administration of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops of the army under the control of one person.

I therefore ask you, my Fuhrer, to relieve me with effect from October 15, 1938, of the charge assigned to me - that of exercising executive powers in Sudeten German territory.

Heil my Fuhrer,

VON BRAUCHITSCH

(Handwritten Note:) Submitted to Fuhrer 11 Nov. Agreed.

H1145 - 0096

Remarks of teleprint office

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Army Telegraph Network

Pass to	Date	Time	R.No.	by
Received from HQ26 10.10 1930	Schmundt's Dept.	10.10	1940	Schm.

Delay notes

Item 47

Note of Priority
Tel.No. of Sender

Telegram SECRET
HBZG No. 17 1915 Schm.

TELEGRAM TO FUHRER'S TRAIN, LT.COL. SCHMUNDT

IF EVENING REPORT SHOWS THAT OCCUPATION OF ZONE FIVE HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO ORDER FURTHER DEMOBILIZATION

PRINCIPLE: 1) To SUSPEND OPERATION "GRUN" BUT MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT STATE OF PREPAREDNESS ON PART OF ARMY AND LUFTWAFFE TO MAKE INTERVENTION POSSIBLE IF NECESSARY.

2) ALL UNITS NOT NEEDED TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE OCCUPIED AREA AND REDUCED TO PEACETIME STATUS, AS POPULATION OF OCCUPIED AREA IS HEAVILY BURDENED BY THE MASSING OF TROOPS.

3) TO DISSOLVE TRUCK REGIMENTS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, IN THE INTERESTS OF ECONOMY.

4) IN THE WEST - GRADUAL REVERSAL OF ALL MOBILIZATION MEASURES WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE WORK ON THE LINES.

5) INTENTION OF THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY TO RELINQUISH HIS EXECUTIVE POWERS ON 10.15

FUHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED

OKW

Item 47

Fuhrer's decision:

1--Agreed
2--Suggestion to be made on the 13th Oct in Essen by Gen Keitel. Decision will then be reached.
3--Agreed
4--Agreed
5--Agreed

NB. Notice of 5 to be sent by 6th Division

Relayed to Lt. Colonel Leitzler at 2300, 10.11

SCHMUNDT

Lt.Col.

(in Schmundt's writing)

(Next page contains illegible notes)

H1145-0097

Remarks of teleprint office

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Army Telegraph Network

Pass to	Date	Time	R.No.	by
Received from HQ26 10.10 1930	Schmundt's Dept.	10.10	1940	Schm.

Delay notes

Item 47

Note of Priority
Tel.No. of Sender

Telegram SECRET
HBZG No. 17 1915 Schm.
TELEGRAM TO FUHRER'S TRAIN, LT.COL. SCHMUNDT

IF EVENING REPORT SHOWS THAT OCCUPATION OF ZONE FIVE HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO ORDER FURTHER DEMOBILIZATION

PRINCIPLE: 1) To SUSPEND OPERATION "GRUN" BUT MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT STATE OF PREPAREDNESS ON PART OF ARMY AND LUFTWAFFE TO MAKE INTERVENTION POSSIBLE IF NECESSARY.

2) ALL UNITS NOT NEEDED TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE OCCUPIED AREA AND REDUCED TO PEACETIME STATUS, AS POPULATION OF OCCUPIED AREA IS HEAVILY BURDENED BY THE MASSING OF TROOPS.

3) TO DISSOLVE TRUCK REGIMENTS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, IN THE INTERESTS OF ECONOMY.

4) IN THE WEST - GRADUAL REVERSAL OF ALL MOBILIZATION MEASURES WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE WORK ON THE LINES.

5) INTENTION OF THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY TO RELINQUISH HIS EXECUTIVE POWERS ON 10.15

FUHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED

OKW

Item 47

Fuhrer's decision:

1--Agreed
2--Suggestion to be made on the 13th Oct in Essen by Gen Keitel. Decision will then be reached.
3--Agreed
4--Agreed
5--Agreed

NB. Notice of 5 to be sent by 6th Division

Relayed to Lt. Colonel Leitzler at 2300, 10.11

SCHMUNDT

Lt.Col.

(in Schmundt's writing)

(Next page contains illegible notes)

H1145 - 0098

Item 47

10.10.38
What is in the Zone?

5 1 (motorized)
1 (light)
1 armoured
1 mountain
1 div.

For special duties 1 mountain
3 div
1 truck transport regt.

4 3 motorized div
1 light
1 armoured
2 div
Liebstandarte

3. 4 div
Germania

1 1 armoured
3 div

13 div
4 div (motorized)
3 armoured
2 mountain
2 light

24 divisions

(notes in Schmundt's writing)

H1145 - 0099

TRANSLATION OF DOC. 388 PS cont.

Army Telegraph Network

Notes of Telegraph Office	Received	Pass to	Date	Time	R.No.	by
	from HOZG 11.10.10.45	Lt.Col. Schmundt	11.10			Schm.

by Schm.
Note of delay

Item 47

HBZG 008 1040 Note of Priority
Tel.No. of Sender

TO THE ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT ATTACHED TO THE FUHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF ARMED FORCES. THE C-IN-C THE ARMY REGARDS HIS DUTIES AS POSSESSOR OF EXECUTIVE POWERS IN THE SUDETEN GERMAN AREA AS FINISHED AS FROM 10.15. AND SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE TAKEN OVER ON THAT DATE BY REICH COMMISSAR HEILEIN, PROVIDING THAT FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY. PERSONAL LETTER OF THE C-IN-C TO THE FUHRER HAS BEEN DESPATCHED.

OKH 6th Div. (Five)

General Staff of the German Army

11.37/38

H1145-0100

Item 48

(Ink note)

1. If advance orders, times can be shortened. Regrouping of armies.

2. If Hungary, small degree of preparedness. 2 brigades between Pressburg and Budapest. 1 brigade east of Friedl.

(Rest of note impossible to decipher completely)

H1145-0101

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Notes of the telegraph office)

Army Telegraph Network

Received	Pass to	Date	Time	R.No.	by	
from HBZC 11.10.1955.	Lt.Col. Schmundt	11.10	2030		Joe	1)4 Mot. Div. 1 B'n ready to march (?) 1 Arm'd Brig.

by Schm.

Notes re delay

24
+5
29 (Uncipherable note)

Note of priority:
Tel. No. of Sender

Item 48

TOP SECRET

HBZG 13 1930.11.10
Lt. Col. Schmundt

Question 1: WHAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BREAK ALL CZECH RESISTANCE IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA?

Answer: ARMY SUGGESTS: ARMY GROUP 5: Nothing

ARMY GROUP FOR SPECIAL DUTIES: 1 Arm'd Brig., 2 Mob. Div.

ARMY GROUP 4: Nothing
ARMY GROUP 3: 1 Mobile Division
ARMY GROUP A: 1 Division ready to march and 1 Mobile Division

B) LUFTWAFFE: EMPLOYMENT NECESSARY OF ALL FORCES PROVIDED TO DATE OKW BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS WITHOUT THESE REINFORCEMENTS IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SIGNS OF WEAKNESS IN CZECH RESISTANCE.

Question 2: HOW MUCH TIME IS REQUIRED FOR THE REGROUPING OR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES?

Answer: A) Army: FOR REGROUPING: 2 days. FOR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES FROM THE REICH 4 to 5 DAYS (INCLUDING MOBILIZATION)

B) Luftwaffe: OPERATIONAL DUTY POSSIBLE ANY TIME

Question 3: HOW MUCH TIME WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE IF IT IS EXECUTED AFTER THE INTENDED DEMOBILIZATION AND RETURN MEASURES?

Answer A) Army: IN THE SOUTHEAST ABOUT 10 to 11 DAYS.--IN THE EAST 9 to 10 DAYS.

B) Luftwaffe: AFTER RETURN OF FLYING UNITS TO PEACE TIME AIRFIELDS AND THEIR DEMOBILIZATION - THE AA GUNS WHICH ARE READY FOR ACTION AND THE GROUND ORGANIZATION BEING LEFT AS THEY ARE - LENGTH OF TIME IN SOUTHEASTERN AREA 12 HOURS IF WEATHER FAVORABLE. AFTER DEMOBILIZATION IS COMPLETE SEVERAL DAYS, IN ANY CASE LESS THAN IN THE CASE OF THE ARMY.

H1145-0102

Question 4: HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE STATE OF READINESS OF OCT. 1st?

Answer: Army: 6 days. If the reserves are called up by radio, 3 days at least.

Luftwaffe: AIR DEFENSE WEST, BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF REORGANIZATION, WILL BE READY FOR OPERATIONS IN 24 hours

(signed) KEITEL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388 PS
(Con'd)

Berlin, Oct 12th, 1938

Item 49
LI a

3 copies
1st copy

REFLECTIONS

Of the Supreme Command of the Army on the withdrawal of Forces from the Sudeten-German Area

PRESENT STRENGTH

ARMY GROUP	NO. OF DIVS.	DIV NOS EARMARKED FOR WITHDRAWAL	NO. OF DIV TO BE WITHDRAWN	STRENGTH AFTER WITHDRAWAL
Army Group Command 5	5 1/3	1/3 44, 2 Mtn, 3 Mtn, 29th Mot, 4 Light, 2nd Armoured	3	1 1/3 2 1/3
Army Group Command for Special Duties	4 1/3 plus 1 SS Regt)	1/3 5th, 7th, 9th 45th, 1st Mtn.	1 1/3	3 1
Army Group Command 4	7 (plus 1 SS Regt)	10th, 24th, 2nd (Mot), 13th (Mot), 20th (Mot), 1st Light, 1st Arm'd.	2	4 2
Army Group Command 3	3 (plus 1 SS Regt)	4th, 3rd, 18th	2	2 1
Army Group Command	4	8th, 28th, 30th 3rd Arm'd.	1	3 2
TOTAL	22 2/3 (Plus 3 SS Regts)		8 1/3	14 2/3 (Plus 3 SS Regts)
	Namely:	Namely:	Namely:	
	11 2/3 Inf Div 3 Mtn Divs 3 Mot Divs 3 Light Divs 3 Armd Divs.	3 1/3 Inf Divs 2 Mtn Divs 1 Mot Div 1 Light Div 1 Arm'd Div	8 2/3 Inf Div 1 Mtn Div 2 Mot Divs 1 Light Div 2 Arm'd Divs	
			7 1/3	

H1145-0103

H1145-0104

ITEM 50

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

MOST SECRET

Received
on 17.10 from kg
at 1535 by (Indecipherable)
Notes re delay
MBZ 0 61
Telegram from MBZ 045 17/10 1525
Lt. Colonel Schmundt

Space for Receipt Stamp

OKW suggests that by 20 October about half of the Army forces still remaining in Sudeten-German Territory (14 1/3 Divs and 3 SS Regiments) should be moved out, as otherwise the orderly discharging of the old age group at the end of October - this is necessary for the building up of the Army - and the reassignment of the recruits will not be possible by 10/11. (Involved are the: 2nd Arm'd Div, 1st Mountain Div., 7th Div, 13th Motorized Div, 20th Motorized Div, 18th Div and 3rd Arm'd Div) Fuhrer's decision requested to-day.

Signed Keitel

(Note at bottom in Schmundt's handwriting:)

The Fuehrer has given his consent 17 Oct.

By telephone, 1905 hours, 17 Oct. to Capt. Vogel,

Section L, OKW.

Schmundt, Lt. Col.

H1145-0105

ITEM 51

The Fuehrer and Supreme Comdr of the Armed Forces

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct. 1938

Despatched 19 X 38 M

TO THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY

GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH, BERLIN

The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory has been completed, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, the Air Forces, the Police, the military SS (SS Verfugungstruppe), the SS and SA.

Placed under protection of the armed forces, 3½ millions of German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all.

The Civil Administration is taking over charge of them on 21 Oct 1938. Simultaneously I relieve you of your right to exercise executive power, while acknowledging the understanding cooperation of all departments.

Along with our Sudeten German compatriots, the entire German people express their gratitude to those who participated in the liberation of the Sudeten-Land.

(signed) Adolf Hitler

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 1938

(signed) Schmundt,

Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.

The Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

After Delivery:

To the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

I request that publication in the press be initiated from there

H1145-0106

Item 51.

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388-PS
Continued

1st Draft

To

The C - in - C of the Army

The occupation of the Sudeten - German territory had been completed according to plan, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, Air Force, and police. Thus 3½ million German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all, and have been placed under the protection of the Armed Forces.

You have borne the responsibility for the occupation of the country and the care of the population from the day when the army marched in, and now I approve your proposal to release you from your authority to exercise executive power in the Sudeten-German area, date of expiry being October 20th 1938.

My thanks to all those who participated in the liberation of the Sudetenland, for the order and discipline, the social understanding and devoted readiness to help with which they have done their duty.

J.

(Handwritten note)

The military SS (SS VERFÜFUNGSTRUPPE), the SS and SA

- - - -

2nd Draft

(Exact repeat of Item 51 followed by handwritten note)

Signed Adolf Hitler (unknown hand)

H1145-0107

ITEM 52

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2560/38 MOST SECRET L I a

Berlin, Oct. 18th, 1938

1300 hours

(Stamp)
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
attached to the Fuhrer & Reich Chancellor
Recd. 20 Oct. 1938
Req. No. 297/38 Most Secret
Despatch Clerk W

60 copies
Copy

MOST SECRET

Directive No. 4

The Fuehrer has ordered:

1. That about half of the forces of the Army still remaining in Sudeten-German territory be shipped back to their peace time bases.

2. That those parts of the Luftwaffe which are under the command of the Army be shipped back and returned to the C-in-C of the Air Force. The withdrawal of other parts of the Luftwaffe operating in Sudeten Germany will be effected by the C-in-C of the Air Force.

Chief of the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces

Keitel

Distribution: III

H1145-0108

ITEM 53

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

MOST SECRET

Received at 1040 by (Indecipherable) Initials Space for Receipt Stamp
Notes re delay
MBZ 066
Telegram from MBZ 050 21/10 1030

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHMUNDT:

(SECRET) - OKW REQUESTS THE FUEHRER'S APPROVAL TO THE FOLLOWING DECREE: ON THE 20TH OF OCTOBER THE REICH LABOUR SERVICE CEASES TO BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RAD FORCES OPERATING IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN FORTIFICATIONS. THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES REGULATES THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THESE SECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY DIRECTIVES, & AGREEMENT WITH THE REICHS LABOR LEADER. OKW NR 2690/38 Secret WFA/L two of 20 Oct 38 JODL

Handwritten: Consent given, 21 Oct 38.

Passed to Colonel Jodl's

Ante-Room at 1400

Sch 22/10

H1145-0109

ITEM 54

MOST SECRET

TOP SECRET

Only through officer

Conference Notes

L I a

Berlin, 27.9.38

4 copies
1st copy

Time of Attack "Grun"?
(Z v. A Grun.)

COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY

As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.

The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i. e. about 0615, it also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.

Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.

If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time desired by the Army no tactical surprise of the enemy's air force would be achieved and it would necessitate certain changes in the method of attack (height of flight level). Consequently, from the outset the Luftwaffe has desired a later hour of attack on the part of the Army. Even so, there would be no definite guarantee of a well-timed coordinated attack of both Forces, as bad weather conditions on the day of attack might postpone the commitment of the Air Force on X Day in part or altogether.

If an early hour of attack on the part of the Army is regarded as indespensable, a simultaneous attack by the Air Force, - desirable as it may be, may possibly have to be dispensed with.

H1145-0110

ITEM 54

Thus it is Proposed:

Attack by the Army - independent of the attack by the air force - at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.

The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.

(J)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 444-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1145-0111

TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

Fuehrer's Headquarters
12 November 40
2F 408

WFSt/Abt.L(I) No 33 356/40 g.K.Chefs

Only by officer

10 copies
4th copy
55

Directive No. 18

The preparatory measures of Supreme Hq for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:-

1) Relations with France.

The aim of my policy towards France is to cooperate with this country in the most effective way for the future prosecution of the war against England. For the time being France will have the role of a "non-belligerent power":-she will have to tolerate German military measures on her territory, especially in the African colonies, and to give support, as far as possible, even by using her own means of defense. The most pressing task of the French is the defensive and offensive protection of their French possessions (West and Equatorial Africa) against England and the deGaulle movement. From this initial task France's participation in the war against England can develop fully.

For the time being, the conversations with France resulting from my meeting with Marshal Petain are being carried on - apart from the current work of the armistice commission - entirely by the foreign office (Auswartiges Amt) in cooperation with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW).

More detailed directives will follow at the close of these talks.

2) Spain and Portugal.

Political steps to bring about an early Spanish entry into the war have been taken. The aim of German intervention in the Iberian peninsula (code name Felix) will be to drive the English out of the Western Mediterranean. For this purpose:

a) Gibraltar will be taken and the Straits closed.
b) The British will be prevented from gaining a foothold at another point of the Iberian peninsula, or the Atlantic Islands.

The preparation and execution of this operation is intended as follows:

Section I.

a) Reconnaissance troops (officers in civilian clothes) make the necessary preparations for the action against Gibraltar and for taking over aerodromes. As regards disguise and cooperation with the Spaniards they will comply with the security measures of the Chief of Foreign Intelligence.

b) Special units of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau are to take over the protection of the Gibraltar area, in secret cooperation with the Spaniards, against English attempts to widen the terrain in front and against premature discovery and frustration of our preparations.

c) The units intended for this operation will be kept in readiness away from the French Spanish border and information will be withheld from the troops, at this early stage. In order to start operations, a warning order will be given three weeks before the troops cross the Spanish-French border (but only after conclusion of the preparations regarding the Atlantic Islands).

With regard to the low capacity of the Spanish railways, the army will detail mainly motorized units for this operation, so that the railways are available for reinforcements.

Section II

a) Units of the Air Force, directed by observation at Algeciras, will, at a favorable moment, carry out an air attack from French soil on the units of the British fleet lying in the port of Gibraltar, and will force a landing on Spanish aerodromes after the attack.

b) Shortly after this the units intended for use in Spain will cross the Franco-Spanish frontier on land or in the air.

Section III

a) Attack for the seizure of Gibraltar by German troops.

b) Mobilization of troops to march into Portugal should the British gain a foothold there. The units intended for this will march into Spain immediately after the units intended for Gibraltar.

Section IV

Support by the Spanish in closing the Straits after the seizure of the Rock from the Spanish-Moroccan side as well, if required.

As for the strength of the units to be used for operation "Felix" the following will apply:

Army

The units intended for Gibraltar must be in sufficient strength to seize the Rock even without Spanish assistance.

Apart from this, a smaller group must be available to aid the Spaniards in the unlikely event of the British attempting to land at a different point on the coast. The units to be kept in readiness for a possible invasion of Portugal are to be predominantly of a mobile nature.

Air Force

Sufficient forces will be detailed for the air attack on Gibraltar to guarantee substantial success.

For the subsequent operations against naval objectives and for the support of the attack on the Rock mainly dive-bomber units are to be transferred to Spain.

Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is to be supplied to the army units, and is also to be used to engage ground targets.

Navy

Provision is to be made for U-boats to attack the British-Gibraltar-Squadron, particularly when they leave harbor, which they are expected to do after the air raid.

To support the Spaniards in the closing of the Straits, preparations are to be made in cooperation with the army for the transfer of single coastal batteries.

An Italian participation is not envisaged.

As a result of operation "Gibraltar", the Atlantic Islands (in particular the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands) will gain increased importance for the British conduct of the war at sea, as well as for our own. The commanders in chief of the Navy and Air Force are examining how the Spanish defense of the Canaries can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be occupied.

H1145-0112

I also request that the question of an occupation of Madeira and the Azores be examined and also the advantages and disadvantages that would arise from this for the conduct of the war at sea and in the air. The results of this examination are to be given to me as soon as possible.

3) Italian Offensive against Egypt.

If at all, the use of German forces only comes into consideration after the Italians have reached Morsa Metruh. Even then the use of German air forces will be considered mainly if the Italians put at our disposal the air bases necessary for this.

The preparations of the branches of the armed forces for use in this or any other North African theatre of war are to be carried on as follows:-

Army

Holding an armored division ready for use in North Africa (composition as previously provided for).

Navy

Fitting out of such German ships lying in Italian ports as are suitable as transports for the transfer of the strongest possible forces either to Libya or to North West Africa.

Air Force

Preparations for attacks on Alexandria and on the Suez Canal, so as to deny the British Command the use of the latter.

4) Balkans.

The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Roumanian oil area.

In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.

So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.

The Commander-in-chief of the Air Force will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations.

The German Air Force mission in Roumania will be increased to the extent proposed to me.

Bulgarian requests to equip their army (supply of weapons, ammunition) are to be given favorable treatment.

5) Russia

Political discussions have been intiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

H1145-0113

H1145-0114

Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by, me.

6) Landing in England

Due to a change in the general situation it may yet be possible or necessary to start operation "Seelowe" in the spring of 1941. The three services of the armed forces must therefore earnestly endeavor to improve conditions for such an operation in every respect.

7) I shall expect the commanders-in-chief to express their opinions of the measures anticipated in this directive. I shall then give orders regarding the methods of execution and synchronization of the individual actions. In order to assure secrecy, only a restricted staff will work on these plans. This applies particularly to the operations in Spain and for the plans concerning the Atlantic Isles.

signed: ADOLF HITLER

initialled: Jodl

Distribution:

Ob.d.H (Op.Abt.)	1st Copy
Ob.d.M (1.Skl.)	2nd Copy
Ob.d.L.(LwFüSt.Ia)	3rd Copy

O.K.W.

SFSt,	4th Copy
Abt. L.	5th - 10th Copy

- - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 444-PS

15 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 444-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 446-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 33 408/40 gK Chefs.

The Fuehrer's Headquarters
18 December 40

SECRET
only through officer

9 copies
4th copy

Directive Nr. 21

Case Barbarossa

The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick compaign before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa)

For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.

For the Eastern campaign the Airforce will have to free such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break down.

Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.

If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intented beginning of operations

Preparations requiring more time to start are - if this has not yet been done - to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.

Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.

The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the following basis:

I. General Purpose:

The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.

In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the Russian Airforce will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight.

Effective intervention by the Russian Airforce is to be prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations.

H1145-0115

II. Probable Allies and their tasks.

. . . . . .

(Page 4, Par. II).

2.) It will be the task of Rumania, together with the forces concentrating there, to pin down the opponent on the other side and, in addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear area.

. . . . . .

(Page 8, Par. IV).

IV. It must be clearly understood that all orders to be given by the commanders in chief on the basis of this letter of instructions are precautionary measures, in case Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be drafted for the preparations at an early time is to be kept as small as possible. Further co-workers are to be detailed as late as possible and only as far as each individual is needed for a specific task. Otherwise, the danger exists that our preparations (the time of their execution has not been fixed) will become known and thereby gra. political and military disadvantages would result.

V. I am expecting the reports of the commanders in chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.

The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.

Signed by Hitler

and initialed by: Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible.

Distribution:

Ob. d. H. (Op. Abt.)	1. copy
Ob. d. M. (Skl.)	2. "
Ob. d. L. (Lw.Fü.St.)	3. "

OKW:

WFSt.	4. copy
Abt. L	5 - 9. copy

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

TIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
F DOCUMENT 446-PS

6 November 1945.

I [redacted], XO46349, (CIVILIAN), hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 446-PS.

ALFRED BREINER
XO46349
(CIVILIAN)

H1145-0116

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 447-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

Top Secret
Only thru officer

OKW
Armed Forces Operational Staff
Section L (IV/Qu)
44125/41 Top Secret

Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941
5 copies
4th copy

Subject: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L(I) #33408/40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940

Directives for Special Areas

To Order #21

(Case Barbarossa)

I. Area of Operations and executive power

1) The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding supply for an area of operations within the armed forces/ shall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in East Prussia and in the General Gouvernement at the latest four weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob.d.L.) has been reached.

It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.

2) The Russian territory which is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states with governments of their own, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this the following is inferred:

a) The area of operations, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.

b) In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.

c) As soon as th area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.

H1145-0117

3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks.

a) Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.
b) Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4)
c) Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according to the needs of the OKH.
d) Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.
e) Traffic regulations.
f) Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.

The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the civilian agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the commissioners of the Reich.

Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.

The time for the assumption of command by the commanding officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to the principles valid for the commanding officers.

4) The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the "Wi Rü Amt" with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/WiRüAmt.

5) The majority of the Police Forces shall be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense.

6) The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of the military courts shall be separately regulated, and commanded.

II. Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic:

7) Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff for the measures necessary before the beginning of operations for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to Russia.

8) As soon as operations begin, the German-Soviet Russian frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of liaison officers.

The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the agencies under him

H1145-0118

shall decide on exceptions.

Except for the special regulations applying to the police organizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.

III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.

9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.

10) Police measures for the protection of the troops are permitted, independently from the granting of special rights.

Further orders in this shall be issued later.

11) Special orders shall be issued at a later date for the territories of these countries, on the following subjects:

Procurement of food and feed.
Housing and machinery.
Purchase and the shipment of merchandise.
Procurement of funds and wage-control.
Salaries.
Request for indemnity-payments.
Postal and telegraph services.
Traffic.
Jurisdiction.

Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKW from the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to be submitted to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941.

IV. Directives regarding Sweden.

12) Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
signed: KEITEL

Distribution:

OKH	1st copy
OKM	2nd copy
R.d.L.u.O.K.L.	3rd copy
Armed Forces Operational Staff	4th copy
Section L	5th copy

(Translator's note: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense = Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab/Abt. Landesverteidigung)

- - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 447-PS

16 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 447-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.498-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer
No. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFSt

Fuehrer HQ, 18 Oct.1942

12 Copies
12th Copy

1.) For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, a re partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged, that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.

2.) For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British a nd their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.

3.) I therefore order:

From now on a ll enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. for publiccation in the Report of the Military Forces.

4.) If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW Stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.

5.) This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute a fter battles.

6.) I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and

H1145-0120

officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.

ADOLF HITLER

Distribution:	Copy No.
O.K.H. / Genst.d.H (High Command of the Army / General Staff of the Army)	1.
O.K.M. / Skl. (High Command of the Navy / Naval War Staff)	2.
Ob.d.L. / Lw.Fü.St. (C in C Air Force / Air Force Operational Staff)	3.
W.B. Norwegen (Armed Forces Commander, Norway)	4.
W.B. Südost (Armed Forces Commander, Southeast)	5.
Ob. West (C in C, West)	6.
Geb.A.O.K. 20 (20th Mountain Army)	7.
Ob. Süd (C in C, South)	8.
Pz.Armee Afrika (Panzer Army Africa)	9.
Rf.SS u. Chef d.Dtsch.Polizei (Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police)	10.
OKW/WFSt (High Command of the Armed Forces / Armed Forces Operational Staff)	11.-12.

I, Mark S. Schafer, Pvt. 42090012, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 498-PS.

MARK S. SCHAFER,
Pvt. 42090012.

H1145-0121

H1145-0122

Exhibit USA 542
Filed Jan 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 503-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret

High Command of the Armed Forces.
No 55 1781/42 g. K. CHefs. W F St/Qu

F.H. Qu.,19 October 1942

Top Secret
By officer only

22 copies
21st copy

Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops (OKW/Wst No. 003830/42 top secret of 18 October 1942) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.

This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.

The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus.

The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and copies made thereof.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

By order of
Jodl

1 enclosure
(distribution list--over)

Distribution list:

General Staff of the Army - 1st copy
Chief of Ordnance and Commander of Replacement Army - 2nd copy
High Command of the Navy Sea Warfare Diary - 3rd copy
High Command of the Air Force command staff - 4th copy
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in Norway - 5th copy
" " " " " The Netherlands - 6th copy
" " " " " the southeast - 7th copy
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((GEB.) AOH 20))
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Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police and Main Bureau for Security Police - 16th and 17th copies
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Foreign counter Intelligence - 18th copy
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Armed Forces propaganda section (PR) - 20th copy
Armed Forces Command Staff, Quartermaster inclusive file copy - 21st copy
War Diary (KtC) - 22nd copy

Top Secret
By officer only

The Fuehrer
and Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces

18 K

I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree.

As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.

H1145-0123

territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.

In the east, this type of combat in the form of partisan warfare as early as last winter led to severe encroachment upon our fighting strength and cost the lives of numerous German soldiers, railroad workers, members of the labor corps (Organisation Todt), the labor service,etc. It severely interfered with and sometimes delayed for days the performance of transportation necessary for the maintenance of the fighting strength of the troops. By a successful continuation or perhaps even intensification of this form of war, a grave crisis in one or another place at the front might develop. Many measures against these horrible as well as wily sabotage activities have failed, simply because the German officer and his soldiers were not aware of the great danger confronting them and therefore in individual cases did not act against these enemy groups as would have been necessary in order to help the forward echelons of the front and thereby the entire conduct of the war.

It was therefore in part necessary in the East to organise special units who mastered this danger or to assign this task to special SS formations.

Only where the fight against this partisan disgrace was begun and executed with ruthless brutality were results achieved which eased the position of the fighting front.

<u>In all eastern territories the war against the partisans is therefore a struggle of absolute annihilation of one or the other part</u>.

As soon as the realization of this fact becomes the common knowledge of troops, they will regularly be able to cope with these occurrences in short order; otherwise their efforts achieve no decisive results and become purposeless.

Even though under a different name, England and America have decided upon a similar kind of warfare, while the Russian attempts to put partisan troops behind our front by land and only in exceptional cases uses air transportation to land men and to drop supplies, England and America use this method of warfare primarily by landing sabotage troops from submarines or pneumatic boats or by means of parachute agents. Essentially, however, this form of warfare does not differ from the activites of the Russian partisans. For it is the task of these troops:

1) to build up a general espionage service with the assistance of willing natives,
2) to organize troops of terrorists and supply them with the necessary weapons and explosives,
3) to undertake sabotage activites which by destruction of traffic installations, not only continuously disrupt our communications, but also, when things become serious, make troop movements absolutely impossible and eliminate our communications system.

Finally, these troops are to make attacks on war-important installations, in which, according to a scientifically worked out program, they destroy key works by dynamiting, thereby forcing whole industries into idleness.

The consequences of these activites are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.

Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 503-PS
Continued

that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these activites.

England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worst, all they have to do is to successfully commit their attacks on people, traffic installations, or other installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate.

If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man.

This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly exterminated.

The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.

I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy. Officers and non-commissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail, or under circumstances-when there is danger in delay-to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.

These are the reasons for the issuance of this decree.

If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation.

(signed:) A. Hitler

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 503-PS

26 November 1945

I, ARNE OLSEN, 2nd Lt., AUS, O-2015976, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 503-PS.

ARNE OLSEN
2nd Lt., AUS
O-2015976

Exhibit USA 549
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 506-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Draft

WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1)
Nr 006580/44 g.Kdos

Fuehrer Headquarters,
22 June 1944
TOP SECRET

2 copies
1st copy

Reference: WR 2 f 10.34 (III/10) Nr 158/44 g.Kdos.-119/44 V - of 17 June 1944

Subject: Enemy agents -
Fuehrer order 003830/42 g.Kdos/OKW/WFSt of 18 October 42

To
W R

WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the army group judge (Heeresgruppenrichter) with the Supreme Commander Southwest of 20 May 44 (Br. B. Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order is to be applied even if the enemy employs only one person for a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several persons or a single person take part in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of participants in a commando operation is that such operations do not correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.

By direction

initialled: W
(Warlimont)

3 inclosures

. . . . . .

(Translator's note: Following is an attached handwritten note):

Qu 2 W

All questions connected to the commando order (18 Oct 42) are to be handled according to a previous directive of Chef Qu at Qu 2 (W) page 2140, not at administration.

(initial illegible)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 506-PS

17 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 506-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

H1145-0125

H1145-0126

Exhibit USA 543
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 508-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

Fuehrer's Headquarters
November 21, 1942

WFSt/Op (L)

5 copies
5th copy

Reference: Landing of British Freight Gliders in Norway. (Illegible signature 2/40/43)

N O T E

Supplement to situation report OKW/WFSt/Op. 21 Nov. 42).

Air Force 5, Ic (G-2) (Capt. S. Lilienskjold) reports 21 Nov. by telephone to inquiry:

1.) Following supplementary report is made about landing of a British freight glider at Hegers and in the night of November 11:

a.) No firing on the part of German defense.

b.) The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed after touching the ground, 7 man crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer order has been carried out.

2.) In the same night a second freight glider landed East of Stavanger. 3 men of the crew were captured by the Norwegian police on November 21. They state that after it was detached the freight glider made a crash-landing at the Lyse Fjord in the night of Nov. 20; it had a crew of 16. Supposedly several dead and wounded. The landing occurred on the North Shore of the Fjord, opposite the electric plant of Flörly (supplies Stavanger).

The plane has not yet been found. Each and every possible measure to find it and also to seize the other members of the crew has been initiated by the recruiting distruct.

The towing plane has apparently returned to England. The radio communication was monitored by Air Fleet #5.

(Signed: "[illegible]")
Went out Nov. 11, 42.

Distribution:

Chief of Operational Staff of the Armed Forces (previous telephone report)
Asst. Chief (Ktb)
Operations (Army)
Operations (Navy)
Operations (Air Force)

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H1145-0127

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 508-PS
(cont'd)

TOP SECRET

F. Amt. Ausl./Abw

Ag Ausl. Nr. 1951/42 gKdos Ausl. Chef

F XVI, E 1/e

Berlin, 4 December, 1942

3 copies
1st copy

To: WFSt

For: Information

From: Abw III.

Subject: Fuehrer order of 18 Oct. 42, about treatment of enemy sabotage troops.

Attached copies of two teletype messages of the Norway Counter Intelligence are hereby forwarded, referring to the order contained in the last paragraph of the 2nd teletype order of the Military Commander of Norway.

It is asked that it should be examined how far this order is compatible with the above discussed Fuehrer order.

By direction
(Illegible signature)

Malimont's initials 8/12

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C O P Y

TOP SECRET

1) Teletype to:

O K W / Abw III F

Subject: Commando Raid.

On November 20, 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 Km NE of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are severly, the others slightly wounded.

All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia. Furthermore following items were found: 8 Knapsacks, tents, skis and radio sender, exact number is unknown. The glider carried rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number unknown. At present the prisoners are with the Bn. in Egersund.

A second plane has crashed 5 Km East of Helleland. It had a 6 man crew and is supposed to have towed the above glider.

The artillery officer of Stavanger is still at the scene of the incident. Further exact report follows; new annexes attached. The competent Commander's Staff (KDS) was immediately notified on the basis of the Fuehrer order. Foreign agency Norway, Nov. 20, 42, No. 34304/42

TOP SECRET III F

2) Teletype to

OKW/Amt Ausl./Abw III F

Reference: Our No 3/304/42 g.Kdos III F of 20 Nov 42.

Subject: Commando Raid.

Foreign service (AST) reports to above teletype:

Beside the 17 member crew estensive sabotage material and work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely proved. The 280th Inf. Div. (J.D.) ordered the execution of the action according to the Fuehrer's order. The execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks and serial numbers.

The salvage of the sabotage material was performed by the Commander's Staff (Kds) of Stavanger. The 2nd aircraft mentioned in the above report is a two-engine plane and was probably the towing plane. It will be inspected. In the same night of the 19th to 20th Nov. a second glider plane was landed at the Lysefjord, 20 Km East of Stavanger, 8 Km East of the Electric plant of Floerly. Until now 3 men, presumably English, were captured by the Norwegian police. The police are on the way to conduct a search for the plane. Supposedly dead and wounded lie around it. According to the statements of the prisoners, this freight glider is supposed to have a 16 man crew. It is possible that this freight glider was towed by the same enemy plane which towed the glider found 15 Km North East of Egersund. The Armed Forces Commander of Norway was notified. Refer at III Wi and Ag WNV/Fu, Oslo.

In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew, the Armed Forces Commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order to the district commanders, according to which the interrogations by G-2 (Ic) and by BDS are important before the execution of the Fuehrer order; in case of No 4 of the Fuehrer order the prisoners are to be handed out to the BDS.

Foreign agency (Ast) Norway, No. 3/304/42 III F. g.Kdos

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H1145-0128

H1145-0129

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 508-PS
(cont'd)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 508-PS

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 508-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

Exhibit USA 547
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 509-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Telegraph Office: G W N O L

Date: 7 Nov 1943

TOP SECRET

SSD WAQC 0183 7/11 1112 DGZ

To Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/ Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab/ Room I c

GKDOS (TOP SECRET)

Subject: British Commando - Operation in Northwest

Pescara 2 Nov 43

3 commandos - special treatment

remaining 9 men wounded, in hospital -

OB SUED F.A. ROEM Ic Nr 7595/43 TOP SECRET

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 509-PS

16 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 509-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

H1145-0130

H1145-0131

Exhibit USA 546
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 512-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

'SSD HOSX 4041 13/12 1400-
OKW / WFSt-
TOP SECRET - According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer order of 18th October (CHEFS), individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proven in the cases of Glomfjord, Twoman torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the use of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore, Armed Forces Commander /WB/ referred to above mentioned /OK/ last sentence of the Führer order (Liquidation only after short interrogation).

The Rec Cross /RK/ and the BDS protested after the immediate carrying out of the Führer order in the case of Egersund and intend for their part to bring up the whole question as a matter of principle.

WBN ROEM One A number 5409/42 GKDOS

SSD - Telegram 14 December 1942

TOP SECRET

/illegible pencil remarks/

TO

Supreme Command Armed Forces
Foreign Department (OKW/Ausl)

For information: Commander Armed Forces Norway (WBfb Norwegian)
Supreme Command Armed Forces Counter Intelligence Service (OKW/abw III)

Reference: AG Ausl. number 1951/42 Top Secret of 4 December 1942.
(Commander Armed Forces Norway I a number 5409/42 Top Secret of 13 December 1942)

Subject: Commando Operations

It is reported that the Armed Forces Commander Norway intends to spare individual saboteurs for the time being in order to have them interrogated. This intention corresponds to the last paragraph of the order OKW/WFSt/QU. number 551781/42 top secret CHEFS of 19th October 1942.

OKW/WFSt/Qu (III)

Number 004872/42 Top Secret

Initial: Warlimont

- - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 512-PS

22 October 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 512-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel
Translation of Document 526-PS

WFSt / Qu (III)

10. 5. 1943

Subject: Saboteurs, Toftefjord.

TOP SECRET

NOTICE

On the 30. 3. 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) an enemy cutter was sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners.

Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian Navy.

Armament: 2 Colt - MG's, 2 mounted MG's, a small transmitter. In addition there were supposed to have been 4 MG's, 6 submachine guns and 1,000 kg of explosives on board.

Captain of the Cutter: Norwegian, Lt. Eskeland.

Purpose: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and bridges.

Assigner of Mission in London: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.

Fuehrer order executed by S.D. (security service).

Wehrmacht Report of 6.4 announces the following about it:

In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage-unit was engaged and destroyed on approaching the coast.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 526-PS

16 Oct. 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt(jg) USNR 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages: and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 526-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
LT(jg) USNR
391590.

H1145-0132

Exhibit USA 550
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 531-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Armed Forces Operational Staff
Qm (Adm. 1)
No. 006688/44 Top Secret

Fuehrer's Hq, 23 June 1944
TOP SECRET
3 copies
1st Copy

Reference: The Fuehrer's Order No 003832/42/OKW/WFST of 18 Oct 42

Subject: Treatment of Commando-men

Conference Memorandum

Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 44:

" The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and 4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the troops how far the concept "within the limits of normal combat operations, etc." is to be extended. The view of the Supreme Command West is as follows:

A. The commitment of air-borne troops and commandos effected in Normandy falls clearly under number 5.

B. It is likewise not to be contested that paratroop units or groups set down further to the rear are connected with the large-scale landing operation effected, if they have the mission of breaking supply lines or carrying out deceptive manoeuvers etc. The German combat soldier will not always be able, during battle, to decide whether it is a question of sabotage groups parachuted down or larger air-borne operations in closer or more distant connection with a landing from the sea already carried out or still being carried out.

C. As a result of the large turn-over of troops in the area of the Supreme Command West, especially recently, it is possible that a considerable number of soldiers are ignorant of the order referred to, which dates from more than 1 1/2 years ago. For Germans from foreign countries (Volksdeutsche) and foreign nationalities the differentiation in the treatment of prisoners will hardly be able to be made clear due to language difficulties. A further reproduction of the order in the present situation, where cases of losses must be considered, is held by Supreme Command West to be a false course of action. Considerable reprisals against our own prisoners must be expected if its contents becomes known.

D. The application of number 5 for all enemy soldiers in uniform penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest solution. On the other hand an order of the chief office for Reich security to the commander of the SIPO (Security Police) and the SD (Party Security Service) in Paris has decided that numbers 3 and 4 of the order referred to are to be applied in the future the same as before in the case of uniformed parachutists committed in groups. A conversation with representatives of the higher SS and police fuehrers in France and of the Commander of the SIPO and SD in Paris gave the result that according to the opinion of all concerned the difficulty lies in the determination of the "limits of normal combat operations". As a solution it was agreed to set a line (e.g. Seine from the mouth to Rouen-Argentan-Avranches) North of which number 5, inland of which numbers 3 and 4 apply. This solution also must be called incomplete, since the combat situation can at any time bring the necessity of extending this line to other coastal areas as well. In case of a large-scale aerial landing in the interior such boundaries cannot be drawn anymore at all. Supreme Command West requests, therefore, that, in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS, the decision be made, that, in view of the new situation, number 5 is to be applied in the whole occupied western area."

Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff:

1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after the enemy landing in the west.

2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that the order is not valid for those enemy soldiers in uniform, who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the beachhead by our troops commited there, or who surrender. Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to and including corps headquarters.

3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is encumbent to determine whether the Commando order is to be applied or not.

4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando undertakings of 18 Oct 42 along with the above explanation.

Proposal:

Attached teletype message.

signed: WARLIMONT

Distribution:

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 1 copy
through Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces Operational Staff
Ktb 2 copies
Qu - Draft 3 copies

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 531-PS

13 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 531-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1145-0134

Exhibit USA 553
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 537-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1145-0135

D R A F T

The High Command of the Wehrmacht

'009074/44 g.k./WFSt/Qu.(Verw.1)

The Führer's Headquarters
30 July 1944

TOP SECRET

re: Treatment of members of foreign "Military Missions", captured together with partisans.

In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest members of foreign so-called "Military Missions" (Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as speculated in the Special orders regarding the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs but in conformity with the Führer's order are the elimination of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW/WFSt. 003830/42 g.Kdos).

This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the Armed forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be destroyed after being made record.

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

KEITEL

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 537-PS

16 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 537-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

Exhibit USA 551
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

H1145-0136

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 551-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

WFA/Wu (verw.1)

Chief of OKW (in penci
of 25 June 1944
Top Secret (Rubber Stamp)
5 Copies
1st Copy

KR-Teletype

Checked before Release (in pencil
Chief West
Remark (in pencil)
OB. Southwest

To

1.) Supreme Commander West
2.) Chief of Army General Staff
3.) OKL/LW Fu. STAB
4.) OKM/1.SKL.
5.) Reichsführer SS-Command Staff
6.) Military Commander, France
7.) Military Commander, Belgium,/Northern France
8.) Armed forces Commander, Netherlands
9.) OKW/WR.
10.) Supreme Commander Southwest (in pencil)

Reference: 1.) Führerorder No.003830/42 top secret of 18 Oct.1942 OKW/West

2.) Teletype Supreme Commander West No.1750/44 top secret of 23 June 1944 (only to OKW/West).

Subject: Treatment of Kommando Participants.

1.) Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of the Führer on the destruction of terror and sabotage units of 18 Oct.1942 remains fully in force.

Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immidiate combcit area of the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the Corps Commands, according to No.5 of the basic order of 18 Oct.1942, remain exempted.

2.) All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the immidiate combat area, who include fundamentally all parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to be turned over to the SD.

3.) All troops, commi Hed outside the combat area of Normandy, are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the directives, issued for it.

4.) Supreme Commander West will report immidiately daily, how many saboteurs have been liquitated in this manner. This applies especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces Communique to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done toward previons commando untertakings in the same manners.

(Initial) W (Warhmont)

(signature) Keitel

OKW/West/Rv(verw.1)
No.006688/44 top Secret

H1145-0137

Addition for Supreme Commander Southwest (written by hand)
Similar action is to be taken in the Italian theater of war.

(initial) J (Jodl)

After forwarding:

Qu (Verw.1) simmultaneously teletype	1st copy
OP (H)	2nd copy
OP (M)/(L)/KTB)	3rd copy
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VO WPr	5st copy

Copy was sent on 18 Aug. to the Chief of the Security police and the SD.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 551-PS — 11 November 1945

I WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt.(jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thorougly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 551-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391590

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1145-0138

Pencilled note: Duplicate

Nov. 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:

The purpose of this conference it to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological (weltanschaulich) education of the German people by the Party. When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of set-backs which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probably course of historical events, and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years, I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While re-organizing the interior, I undertook the second task: to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out: secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conferenc It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few be-lievers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me, was very small. Then the beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.

One year later, Austria came, this step alsa was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger living space (Lebensraum). My goal was to create a logical relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in. The struggle must start here. No people can get away from the solution of this task or else it must yield and gradually die out. That is taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southwest, then adaptation of the number of people to the small space by emigration. In the last years, adaptation of the people to insufficient space, by reducing the number of births. This would lead to the death and weakening of the blood of the people. If a people chooses that course all their weaknesses are mobilised. One yields to the force of the outside and uses this force against one's self by killing of the child. This means the greatest cowardice, decimation of the number, and loss of value. I decided a different way: adaptation of the living space to the number of people. One acknowledgement is important. The state has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its population potential. In our case 82 millions of people were concerned. That means the

greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the mass of the people. That gave me the strength to fight. It is one eternal problem to bring the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available space. Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of any help, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the strength for fight, must withdraw. Struggles are different than those of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial fight. Today we fight for oilfields, rubber, treasures of the earth, etc. After the peace of Westphalia Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence of the German Reich was determined by decree. This German impotence was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia realized her task. Then the opposition between France and England began. Since 1870 England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were certain that there would have to be one more action. The danger at that time was of a two-front war. Moltke was at times in favor of a preventive war. To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization. German armed might was not fully employed. Insufficient sternness of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke was the offensive. He never thought of the defense. Many opportunities were missed after Moltke's death. The solution was only possible by attacking a country at a favorable moment. Political and military leadership always declared that it was not yet ready. In 1914 there came the war on several fronts. It did not bring the solution of these problems. Today the second act of this drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years it must be made clear that we do not have a two-front war to wage. That which has been desired since 1870 and considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and materiel. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation? Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many incidents today. Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are only held as long as they serve the purpose. Russia will hold herself to it only so long as Russia considers it to be to her benefit. Even Bismarck thought so. Let one think of the pact to assure our back. Now Russia has far reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further Russia is striving to increase her influence on the Balkans and is striving toward the Persian Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to benefit her. At the present moment it has retired from internationalism. In case she renounces this, she will proceed to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to see into the future. It is a fact that at the present time the Russian army is of little worth. For the next one or two years the present situation will remain.

Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death could alter everything. Italy has a great goal for the consolidation of her empire. Those who carry this idea are fascism and the Duce, personally. The court is opposed to that. As long as the Duce lives, then it can be calculated that Italy will seize every opportunity to reach her imperialistic goal. However, it is too much to ask of Italy, that it should join in the battle before Germany has seized the offensive in the west: Just so Russia did not attack until we had marched into Poland. Otherwise Italy will think that France has only to deal with Italy, since Germany is sitting behind its West Wall. Italy will not attack until Germany has taken the offensive against France. Just as the death of Stalin, so the death of the Duce can bring danger to us. Just how easily the death of a statesman can come I myself have experienced recently. The time must be used to the full, otherwise one will suddenly find himself faced with a new situation. As long as Italy maintains this position then no danger from Jugoslavia is to be feared. Just so is the neutrality of Rumania achieved by the position of Russia. Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxistic influences, but is neutral now. America is still not dangerous to us because of its neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponents by America

H1145-0139

is still not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is not yet certain whether she will join against England.

Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now, in 6 months it might not be so anymore.

As the last factor I must name my own person in all modesty: irreplaceable. Neither a military nor a civil person could replace me. Assassination attempts may be repeated. I am convinced of the powers of my intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only by the destruction of the opponent. Everyone who believes differently is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversary. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious, but can only deteriorate for us. The enemy will not make peace when the relationship of forces is unfavorable for us. No compromise. Sternness against ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate. The fate of the Reich depends only on me. I shall deal accordingly. Today we have a superiority such as we have never had before. After 1914 our opponents disarmed themselves of their own accord. England disregarded the construction of her fleet. The fleet is no longer sufficiently large to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only two modern new constructions: Rodney and Nelson. New construction activity only in the cruisers of the Washington class, which were, however, an unsatisfactory type. The new measures can become effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war England did not have enough strength to occupy the Tana Sea. At Malta, Gibraltar and London little anti-aircraft protection. Since 1937 a renewal of rearmament. At present however, only a small number of divisions, which must form the nucleus of new divisions. Material for the army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British army has only a symbolic meaning. Rearmament in the air is proceeding. The first phase will end in the spring of 1940. Anti-aircraft has only guns from the last war. A German flyer is safe from English anti-aircraft fire at 6000 meters altitude. The navy will not be fully rearmed before one to two years (1 - 2 Jahren). I have the greatest experience in rearmament and I know the difficulties which must be overcome therein.

After 1914 France reduced the length of service. After 1914 decrease of military might. Only in some special branches are we inferior. Only the French Navy was modernized. In the time after the war the French army deteriorated. There were no changes until Germany rearmed and announced her demands.

In summary:

1) The number of active organizations in Germany is greatest.
2) Superiority of the Luftwaffe.
3) Anti-aircraft beyond all competition.
4) Tank corps
5) Large number of anti-tank guns, five times as many as 1914 machine guns.
6) German artillery has great superiority because of the 10.5 gun.
7) French superiority in howitzers and mortars does not exist.

Numerical superiority, but also the value of the individual soldier is greater than for the others. I am most deeply pained when I hear the opinion that the German army is not individually as valuable as it should be. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what one should have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that the soldiers must be judged in their relative value in comparison with the opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. Every German infantryman is better than the French. Not the exhiliration of patriotism but tough determination. I am told that the troops will only advance if the officers lead the way. In 1914 that was also the case. I am told that we were better trained then. In reality we were only better trained on the drill field, but not for the war. I must pay the present leadership the compliment that it is better than it was in 1914. Mention of the collapse while storming Liege. There was nothing like this in the campaign in Poland.

Five million Germans have been called to the colors. Of what importance if a few of them collapse. Daring in the army, navy and Luftwaffe. I can not bear it when one says the army is not in good shape. Everything lies

H1145-0141

in the hands of the military leader. I can do anything with the German soldier if he is well led. We have succeeded with our small navy in clearing the North Sea of the British. Recognition of the small navy, especially the High Command of the Navy.

We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire living space of the Germans.

The land army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in the West it was not shown that the German soldier is inferior to the French.

Revolution from within is impossible. We are superior to the enemy numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongest armaments industry of the world.

I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the English. The English are a tough enemy. Above all on defence. There is no doubt that England will be very much represented in France at the latest in six to eight months.

We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That could lead to the paralizing of the German power of resistance. Every hope of compromise is childish: Victory or defeat! The question is not the fate of a national-socialistic Germany, but who is to dominate Europe in the future. The question is worthy of the greatest efforts. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England. Mention of the incident at Venlo: The man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a Dutch General Staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The Dutch government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up. This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not even mention the incident anymore. At a given time I shall use that to motivate my action. If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them. One more thing. U-boat. Mines, and Luftwaffe (also for Mines) can strike England effectively, if we have a better starting point. Now a flight to England demands so much fuel that sufficient bomb loads cannot be carried. The invention of a new type mine is of greatest importance for the Navy. Aircraft will be the chief mine layers now. We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon the favorable instant. The military conditions are favorable. A prerequisite however, is that the leadership must give an example of fanatical unity from above. There would not be any failures if the leaders always had the courage a rifleman must have.

Individual acknowledgements: The enemy must be beaten only by attack. Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically we can use more than 100 divisions. With respect to men, reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. Moreover that which is not

H1145-0142

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
(cont.)

ready today must be ready tomorrow. The whole thing means the end of the World War, not just of a single action. It concerns not just a single question but the existence or non-exsistence of the nation.

I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons

1) The decision is irrevocable.
2) The only prospect for success, if the whole armed forces are determined.

The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate demands from us no more than from the great men of German history. As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall destroy everyone who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unshamed if I have to die. I want to destroy the enemy. Behind me stands the German people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles with destiny can have a good intuition. In the last years I have experienced many examples of intuition. Even in the present development I see the prophecy.

If we come through this struggle victoriously - and we shall come through victoriously - our time will enter into the history of our people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside forces, no revolution from the interior forces.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 789-PS

3 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document 789-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

The Führer's speech to the Cammanders in Chief on 22 August 1939.

I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual elements on which I have based my decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence.

After this we will discuss military details.

It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed, since essentialspoints have changed. It became clear to me, that Poland would attack us in case of a conflict with the West. Poland wants access to the sea. The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an inopportune moment. I enumerate as reasons for this reflection:

1)First of all two personal constitutions:

My own personality and that of Mussolini.

Essentially it depends on me, my existence, because of my political activities. Furthermore the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidance of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.

The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy's loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian court is against the Duce. Above all, the court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.

The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask only benevolent neutrality from Spain. But this depends on Franco's personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist party of our internal unity.

On the other side a negative picture as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or France.

For us it is easy to make decision. We have nothing to lose; we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, **because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice**, we must act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little. England's stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.

Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England, in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.

The English empire did not emerge from the last war strong strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved. Conflict between England and Ireland. The South African Union became more independent. Concessions had to be made to India. England is in great danger. Unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.

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France's position has also deteriorated particularly in the Mediterranean.

Further favorable factors for us are these:

Since Albania there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation.

Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady, weak men.

All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2 to 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.

The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved throughta bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military. If at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.

The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to Poland(Danzig corridor) were disturbed by England's intervention. Poland changed her tone toward us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment is more favorable then in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini's could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.

Reference to previous risks.

I would have been stoned if I had not carried my point. The most dangerous step was the invasion of the neutral zone. Only a week before, I got a warning through France. I have always accepted a great risk in the conviction that it may succeed.

Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.

The following special reasons strengthen my idea. England and France are obligated, neither is in a position for it. There is no actual rearmament in England, just propaganda. It has done much damage that many reluctant Germans said and wrote to Englishmen after the soluction of the Czech question; The Führer carried his point because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too soon. This explains the present propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. It is one element of this war of nerves forpresent the increase of armament. But how is British rearmament in actual fact. The construction program of the Navy for 1938 has not yet been filled. Only mobilization of the reserve fleet. Purchase of fishing steamers. Considerable strengthening of the Navy, not before 1941 or 1942.

Little has been done on land. England will be able to send a maximum of 3 divisions to the continent. A little has been done for the air force, but it is only a beginning. AA defense is in its beginning stages. At the moment England has only 150 AA guns. The new AA gun has been ordered. It will take a long time until enough have been produced. Fire directors are lacking. England is still vulnerable from the air. This can change in 2 to 3 years. At the moment the English air force has only 130,000 men, France 72,000 men, Poland 15,000 men. England does not want the conflict to break out for two or three years.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-P
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

The following is characteristic for England. Poland wanted a loan from England for rearmament. England, however, only gave credit in order to make sure that Poland buys in England, although England cannot deliver. This means that England does not really want to support Poland. She does not risk 8 million pounds in Poland, although she put half a billion into China. England's position in the world is very precarious. She will not accept any risks.

France lacks men(decline of the birth rate). Little has been done for rearmament. The artillery is antiquated. France did not want to enter on this adventure. The West has only two possibilities to fight against us:

1)Blockade: It will not be effective because of our antarchy and because we have sources of aid in the east.

2) Attack from the west from the Maginot line: I consider this impossible.

Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well as Skandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. Actually England cannot help Poland. There remains an attack on Italy. A military attack is out of the question. No one is counting on a long war. If Mr. von Brandutch had told me that I would need 4 years to conquer Poland I would have replied: then it cannot be done. It is nonsense to say that E ngland wants to wage a long war.

We will hold our position in the West until we have conquered Poland. We must be conscious of our great production. It is much bigger than in 1914-1918.

The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our emeny after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them in Munich.

I was convinced that Stalin would neveryaccept the England offer. Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland and Stalin knows that it is the end of his regime no matter whether his soldiers come out of a war victorious or beaten. Litvinow's replacement was decisive. I brought about the change toward Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversation. Proposal of a non-agression pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step, which brought it about that Russia answered yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contract with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.

We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation.

The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations.

Today's publication of the non-agression pact with Russia hit like a shell. The consequences cannot be overlooked. Stalin also said that this course will be of benefit to both countries. The effect on Poland will be tremendous.

Goering answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS
Contd.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS ;

15 Nov 1945.

I, Virginia von Schon, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 798-PS.

Virginia von Schon
046318

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H1145-0147

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 872-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

Most Secret

Armed Forces Ops Staff 3.2.41.

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Conference of "Fall Barbarossa" and Sonnenblume.

The following persons attended:

The Fuehrer
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff
C-in-C Army
Chief of the Army General Staff
Chief of Army Op. section
Colonel Schmundt
Major Christian
Major Engel

Chief of Army General Staff (JD) 1) Enemy strength approximately 100 Infantry divisions 25 Cavalry divisions, approximately 30 mechanized divisions.

Our own strength about the same, far superior in quality.

In estimating the leading personalities, Timoshen is the only outstanding figure. The only one, that, is, according to Gen. Koestring.

Details of the strength and organisation of the Russian divisions are important only in that even the Infantry Divisions include a comparitively large number of tanks, though the material is bad and merely thrown together.

In the case of mechanized divisions, we have superiority with regard to tanks, weapons (Schuetzen) and artlery. The Russians are superior in numbers, we in quality.

The Russians are normally equipped im artillery. Materials likewise inferior. The Command of the artillery is insufficient. The Russian Operational intentions are unknown. Strong forces are at the fronier. Any retreat could be only on a small scale since the Baltic States and and Ukraine are vital to the Russians for supply reasons. Fortification work is in progress especially on the North and Southern flanks.

There is no fresh information on the communications system.

Directives to Army Groups so given that the Russian front will be split imto 2 sections and a Russian retreat on the Dnjeper-Duena Mine prevented.

The Army Group North and Centre ordered to press forward across the Duena in a north-easterly direction wit concentrated armoured forces iin 3 armoured groups (the strongest in the South).

The most northerly group is to press on up to the region of Lake Peipus, then advance further to the East in cooperation with the other two armoured groups, who will be attacking Smolensk.

The Army Group South is to advance across the Dneper in a south-easterly direction. Army Group North and Centre is to carry out operations North of the Pripet Marshes. Army Group South will be to the South, that is, separate and independent. The main sector lies in the North, army reserves are massed there.

6 armoured divisions are required from the Marita operation; of thes the 2 training divisions are for the 1st line, a further 2 from Roumania itself for the Southern Group, the last 2 divisions as reserves for the Northern Group. It all depends on the Balkan situation (Turkey's attitude).

Fuehrer — When the die has been cast, the Turks will not make anyfurther moves. No special protection of the Balkans is therefor necessary. One dangerous moment will be if North Africa is cleared by the British, thus enabling the British to operate in Syria with unhampered forces.

Chief of Army General Staff — Northern Group 50 divs, 13 armoured divs, 9 motorized divs. Attac
Southern Group 30 divs, 5 armoured divs, 3 motorized divs. Forces

In addition : Surpreme Command of the Army Reserves.

The assigning of Pioneers is not entirely satisfactory. This is made good by additional bridge-building units (Bruecktenmaterial).

Fuehrer — agreed with the large dispositions.

Chief of Army General Staff — It is proposed to isolate a large number of Russian troops in various places, at the time the split is effected. The early use of reserves is necessary for this purpose. Note: The Pripet Marshes are not definitely tabu.

Fuehrer — mentioned the Russians tactics of flank attacks.

Chief of Army General Staff — The cavalry divisions are particularly dangerous in this respect.

Orders issued to date:
Orders for Army Group are binding
Orders for Armies set out the targets
Orders for Units leave possibility for changes.

He expounded on the orders issued to Army groups etc. up to the present.

Fuehrer — mentioned that the operational areas were enormous, that the enemy troops could be successfully encircled, only if the encirclement were complete (Cavalry divisions). (At the moment, there is a very biassed play on in Moscow about Suwarow). The immediate surrender of the Baltic States, including Leningrad and the Ukraine cannot be expected at once. It is, however, possible that, after the initial defeat, the Russians, knowing our operational aims, will retreat on large scale and prepare for defende further East behind some barrier.

In this case, the North, regardless of the Russians in the East, will be cleared. From there, (a favourable supply-

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base) a thrust in the rear of the Russians without a frontal attack. It is essential to wipe out large sections of the enemy and not to put them to flight. This will be accomplished if we occupy the flanking areas with the strongest possible forces. Then, with the enemy held in the centre, he can be manoeuvred out of it from the flanks.

Chief of Army General Staff

The Falkenhorst army can advance on Petsamo with 1½ divisions, by using Swedish railways, with a further 1½ divisions (including 1 SS Brigade). The aim is the protection of the Finnish northern industrial area, trapping and cutting off the Murmansk forces.

The Finns will probably make a strategic concentration in the South with 4 Army Corps (Aks) of which an attacking group of 5 divisions will advance in the direction of Leningrad, with 3 divisions against Lake Onegin, 2 divisions against Hangö, they need strong support. There are 15 Russian divisions on the Finnish front, approximately 1 division in Murmansk.

Führer

assumed that Sweden would join with us at a price. The price: the Aaland Islands (not our possessions). There is no question of a union between Finnland and Sweden as this would not suit the European New Order.

Norway must be under protection, no repercussions are desired from that quarter. Artillery reinforcements are required.

In the South: The most important task is the protection of the oil fields, therefore speedy action from Roumania is necessary.

Chief of Army General Staff

Position of Hungary. If Hungary is not to participate, we must withdraw from Hungary. The destination of the march will be given as Roumania. At the last minute the direction will change towards the Russian frontier. Hungary will permit anything so long as she is given the corresponding political assurances. Agreements with all states taking part (with the exception of Roumania) can be made only at the eleventh hour. With Roumania it is a matter of life and death.

Chief of Army General Staff

Armoured reconnaissance forces are still scarce.

Flak question is still unsettled, it depends on the conditions of the roads (to follow in writing).

The Air Force commands 30 Flak battalions, in addition 30 batteries set up by the Army.

The Navy must hasten the opening of supply routes to the Baltic.

Supply is a road transport problem as the gauge has to be changed on the railroads here. A system of long-distance trucks, which can bring supplies to supply-bases.

Agreement with the Air Force that all transport is to be used to the full.

Supply-areas, shifted to the region of East Poland, are at present being developed. (Possibilities in Roumania are still being explored).

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H1145-0150

In connection with Marita, the difficulties of transporting back those forces urgently needed for Barbarossa were stressed.

The intended time period was discussed with a plan.

1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) transfer now, Front-Germany - East
2nd " " " from the middle of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. 3 deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained.

In industry the full capacity time table is in force. No more camouflage.

From 25.IV - 15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from the West. (Seelöwe can no longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognisable.

The full capacity time table remains. 8 Marita divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.

C-in-C Army requested that he no longer have to employ 5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West.

Führer When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.

Chief of the Air Force General Staff joined the conference.

Führer discussed the Italian situation in the Mediterranean.

He stated that the loss of North Africa could be withstood in the military sense but must have a strong psychological effect on Italy.

Britain can hold a pistol to Italy's head and force her either to make peace and retain everything or after the loss of North Africa to be bombarded. This would be to our disadvantage. British forces in the Mediterranean area will not be tied down. We ourselves have a weak base there through Southern France. The British have the free use of a dozen divisions and can employ them most dangerously, i.e. in Syria.

We must make every effort to prevent this. Italy must be given support.

We are already doing this in Marita. We must, however, attempt to render effective assistance in North Africa.

The Italians are of the opinion that they can put up a defence now only at Tripoli. This is not feasible. The Air Force cannot operate there. Therefore the position cannot be held. There must be some larger protection zone. Our blocking units can also be effective only in larger protection zones.

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He discussed the connection between successes, even defensive successes there and Balkan events, possibly a peaceful settlement in the Balkans.

What can be done?

Land units will arrive late even if not too late. Graziani must receive some kind of support. Therefore the Air Force must be employed if possible with Stuka groups.with jumping-off bases and home-fields in Lybia.

If this can bring the British advance to a standstill, the intended blocking unit is still insufficient and must be reinforced by a mobile unit (strong armoured division).

The British personnel and material must have been exhausted during the advance. If the British encounter fresh and well-equipped German forces, the situation will soon alter.

Query from C-in-C Army. Can we spare an armoured division for this?

C-in-C Army unwillingly from Marita.

Führer out of the question.

C-in-C Army If it comes to that, Barbarossa is also in need.

Führer If we send help to North Africa, we must do so at once before the Italians. (We have made the offer to the Italians).

The primary consideration is: can the Air Force intervene now.

The time required for the transport of Air Force supplies, blocking unit and armoured divisions must be established at once.

Then, what are the climatic conditions?

C-in-C Army It is important that British supplies by land and sea are stopped. This can be done only by the German Air Force.

Führer The Italians must be asked how long they can allow for the transport of the above mentioned German troops.

If necessary, transport groups must be employed.

Proposal: General Jeschonek III/KG for special duties, from Foggia.

C-in-C Army proposed that the blocking unit should first be reinforced by 1 armoured regiment. The rest to follow. The Führer agreed.

Chief of Air Force General Staff spoke of the position of the ground-organisation in North Africa. Only in Benghazi are Stuka-Forces ready within range for operations.

Fighter forces will naturally be sent there also, or Italian fighters be placed under German orders.

It is most important that the air base of Malta be subdued.

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Führer agreed. The Italians are to withdraw Italian fighters from the Channel coast (He will speak to the Duce).

The Air Force must test immediately, the possibilities of intervening in North Africa. The Army is to see to the transport for the blocking unit.

The transport must be speeded up. Reinforcement by an armoured regiment, further reinforcement up to an armoured division will be withdrawn from Marita. Flak forces on ahead.

C-in-C Army proposed a united command of all mobile forces under 1st General Headquarters. Cooperation with the Air Force which also commands the Italian naval air forces.

Conclusions:

1). Barbarossa

a). The Führer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.

b). The Führer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.

c). Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldau.

d). It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila. (auxiliary measure)

e). The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seelöwe and the subsidiary measure Marita.

2). Sonnenblume

a). The Air Force must intervene as soon as possible with Stuka and Fighter forces. Bases and jumping-off bases in accordance with decisions made in North Africa.
It is desired that the Italian fighter forces be placed under German orders.

b). The 10th Flieger Korps is to take over the task of protecting the transports to East Africa, in the closest cooperation with the Italian Air Force and Naval Commander in Catania.

c). The 10th Flieger Korps is to strike a strong blow against the British troops in Cyrenaica as soon as possible. (with the use of the heaviest bombs)

The main task is to disrupt British supplies by land and sea, next, to combat the British fleet.

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First of all, attempts must be made to subdue the air base of Malta.

d). The Army is to continue the transport of the blocking unit. This is, however, to be reinforced at once with armour. Preparations for adding one Armoured Division. (Il Staffel from Malta). Flash forces on ahead. 1st General Headquarters to be established immediately. United German Supreme Command over all mobile forces will be proposed to the Italians.

Distribution:

Chef L
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IV

Certified

- - - - - -(illegible)

Captain

- - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 872-PS

7 November 1945

I, ESME SHERRIFF, 2/O, W.R N.S., 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 872-PS.

ESME SHERRIFF
2/O, W.R.N.S.
36482

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1061-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

H1145-0154

THERE IS NO JEWISH GHETTO IN WARSAW ANYMORE!

For the Fuehrer and their country the following fell in the battle for the destruction of Jews and bandits in the former ghetto of Warsaw:

(follow 15 names.)

Furthermore

the Polish Police Sergeant Julian Zielinski, born 13 November 1891, 8th Commissariat.

fell on 19 April 1943 while fulfilling his duty.

They gave their utmost, their life. We shall never forget them.

The following were wounded:

(follow the names of 60 Waffen SS personnel,
11 "Watchmen" from Training Camps, probably Lithuanians, to judge by their names,
12 Security Police Officers in SS units
5 men of the Polish Police
2 regular Army personnel(engineers)

Units used in the action

	Average number of personnel used per day:
SS Staff and Police Leader.	6/5
Waffen SS	
SS Panzer Grenadier Training and Reserve Battalion 3, Warsaw.	4/400
SS Cav. Training and Res. Bat. Warsaw	5/381
Police	
SS Police Regiment 22 I Bat.	3/94
III Bat.	3/134
Engineering Emergency Service	1/6
Polish Police	4/363
Polish Fire Brigade	166
Security Police	
Wehrmacht	
Light A Alarm Battery III/8 Warsaw	2/22
Engineers Det. Of Railway Armored Trains Res. Bat. Rembertow	2/42
Res. Eng. Bat. 14 Gora-Kalwaria	1/34
Foreign Racial Watchmen	
1 Bat. "Trawniki" men	2/335
Total	36/2054

(Translator's note; this obviously means: 36 officers, 2054 men.)

Page 1. The creation of special areas to be inhabited by Jews, and the restriction of the Jews with regard to residence and trading is nothing new in the history of the East. Such measures were first taken far back in the Middle Ages; they could be observed as recently as during the last few centuries. These restrictions were imposed with the intention of protecting the aryan population against the Jews.

Indetical considerations led us as early as February, 1940 to conceive the project of creating a Jewish residential district in Warsaw. The initial intention was to establish as the Ghetto that part of the City of Warsaw which has the Vistula as its eastern frontier. The particular situation prevailing in Warsaw seemed at first to frustrate this plan. It was moreover opposed by several authorities particularly by the City Administration. They pointed in particular that disturbances in industry and trade would ensue if a Ghetto were founded in Warsaw, and that it would be impossible to provide the Jews with food if they were assembled in a closed area.

At a conference held in March 1940, it was decided to postpone the plan of creating a Ghetto for the time being, owing to the above objections. At the same time a plan was considered to declare the District of Lublin the collecting area for all Jews within the Government General, especially for the evacuated or fugitive Jews arriving from the Reich. But as early as April 1940, the Higher SS and Police Leader, East, Cracow, issued a declaration that there was no intention of assembling the Jews within the Lublin District. In the meantime, the Jews had increasingly taken to crossing the frontiers without permission and illegally. This noted especially at the limits of the Districts of Lowicz and Skierniewice. Conditions in the town of Lowicz became dangerous from the point of view of hygiene as well as from that of the Security Police, owing to these illegal migrations of Jews. The District President of Lowicz therefore, began to install Ghettos in his district in order to avoid these dangers.

The experiences in the district of Lowicz, after Ghettos had been installed, showed that this method is the only one suitable for dispelling the dangers which emanate repeatedly from the Jews.

The necessity of erecting a Ghetto in the City of Warsaw as well became more and more urgent in the summer of 1940, since more and more troops were being assembled in the district of Warsaw after termination of the French campaign. At that time the Department for Hygiene urged the speedy erection of a Ghetto in the interest of preserving the health of the German Forces and of the native population as well. The original plan of establishing the Ghetto in the suburb of Praga as intended in February 1940, would have taken at least 4 to 5 months, since almost 600,000 persons had to be moved. But since experience showed that greater outbreaks of epidemics might be expected in the winter months and since for this reason the District Medical Officer urged that the resettling action ought to be completed by 15 November 1940 at the latest, the plan of establishing a suburban ghetto in Praga was dropped; and instead, the area which hitherto had been used as a quarantine area for epidemics was selected for use as a Jewish residential area. In October 1940, the Governor ordered the Commissioner of the District President for the City of Warsaw to complete the resettlement

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necessary for establishing the Ghetto within the City of Warsaw by 15 November 1940.

The Ghetto thus estaplished in Warsaw was inhabited by about 400,000 Jews. It contained 27,000 apartments with an average of 2½ rooms each. It was separated from the rest of the city by partition and other walls and by walling- up of thoroughfares, windows, doors, open spaces, etc.

It was administered by the Jewish Board of Elders, who received their instructions from the Commissioner for the Ghetto, who was immediately subordinated to the Governor. The Jews were granted self-administration in which the German supervising authorities intervened only where German interest were touched. In order to enable the Jewish Board of Elders to execute its orders, a Jewish Police force was set up, identified by special armbands and a special beret and arred with rubber truncheons. This Jewish Police force was charged with maintaining order and security within the Ghetto and was subordinated to the German and Polish Police.

II

It soon became clear, however, that not all dangers had been removed by this confining the Jews to one place. Security considerations required removing the Jews from the city of Warsaw altogether. The first large resettlement action took place in the period from 22 July to 3 October 1942. In this action 310,322 Jews were removed. In January 1943 a second resettlement action was carried out by which altogether 6,500 Jews were affected.

When the Reichsfuehrer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943 he ordered the SS and Police Leader for the District of Warsaw to transfer to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises of military importance which were included within the Ghetto including their personnel and machines. The execution of this transfer order proved to be very difficult, since the managers as well as the Jews resisted in every possible way. The SS and Police Leader thereupon decided to enforce the transfer of the enterprises in a large scale action which he intended to carry out in three days. The necessary preparations had been taken by me predecessor, who also had given the order to start the large scale action. I myself arrived in Warsaw on 17 April 1943 and took over the command of the action on 19 April 1943, 0800 hours, the action itself having started the same day at 0600 hours.

Before the large-scale action began, the limits of the former Ghetto had been blocked by an external barricade in order to prevent the Jews from breaking out. This barricade was maintained from the start to the end of the action and was especially reinforced at night.

When we invaded the Ghetto for the first time, the Jews and the Polish bandits succeeded in repelling the participating units, including tanks and armored cars, by a well-prepared concentration of fire. When I ordered a second attack, about 0600 hours, I distributed the units, separated from each other by indicated lines, and charged them with combing out the whole of the Ghetto, each unit for a certain part. Although firing cimmenced again, we now succeeded in combing out the blocks according to plan. The enemy was forced to retire from the roofs and elevated bases to the basements, dug-outs and sewers. In order to predammed up below the Ghetto and filled with water, but the Jews frustrated this plan to a great extent by blowing up the ~~Jews~~ turning off valves. Late the first day we encountered rather heavy resistance, but it was quickly broken by a special raiding party. In the course of further operations we succeeded in expelling

the Jews from their prepared resistance bases, sniper holes, and the like, and in occupying during the 20 and 21 April the greater part of the so-called remainder of the Ghetto to such a degree that the resistance continued within these blocks could no longer be called considerable.

The main Jewish battle group, mixed with Polish bandits, had already retired during the first and second day to the so-called Muranowski Square. There, it was reinforced by a considerable number of Polish bandits. Its plan was to hold the Ghetto by every means in order to prevent us from invading it. The Jewish and Polish standards were hoisted at the top of a concret building as a challenge to us. These two standards, however, were captured on the second day of the action by a special raiding party. SS Untersturmfuehrer Dehmke fell in this skirmish with the bandits; he was holding in his hand a hand-grenade which was hit by the enemy and exploded, injuring him fatally. After only a few days I realized that the original plan had no prospect of success, unless the armament factories and other enterprises of military importance distributed throughout the Ghetto were dissolved. It was therefore necessary to approach these firms and to give them appropriate time for being evacuated and immediately transferred. Thus one of these firms after the other was dealt with, and we very soon deprived the Jews and bandits of their chance to take refuge time and again in these enterprises, which were under the supervision of the Armed Forces. In order to decide how much time was necessary to evacuate these enterprises thorough inspections were necessary. The conditions discovered there are indescribable. I cannot imagine a greater chaos than in the Ghetto of Warsaw. The Jews had control of everything, from the chemical substances used in manufacturing explosives to clothing and equipment for the Armed Forces. The managers knew so little of their own shops that the Jews were in a position to produce inside these shops arms of every kind, especially hand grenades, Molotov cocktails, and the like.

Moreover, the Jews had succeeded in fortifying some of these factories as centers of resistance. Such a center of resistance in an Army accommodation office had to be attacked as early as the second day of the action by an Engineer's Unit equipped with flame-throwers and by artillery. The Jews were so firmly established in this shop that it proved to be impossible to induce them to leave it voluntarily; I therefore resolved to destroy this shop the next day by fire.

The managers of these enterprises, which were generally also supervised by an officer of the Armed Forces, could in most cases make no specified statements on their stocks and the whereabouts of these stocks. The statements which they made on the number of Jews employed by them were in every case incorrect. Over and over again we discovered that these labyrinths of edifices belonging to the armament concerns as residential blocks, contained rich Jews who had succeeded in finding accomodations for themselves and their families under the name of "armament workers" and were leading marvelous lives there. Despite all our orders to the managers to make the Jews leave those enterprises, we found out in several cases that managers simply concealed the Jews by shutting them in, because they expected that the action would be finished within a few days and that they then would be able to continue working with the remaining Jews. According to the statements of arrested Jews, women also seem to have played a prominent part. The Jews are said to have endeavored to keep up good relations with officers and men of the armed forces. Carousing is said to have been frequent, during the course of which business deals are said to have been concluded between Jews and Germans.

H1145-0157

The number of Jews forcibly taken out of the buildings and arrested was relatively small during the first few days. It transpirted that the Jews had taken to hiding in the sewers and in specially erected dug-outs. Whereas we had assumed during the first days that there were only scattered dug-outs, we learned in the course of the large-scale action that the whole Ghetto was systematically equipped with cellars, dug-outs and passages. In every case these passages and dug-outs were connected with the sewer system. Thus, the Jews were able to maintain undisturbed subterranean traffic. They also used this sewer network for escaping subterraneously into the aryan part of the City of Warsaw. Continuously, we received reports of attempts of Jews to escape through the sewer holes. While pretending to build air-raid shelters they had been erecting dug-outs within the former Ghetto ever since the autumn of 1942. These were intended to conceal every Jew during the new evacuation action, which they had expected for quite a time, and to enable them to resist the invaders in a concerted action. Through posters, handbills, and whisper propaganda, the communistic resistance movement actually brought it about that the Jews entered the dug-outs as soon as the new large-scale operation started. How far their precautions went can be seen from the fact that many of the dug-outs had been skilfully equipped with furnishings sufficient for entire families, washing and bathing facilities, toilets, arms and munition supplies, and food supplies sufficient for several months. There were differently equipped dug-outs for rich and for poor Jews. To discover the individual dug-outs was difficult for the units, as they had been efficiently camouflaged. In many cases, it was possible only through betrayal on the part of the Jews.

When only a few days had passed, it became apparent that the Jews no longer had any intention to resettle voluntarily, but were determined to resist evacuation with all their force and by using all the weapons at their disposal. So-called battle groups had been formed, led by Polish-Bolshevists; they were armed and paid any price asked for available arms.

During the large-scale action we succeeded in catching some Jews who had already been evacuated and resettled in Dublin or Troblinka, but had broken out from there and returned to the Ghetto, equipped with arms and ammunition. Time and again Polish bandits found refuge in the Ghetto and remained there undisturbed, since we had no forces at our disposal to comb out this mare. Whereas it had been possible during the first days to catch considerable numbers of Jews, who are cowards by nature, it became more and more difficult during the second half of the action to capture the bandits and Jews. Over and over again new battle groups consisting of 20 to 30 or more Jewish fellows, 18 to 25 years of age, accompanied by a corresponding number of women kindled new resistance. These battle groups were under orders to put up armed resistance to the last and if necessary to escape arrest by committing suicide. One such battle group succeeded in mounting a truck by ascending from a sewer in the so-called Prosta, and in escaping with it (about 30 to 35 bandits). One bandit who had arrived with this truck exploded 2 hand grenades, which was the agreed signal for the bandits waiting in the sewer to climb out of it. The bandits and Jews, - there were Polish bandits among these gangs armed with carbines, small arms, and in one case a light machine gun, - mounted the truck and drove away in an unknown direction. The last member of this gang, who was on guard in the sewer and was detailed to close the lid of the sewer hole, was captured. It was he who gave the above information. The search for the truck was unfortunately without result.

During this armed resistance the women belonging to the battle groups were equipped the same as the men; some were members of the Chaluzim movement. Not infrequently, these women fired

H1145-0158

H1145-0159

pistols with both hands. It happened time and again that these women had pistols or hand grenades(Polish "pineapple" hand grenades) concealed in their bloomers up the last moment to use against the men of the Waffen SS, Police, or Wehrmacht.

The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could be broken only by relentlessly using all our force and energy by day and night. On 23 April 1943 the Reichs Fuehrer SS issued through the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East at Cracow his order to complete the combing out of the Warsaw Ghetto with the greatest severity and relentless tenacity. I therefore decided to destroy the entire Jewish residential area by setting every block on fire, including the blocks of residential buildings near the armament works. One concern after the other was systematically evacuated and subsequently destroyed by fire. The Jews then emerged from their hiding places and dug-outs in almost every case. Not infrequently, the Jews stayed in the burning buildings until, because of the heat and the fear of being burned alive they preferred to jump down from the upper stories after having thrown mattresses and other upholstered articles into the street from the burning buildings. With their bones broken, they still tried to crawl across the street into blocks of buildings which had not yet been set on fire or were only partly in flames. Of the Jews changed their hiding places during the night, by moving into the ruins of burnt-out buildings, taking refuge there until they were found by our patrols. Their stay in the sewers also ceased to be pleasant after the first week. Frequently from the street, we could hear loud voices coming through the sewer shafts. Then the men of the Waffen SS, the Police or the Wehrmacht Engineers courageously climbed down the shafts to bring out the Jews and not infrequently they then stumbled over Jews already dead, or were shot at. It was always necessary to use smoke candles to drive out the Jews. Thus one day we opened 183 sewer entrance holes and at a fixed time lowered smoke candles into them, with the result that the bandits fled from what they believed to be gas to the center of the former Ghetto, where they could then be pulled out of the sewer holes there. A great number of Jews, who could not be counted, were exterminated by blowing up sewers and dug-outs.

The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the Waffen SS, Police and Wehrmacht became; they fulfilled their duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as models and examples of soldiers, Their duty hours often lasted from early morning until late at night. At night, search patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their stores from abandoned dug-outs and for contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news with them.

Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen-SS had only been trained for three to four weeks before being assigned to this action, high credit should be given for the pluck, courage, and devotion to duty which they showed. It must be stated that the Wehrmacht Engineers,too, executed the blowing up of dug-outs, sewers, and concrete buildings with undefatigability and great devotion to duty. Officers and men of the Police, a large part ofwhom had already been at the front, again excelled by their dashing spirit.

Only through the continuous and untiring work of all involved did we suceed in catching a total of 56,065 Jews whose extermination can be proved. To this should be added the number of Jews who lost their lives in explosions or fires but whose numbers could not be ascertained.

During the large-scale operation the aryan population was informed by posters that it was strictly forbidden to enter the former Jewish Ghetto and that anybody caught within the former Ghetto without a valid pass would be shot. At the same time these posters informed the aryan population again that the death penalty would be imposed on anybody who intentionally gave refuge to a Jew, especially lodged, supported, or concealed a Jew outside the Jewish residential area.

Permission was granted to the Polish police to pay to any Polish Policeman who arrested a Jew within the aryan part of Warsaw one third of the cash in the Jew's possession. This measure has already produced results.

The Polish population for the most part approved the measures taken against the Jews. Shortly before the end of the large-scale operation, the Governor issued a special proclamation which he submitted to the undersigned for approval before publication, to the Polish population; in it he informed them of the reasons for destroying the former Jewish Ghetto by mentioning the assassinations carried out lately in the Warsaw area and the mass graves found in Catyn; at the same time they were asked to assist us in our fight against Communist agents and Jews(see enclosed poster.)

The large-scale action was terminated on 16 May 1943 with the blowing up of the Warsaw Synagogue at 2015 hours.

Now, there are no more factories in the former Ghetto. All the goods, raw materials, and machines there have been moved and stored somewhere else.. All buildings etc. have been destroyed. The only exception is the so-called Dzielna Prison of the Security Police, which was exempted from destruction.

III

Although the large-scale operation has been completed, we have to reckon with the possibility that a few Jews are still living in the ruins of the former Ghetto; therefore, this area must be firmly shut off from the aryan residential area and be guarded. Police Battalion III/23 has been charged with this duty. This Police Battalion has instructions to watch the former Ghetto, particularly to prevent anybody from entering the former Ghetto, and to shoot immediately anybody found inside the Ghetto without authority. The Commander of the Police Battalion will continue to receive further direct orders from the SS and Police Fuhrer. In this way, it should be possible to keep the small remainder of Jews there, if any, under constant pressure and to exterminate them eventually. The remaining Jews and bandits must be deprived of any chance of survival by destroying all remaining buildings and refuges and cutting off the water supply.

It is proposed to change the Dzielna Prison into a concentration camp and to use the inmates to remove, collect and hand over for re-use the millions of bricks, the scrap-iron, and other materials.

IV.

Of the total of 56,065 Jews caught, about 7,000 were exterminated within the former Ghetto in the course of the large-scale action, and 6,929 by transporting them to T.II, which means 14,000 Jews exterminated altogether. Beyond the number of 56,065 Jews an estimated number of 5 to 6,000 were killed by explosions or in fires.

The number of destroyed dug-outs amounts to 631.

H1145-0160

Booty:
7 Polish rifles, 1 Russian rifle, 1 German rifle,
59 Pistols of various calibers,
several hundred hand grenades, including Polish and home-made ones,
several hundred incendiary bottles,
home-made explosives,
infernal machines with fuses,
a large amount of explosives, ammunition for weapons of all calibers, including some machine-gun ammunition.

Regarding the booty of arms, it must be taken into consideration that the arms themselves could in most cases not be captured, as the bandits and Jews would, before being arrested, throw them into hiding places or holes which could not be ascertained or discovered. The smoking out of the dug-out by our men, also often made the search for arms impossible. As the dug-outs had to be blown up at once, a search later on was out of the question.

The captured hand grenades, ammunition, and incendiary bottles were at once re-used by us against the bandits.

Further booty:
1,240 used military tunics (part of them with medal-ribbons--Iron Cross and East Medal)
800 pairs of used trousers,
other equipment and German steel-helmets.
108 horses, 4 of them still in the former Ghetto (hearse)

Up to 23 May 1943 we had counted:

4.4 million Zloty; furthermore about 5 to 6 million Zloty not yet counted, a great amount of foreign currency, e.g. 814,300 in paper and 89,200 in gold, moreover valuables (rings, chains, watches, etc.) in great quantities.

State of the Ghetto at the termination of the large-scale operation:

Apart from 8 buildings (Police Barracks, hospital, and accomodations for housing working-parties) the former Ghetto is completely destroyed. Only the dividing walls are left standing where no explosions were carried out. But the ruins still contain a vast amount of stones and scrap material which could be used.

Warsaw, 16 May 1943.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.

SS Brigadefuehrer and
Majorgeneral of Police.

H1145-0161

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1061-PS
Cont'd.

(Daily reports)

Copy

SS Service Teletype Message

From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Ref No. I ab St/Gr 16 07
Re: Ghetto Operation

Warsaw, 20 April 1943
Journal No. 516/43 secret.

To:
The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East
Cracow

Progress of Ghetto Operation on 19 April 1943:

Closing of Ghetto commenced 0300 hrs. At 0600 order to Waffen-SS(strength: 16/850) to comb out the remainder of the Ghetto. Hardly had the units fallen in, strong concerted fire-concentration by the Jews and bandits. The tank used in this action and the two heavy armored cars pelted with Molotov cocktails (incendiary bottles). Tank twice set on fire. Owing to this enemy counterattack, we had at first to take the units back. Losses in first attack: 12 men(3 SS-men, 6 Trawniki-men). About 800 hrs. second attack by the units, under the command of the undersigned. Although the counterattack was repeated, this time we succeeded in combing out the blocks of buildings according to plan. We caused the enemy to retire from the roofs and elevated prepared positions into the cellars or dug-outs and sewers. During this combing-out we caught only about 200 Jews. Immediately afterwards raiding parties were directed to dug-outs known to us with the order to pull out the Jews and to destroy the dug-outs. About 380 Jews captured. We found out that the Jews had taken to the sewers. Sewers were completely inundated, to make staying there impossible. About 1730 hrs. we encountered very strong resistance from one block of buildings including machine gun fire. A special raiding party invaded that block and defeated the enemy, but could not catch the resisters. The Jews and criminals resisted from base to base, and escaped at the last moment across lofts or through subterranean passages. About 2030 hrs. the esternal barricade was reinforced. All units were withdrawn from the Ghetto and dismissed to their barracks. Reinforcement of the barricade by 250 Waffen-SS men. Continuation of operation on 20 April 1943.

Units at my disposal:

SS-Panzer-Gren. Res. Batl.	6/400
SS-Cav. Res. Batl.	10/450
Police	6/165
Security Service.	2/48
Trawniki-men	1/150
Wehrmacht:	
1 10-cm-Howitzer	1/7
1 Flame-thrower	1
Engineers	2/16
Medical detachment	1/1
3 2.28-cm A.A. Guns	2/24

1 French tank of the Waffen-SS
2 heavy armored cars of the Waffen-SS

Total: 31/1262

H1145-0162

I put Major of Police Sternagel in command of today's operations subject to my further instructions if necessary.

At 0700 hrs 9 raiding parties were formed, each 1/36 strong, consisting of mixed units, to comb out and to search the remainder of the Ghetto intensively. This search is still in progress; its first objective will be completed by 1100 hrs. In the meantime it has been ascertained that part of the Ghetto which is no longer inhabited but not yet released and which contains several armament factories and the like, there are several centers of resistance, which were so strong that the tank could not go through. 2 raiding parties defeated these centers of resistance and made a passage for the tank men. In this operation we already had two wounded (Waffen-SS)

Enemy is much more cautious than yesterday, since he has of course learned of the heavy arms at our disposal.

My intention is first to comb out completely the remainder of the Ghetto and then to clean out in the same manner the so-called uninhabited Ghetto, which so far has not been released. It has been ascertained in the meantime that the latter part of the Ghetto contains at least 10 to 12 dug-outs, some of which are even in armament factories. The whole operation is made more difficult because there are still factories in the Ghetto which must be protected against bombardment and fire, because they contain machines and tools.

A further report will follow tonight.

The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.

/s/ Stroop

SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral
of Police.

certified copy:

SS-Sturmmannfuehrer.

H1145-0163

- -

Teletype message

Copy:

From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 20 April 1943.

Ref. no. I ab St/Gr 16 07-Journal No. 517/43 secret
Re: Ghetto Operation
To the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger - or deputy.

Cracow

Supplementing my teletype message of 20 April 1943--Ref. St/Gr 16 07, re Ghetto operation-- Ibeg to report as follows:

The resistance centers ascertained within the uninhabited but not yet released part of the Ghetto were crushed by a battle group of the Wehrmacht--Engineers and flame-throwers. The

H1145-0164

Wehrmacht had one wounded in this operation, shot through the lungs. Nine raiding parties broke through as far as the Northern limit of the Ghetto. 9 dug-outs were found, their inmates crushed when they resisted, and the dug-outs blown up. What losses the enemy suffered cannot be ascertained accurately. Altogether the 9 raiding parties caught 505 Jews today; those among them who are able-bodied were kept ready for transport to Poniatowo. At about 1500 hrs I managed to arrange that the block of buildings occupied by the Army Accommodation Office said to be occupied by 4,000 Jews is to be evacuated at once. The German manager was asked to call upon the Jewish workers to leave the block voluntarily. Only 28 Jews obeyed this order. Thereupon I resolved either to evacuate the block by force or to blow it up. The A.A. Artillery--3 2-cm. guns used for this operation had two men killed. The 10-cm howitzer, which also was used, expelled the gangs from their strong fortifications and also inflicted losses on them, as far as we were able to ascertain. This action had to be broken off owing to the fallof darkness. On 21 April 1943 we shall attack this resistance center again, as far as possible it will remain blocked off during the night.

In today's action we caught, apart from the Jews reported above, considerable stores of incendiary bottles, hand grenades, ammunition, military tunics, and equipment.

Losses: 2 dead (Wehrmacht)
7 wounded (6 Waffen SS, 1 Trawniki-man)

In one case the bandits had laid pressure mines. I have succeeded in causing the firms L.C. Toebbens, Schultz and Co., and Hoffman to be ready for evacuation with their entire personnel on 21 April 1943 at 0600 hrs. In this way, I hope to get the way free at last for cleaning out the Ghetto. The Trustee Toebbens has pledged himself to induce the Jews, numbering about 4 to 5,000, to follow him voluntarily to the assembling point for being resettled. In case this has as little success as was attained in the case of the Army Accommodation Office, I am going to clean out this part of the Ghetto as well by force. I beg to acknowledge receipt of the order which the Obergruppenführer communicated to me by telephone today, and of the powers granted to me.

Next report on 21 April 1943 at noon.

The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.

signed: Stroop

SS-Brigadefuehrer and
Major-general of Police.

Certified copy:

SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 21 April 1943.

Ref. Nr. Ia/b St/Gr 16 07 Journal Nr. 527/43

Re: Ghetto Operation.

To the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger - or deputy

Cracow

Progress of Ghetto Operat on on 21 April 1943.

Supplementing the report which I made today about 1400 hrs by telephone, I beg to report:

Forces at my disposal as of 20 April 1943.

Start of Operation: 0700 hrs - the whole of the Ghetto has continued to be cordoned off since the start of the operations on 19 April 1943.

Inasmuch as the special operation concerning the block of buildings occupied by the Army Accommodation Office had to be interrupted yesterday because of darkness, one battle group reinforced by Engineers and heavy artillery was again sent into the block of buildings, which was found to contain an enormous quantity of dug-outs and subterranean passages firing from time to time. I resolved therefore to blow up those passages which we had discovered and subsequently to set the entire block on fire. Not until the building was well aflame did screaming Jews make their appearance, and they were evacuated at once. We had no losses in t is operation. Precautionary measures were taken in order to ensure that the conflagration remained localized.

The main body of our forces was detailed to cleanse the so-called uninhabited, but not yet released, part of the Ghetto by proceeding from South to North. Before we started this action, we caught 5,200 Jews who had been employed in enterprises under the supervision of the Commissioner for Armament (Rüstungs-Kommando) and transported them under armed guard to the Railway Station which had been chosen for use in the resettlement. I formed 3 search-parties to which were attached special raiding parties who had the duty to attack or blow up the dug-outs which were known to us. This operation had to be interrupted when darkness set in, after one half of the area mentioned had been combed out.

Continued on 22 April 1943, 0700 hrs.

Apart from the Jews who were to be evacuated, 150 Jews or bandits were killed in battle and about 80 bandits were killed when their dug-outs were blown up. The enemy today used the same arms as on the previous day, particularly home-made explosives. Samples have been kept by the SS and Police Fuehrer. For the first time we observed the participation of members of the Jewish Women's Battle Association(Chaluzim Movement). We captured rifles, pistols, hand grenades, explosives, horses, and parts of SS uniforms.

Own lossess: 2 policemen, 2 SS-men, 1 Trawniki-man.

(light wounds)

The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.

signed: Stroop

SS-Brigadefuehrer and
Majorgeneral of Police.

Certified copy
SS-Sturmbannführer.

H1145-0165

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1061-PS
Contd.

Copy

Teletype message.

From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 22 April 1943.

Ref. No. I ab St/Gr 16 07 -Journal Nr. 530/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto Operation.- supplement to Par. 1 of letter of 21 April 1943.
To: The higher SS and Police Fuehrer of Police

Krueger - or deputy

Cracow

Our setting the block on fire achieved the result in the course of the night that those Jews whom we had not been able to find despite all our search operations left their hide-outs under the roofs, in the cellars, and elsewhere, and appeared at the outside of the buildings, trying to escape the flames. Masses of them - entire families - were already afire and jumped from the windows or endeavored to let themselves down by means of sheets tied together or the like. Steps had been taken so that these Jews as well as the remaining ones were liquidated at once. During the whole night there were shots from buildings which were supposed to be evacuated. We had no losses in our cordoning forces. 5,300 Jews were caught for the evacuation and removed.

The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.

signed: Stroop

SS- Brigadefuehrer
and Majorgeneral of Police

Certified copy;
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy

Teletype message.

From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 22 April 1943.

Ref. Nr. I ab St/Gr 16 07 - Journal Nr. 531/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto Operation

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of the Ghetto Operation on 22 April 1943 up to 1200 hrs

One raiding party was dispatched to invade once more the block of buildings which for the greater part had burned out or was still aflame, in order to catch those Jews who were still inside. When shooting again started from one block against the men of the Waffen-SS, this block also was set on fire, with the result that a considerable number of bandits were scared from their hide-outs and shot while trying to escape. Apart from those, we caught about 180 Jews in the yards of the

H1145-0166

buildings. The main body of our units continued the cleansing action from the line where we terminated this action yesterday. This operation is still in progress. As on the preceding days local resistance was broken and the dug-outs we discovered were blown up. Unfortunately there is no way of preventing part of the Jews and bandits from taking refuge in the sewers below the Ghetto, where we can hardly catch them since they have stopped the flooding. The City Administration is not in a position to frustrate this nuisance. Neither did the use of smoke candles or the introduction of Creosote into the water have the desired result. Cooperation with the Wehrmacht splendid.

The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw

signed: Stroop

SS Brigadefuehrer and
Major-general of Police

Certified copy
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype message.

From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 22 April 1943.

Ref. Nr. ab St/Gr- 16 o7-Journal Nr. 532/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto Operation.

The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger - or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of operation of 22 April 1943. Report on action up to 1200 hrs has already been submitted by my message of today.

Continuing, I beg to report:

When the special raiding party searched the remainder of the blocks as already reported, they met with resistance at some places; they had the following success: 1,100 Jews caught for evacuation, 203 bandits and Jews killed, 15 dug-outs blown up. They captured 80 incendiary bottles and other booty. Units at my disposal: as reported by teletype message on 20 April 1943. Journal No. 516/43 secret.

Our losses: SS-Untersturmfuehrer Lehmke(dead); enemy hit a hand grenade which he carried. (SS-Cav.Res. Batl.)

1 Sergeant of Police(shot through the lungs)

When the Engineers blow up the dug-outs, a considerable number of Jews and bandits were buried under the ruins. In a number of cases it was found necessary to start fires in order to smoke the gangs out.

I must add that since yesterday some of the units have been shot at time and again from outside the Ghetto, that is, from the Aryan part of Warsaw. Raiding parties at once entered

the area in question and in one case succeeded in capturing 35 Polish bandits, Communists, who were liquidated at once. Today it happened repeatedly when we found it necessary to execute some bandits, that they collapsed shouting "Long live Poland", "Long live Moscow".

The operation will be continued on 23 April 1943, 0700 hrs.

The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw

signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Maj. Gen. of Police.

Certified Copy
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

H1145-0168

Copy Teletype message.

From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, 23 April 1943.

Ref. No. : I ab St/Gr-16 07-Journal No. 538/43 secret
Re: Ghetto Operation

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger - or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of Ghetto Operation on 23 April 1943.
Start: 0700 hours.

The whole of the former Ghetto had been divided for the purposes of today's combing-out operations into 24 districts. One reinforced searching party was detailed to each district with special orders. These assignments had to be carried out by 1600 hours.

Result of this action: 600 Jews and bandits ferreted out and captured, about 200 Jews and bandits killed, 48 dug-outs, some of them of a quite elaborate character, blown up. We captured apart from valuables and money - some gas masks.

The units had been informed that we intended to terminate the operation today. In the morning the Jews had already become aware of this instruction. This is why a renewed search by the searching parties was undertaken after an interval of 1 to 1½ hours. The result was, as always, that again Jews and bandits were discovered to be in various blocks. From one block shots were even fired against the cordoning units. An attack by a special battle group was ordered and in order to smoke the bandits out, every building was now set on fire. The Jews and bandits held out, every building was now set on fire. The Jews and bandits held their fire up to the last moment and then concerted their fire against the units. They even used carbines. A number of bandits who were shooting from balconies were hit by our men and crashed down.

Furthermore, today we discovered a place said to have been the headquarters of the "P PR"; we found it unoccupied and destroyed it. It was on this 5th day of operations that obviously we found the worst of the terrorists and activists, who so far had always found ways and means to dodge every

searching or evacuation action.

A racial German reported that again some Jews had escaped through the sewers into the aryan part of the city. We learned from a traitor that there were some Jews in a certain house. A special motorized raiding party invaded the building and caught 3 Jews, 2 of them females. During this operation their motor-car was pelted with one incendiary bottle and one explosive; 2 policemen were wounded.

The whole operation is rendered more difficult by the cunning way in which the Jews and bandits act; for instance, we discover that the hearses which were used to collect the corpses lying around at the same time bring living Jews to the Jewish cemetery, and thus they are enabled to escape, from the Ghetto. Now this way of escape also is barred by continuous control of the hearses.

At the termination of today's operation about 2200 hours, we discovered that again about 30 bandits had passed into a so-called armaments factory, where they had found refuge. Since the forces are storing goods of great value in this enterprise, this factory was requested to evacuate the building by noon on 24 April: this will enable us to cleanse that labyrinth of a building tomorrow.

Today 3,500 Jews were caught who are to be evacuated from the factories. A total of 13,450 Jews have been caught for resettlement or already evacuated up to today. Of these about 2,500 Jews are still to be loaded. The next train will start on 24 April 1943.

Strength as of 22 April 1943, without 150 Trawniki men; these have already been put at the disposal of the Eastern Command as reinforcement for another assignment.

Our losses: 2 police corporals("SS") wounded,
1 Trawniki man wounded.

The operation will be continued on 24 April 1943, 1000 hours. This hour was chosen so that Jews who may still be in the Ghetto will believe that the operation was actually terminated today.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Majorgeneral of Police.

Certified Copy:

SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy

Teletype message.

From The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, 24 April 1943.

Ref. Nr.: I ab St/Wdt-16 07 Journal No. 545/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto operation.

The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Police
Krueger or deputy.

H1145-0169

Cracow

Progress of operation on 24 April 1943, start 1000 hours.

Contrary to the preceding days, the 24 searching parties which had again been formed did not start at one end of the Ghetto, but proceeded from all sides at the same time. Apparently the Jews still in the Ghetto were deceived by the fact that the operation did not start until 1000 hours into believing that the action really had been terminated yesterday. The search action, therefore, had especially satisfactory results today. This success is furthermore due to the fact that the non-commissioned officers and men have meanwhile become accustomed to the cunning fighting, methods and tricks used by the Jews and bandits and that they have acquired great skill in tracking down the dug-outs which are found in such great number. The raiding parties having returned, we set about to clean a certain block of buildings, situated in the north-eastern part of the former Ghetto. In this labyrinth of buildings there was a so-called armaments firm which reportedly had goods worth millions for manufacture and storage. I had notified the Wehrmacht of my intentions on 23 April 1943 about 2100 hours, and had requested them to remove their goods by 1200 hours. Since the Wehrmacht did not start this evacuation until 1000 hours I felt obliged to extend the term until 1800 hours. At 1815 hours a search party entered the premises, the building having been cordoned off, and found that a great number of Jews were within the building. Since some of these Jews resisted, I ordered the building to be set on fire. Not until all the buildings along the street and the back premises on either side were well aflame did the Jews, some of them on fire, emerge from these blocks, some of them endeavored to save their life by jumping into the street from windows and balconies, after having thrown down beds, blankets, and the like. Over and over again we observed that Jews and bandits, despite the danger of being burned alive, preferred to return into the flames rather than risk being caught by us. Over and over again the Jews kept up their firing almost to the end of the action: thus the engineers had to be protected by a machine gun when toward nightfall they had to enter forcibly a concrete building which had been very strongly fortified. Termination of today's operation; on 25 April 1943 at 0145 hours. 1660 Jews were caught for evacuation, 1314 pulled out of dug-outs, about 330 shot. Innumerable Jews were destroyed by the flames or perished when the dug-outs were blown up. 26 dug-outs were blown up and an amount of paper money, especially dollars was captured; this money has not yet been counted.

Our forces; as on the preceding day, minus 50 men of the Waffen SS.

Our losses: 2 SS men and one Trawniki man wounded.

Altogether there have now been caught in this action 25,500 Jews who lived in the former Ghetto. Since there are only vague estimates available of the actual number of inhabitants I assume that now only very small numbers of Jews and bandits still remain within the Ghetto.

Operation will be continued on 25 April 1943, 1300 hours.

I beg to acknowledge receipt of teletype messages nos. 1222 and 1223 of 24 April 1943. As far as can be predicted, the present large-scale operation will last until Easter Monday inclusive.

H1145-0170

Today large posters were affixed to the walls surrounding the Ghetto, announcing that everybody who enters the former Ghetto without being able to prove his identity will be shot.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.

Signed; Stroop

SS Brigadefuehrer and Major
General of Police.

Certified Copy:

SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw, 25 April 1943.

Ref. No. I ab/St/Wdt-16 07 - Journal No. 549/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger-- or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of operation on 25 April 1943, start 1300 hours.

For today 7 search parties were formed, strength 1/70 each, each allotted to a certain block of buildings.

Their order was: "Every building is to be combed out once more; dug-outs have to be discovered and blown up, and the Jews have to be caught. If any resistance is encountered or if dug-outs cannot be reached, the buildings are to be burnt down". Apart from the operations undertaken by these 7 search parties, a special operation was undertaken against a center of bandits, situated outside the wall surrounding the former Ghetto and inhabited exclusively by Poles.

Today's operations of the search parties ended almost everywhere in the starting of enormous conflagrations. In this manner the Jews were forced to leave their hide-outs and refuges. A total of 1,960 Jews were caught alive. The Jews informed us that among them there are certain parachutists who were dropped here and bandits who had been equipped with arms from some unknown source. 274 Jews were killed. As in the preceding days, uncounted Jews were buried in blown up dug-outs and, as can be observed time and again, burned with this bag of Jews today. We have, in my opinion, caught a very considerable part of the bandits and lowest elements of the Ghetto. Intervening darkness prevented immediate liquidation. I am going to try to obtain a train for T II tomorrow. Otherwise liquidation will be carried out tomorrow. Today also, some armed resistance was encountered; in a dug-out three pistols and some explosives were captured. Furthermore, considerable amounts of paper money, foreign currency, gold coins, and jewelry were seized today.

H1145-0171

The Jews still have considerable property. While last night a glare of fire could be seen above the former Ghetto, today one can observe a giant sea of flames. Since we continue to discover great numbers of Jews whenever we search and comb out, the operation will be continued on 26 April 1943. Start: 1000 hours.

Including today, a total of 27,464 Jews of the former Warsaw Ghetto, have been captured.

H1145-0172

Our forces; as on the previous day.
Our losses; 3 members of the Waffen-SS
and one member of the security police wounded.

Total losses up to date:

Waffen SS	27	wounded
Police	9	"
Security Police	4	"
Wehrmacht	1	"
Trawniki men	9	"
	50	"

and 5 dead;

Waffen SS	2	dead
Wehrmacht	2	"
Trawniki men	1	"
	5	"

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw,

signed; Stroop

SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral
of Police.

Certified copy
SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, 26 April 1943.

Ref. No. I. ab-St/Tgt-16 07 -Journal Nr. 550/43 secret
Re: Ghetto operation - supplementary report

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger - or deputy.

Cracow

1.) The operation on 25 April 1943, was terminated at 2200 hrs.

2.)General effects of the execution of this operation.

The Poles resident in Warsaw are much impressed by the toughness of our operations in the foremr Ghetto. As can be seenfrom the daily reports, the general situation has greatly calmed down since the beginning of that operation within the city area of Warsaw. From this fact one may conclude that the bandits and

saboteurs resided in the former Ghetto, and that now all of them have been destroyed.

In this connection the fact may be of some interest, that an illegal ammunition store was seen to explode when we burned down a certain building in the dwelling area on which we were working at the time.

The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw
signed: Stroop

SS Brigadefuehrer
and Majorgeneral of Police.

Certified Copy
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype Message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, 26 April 1943.

Ref. Nr. I ab-St/Wst-16 07 Journal Nr. 551/43 secret.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger,--or deputy.

Cracow

Start of operation: 1000 hrs,

The whole of the former Ghetto was once more combed through today by the same search parties, each of them allotted to the same district as before. In this way I tried to bring about that the leaders of these parties work in thoroughfares, blocks of buildings, and courtyards which they know already and that thus they are able to penetrate deeper and deeper into the maze of dug-outs and subterranean passages. Almost every search party reported resistance, which however they broke either by returning fire or by blowing up the dug-outs. It becomes clearer and clearer that it is now the turn of the toughest and strongest among the Jews and bandits. Several times dug-outs have been forcibly broken open, the inmates of which had not come to the surface during the whole of this operation. In a number of cases the inmates of the dug-outs were hardly in a condition, when the dug-out had been blown up, to crawl to the surface. The captured Jews report that many of the inmates of the dug-outs became insane from the heat, the smoke, and the explosions. Several Jews were arrested who had kept close liaison with the group of Polish terrorists and collaborated with it. Outside the former Ghetto we arrested 29 Jews. During today's operation several blocks of buildings were burned down. This is the only and final method which forces this trash and sub-humanity to the surface. We again captured arms, incendiary bottles, explosive charges and considerable amounts of cash and foreign currency. Today I also arranged that several so-called armament and defense enterprises will evacuate their stores from the buildings at once, so that

H1145-0173

these buildings in which the Jews now have taken refuge, under the protection of the army of the German Wehrmacht and police, can be combed out. In one case we again discovered, as previously, that in a building which had been said to contain a giant enterprise there existed in fact almost no stores or goods. One factory was closed without further ado, and the Jews were evacuated.

Result of today's operation:

30 Jews evacuated, 1,330 Jews pulled out of dug-outs and immediately destroyed, 362 Jews killed in battle. Caught today altogether: 1,722 Jews. This brings the total of Jews caught to 29,186. Moreover, it is very probable that numerous Jews have perished in the 13 dug-outs blown up today and in the conflagrations.
At the time of writing not one of the Jews caught still remains within Warsaw. The scheduled transport to T II had no success(Note of Translator: This probably that no Jews were available for regular transport to the extermination camp.

Strength: as on preceding day.

Our losses: none

End of today's operation at 2145 hrs; will be continued on 27 April 1943 at 0900 hrs.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in
the District of Warsaw.

signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Major-general of Police;

Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

Copy

Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw, 27 April 1943.

Ref. No. I ab-St/Gr 16 07 Journal Nr. 555/43 secret.
Re; Ghetto Operation.

To the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police

Krueger--or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of operation on 27 April 1943. Start: 0900 hrs.

For today's operation I formed 24 raiding parties with the same task as on several days of last week; they had to search the former Ghetto in smaller groups. These search parties pulled 780 Jews out of dug-outs and shot 115 Jews who resisted. This operation was terminated about 1500 hrs.; some of the parties had to continue to operate because they had found more dug-outs.

H1145-0174

At 1600 hrs a special battle group, 320 officers and men strong, started cleansing a large block of buildings situated on both sides of the so-called Niska Street in the North-Eastern part of the former Ghetto. After the search the entire block was set on fire, after having been completely cordoned off. In this action a considerable number of Jews were caught. As before, they remained in the dug-outs, which were either below the ground or in the lofts of the buildings until the end. They fired their arms to the last moment and then jumped down into the street, sometimes from as far up as the fourth floor, having previously thrown down beds, mattresses, etc., but not until the flames made any other escape impossible. A total of 2,560 Jews were caught today within the former Ghetto, of whom 547 were shot. Moreover, Jews in a not ascertainable number perished when dug-outs were blown up, or in the flames. The sum total of Jews, formerly residing in the Ghetto caught in this action, now amounts to 31,746.
We learned from an anonymous letter that there were a considerable number of Jews in a block of buildings adjoining the North-Eastern part of the Ghetto, but outside of it. A Special raiding party under the command of 1st Lt. of Police Diehl was dispatched to attack these buildings. The raiding party discovered a gang of about 120 men, strongly armed with pistols, rifles, hand grenades, and light machine guns, who resisted. They succeeded in destroying 24 bandits in battle and arresting 52 bandits. The remainder could not be caught or destroyed, since darkness intervened. The buildings, however, were surrounded at once, so that an escape will hardly be possible. This cleansing action will be continued tomorrow. Moreover we arrested 17 Poles, among whom 2 Polish Policemen, who should have been aware, among other things, of the existence of this gang. In this operation we captured 3 rifles, 12 pistols, party of heavier caliber, 100 Polish "pineapple" hand grenades, 27 German steel helmets, quite a number of German uniforms, tunics and coats which were even furnished with the ribbons of the East-medal, some reserve magazines for machine guns, 300 rounds of ammunition, etc. The leader of the raiding party had a difficult task because the bandits were disguised in German uniform. But despite this fact, he did his duty with great efficiency. Among the bandits who were caught or killed, there were some Polish terrorists who were identified with certainty. Today we succeeded furthermore in discovering and liquidating one of the founders and leaders of the Jewish-Polish resistance movement. The external appearance of the Jews whom we are catching now shows that it is now the turn of those Jews who were the leaders of the entire resistance movement. They jumped from the burning windows and balconies, abusing Germany and the Fuehrer and cursing the German soldiers.
SS-men who descended into the sewers discovered that a great number of corpses of perished Jews are being washed away by the water.

Our strength: From 0700 to 1900 hrs. 288 German Police)
200 Trawnikimen)
140 Polish Police) Cordoning
From 1900 to 0700 hrs. 288 German Police) Forces.
250 Waffen-SS
140 Polish Police)

H1145-0175

Strength in the operation:

3/115 German Police
4/400 Waffen-SS
1/6 Engineering Serv.
2/30 security police
2/21 Engineers.

Our losses: 3 wounded:

2 Waffen-SS
1 Trawniki-man

Termination of operation: 2300 hrs.

Will be continued on 28 April 1943 at 1000hrs.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. signed: Stroop

SS Brigadefuehrer and
Maj. Gen. of Police.

Certified Copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype message.

From : The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw, 28 April 1943.

Ref. Nr. I ab-St/Gr- 16 07 Journal Nr. 562/43 secr.
Re: Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police.
Krueger - or deputy.

Cracow.

Progress of operation on 28 April 1943. Start 1000 hrs.

Today, 10 raiding parties were formed for combing out the whole of the Ghetto. These raiding parties again discovered proceeding step by step, a number of dug-outs, which were found to have been prepared as far ago as the middle of last year for use in the resistance of the Jews. A total of 335 Jews were forcibly pulled out of those dug-outs. Apart from these operations, we continued to cleanse the resistance center used by the Jewish military organization, situated at the borders of the Ghetto. We succeeded in shooting 10 more bandits, and in arresting 9, beyond those caught yesterday, and in capturing more arms, ammunition, and military equipment. In the afternoon a battle group again was directed against a block of buildings which had already been combed out; the block was set on fire during this operation. As on previous days, masses of Jews emerged, forced out by the flames and the enormous clouds of smoke. At another point an Engineer Officer, attached by the Wehrmacht to the units with great trouble opened a dug-out situated about 3 meters below ground. From this dug-out, which had been ready since October of last year and was equipped with running water, toilet, and electric light, we pulled out 274 of the richest

H1145-0176

and most influential Jews. Today again we encountered very strong resistance in many places and broke it. It becomes clearer every day that we are now encountering the real terrorists and activists, because of the duration of the operation.

Result of today: 1,655 Jews caught for evacuation, of whom 110 were killed in battle.
Many more Jews were killed by the flames; moreover, Jews in an unascertainable number were destroyed by the dug-outs being blown up. By the results of today the number of Jews caught or destroyed rises to 33,401 altogether. This number does not include the Jews who were killed by fire or destroyed in the dug-outs.
Our strength: as on the previous day.
Our losses: 3 wounded(1 Police, 2 Waffen-SS)
Termination of operation: 2200 hrs. Will be continued on 29 April 1943. 1000 hrs.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop

SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.

Certified copy
SS Sturmbannführer.

- -

Copy

Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, 29 April 1943.

Ref. Nr. I ab-St/Gr 16 07 Journal Nr. 566/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto Operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger - or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation of 29 April 1943. Start 1000 hrs: As on the previous day I formed search parties, who had the special task of searching those blocks of buildings which had been recently separated. A larger raiding party was detailed to clean a certain block of buildings(formerly the Hallmann concern) and to burn this block down. 36 more dug-outs used for habitation were discovered altogether, and from them and other hideouts and from the burning buildings 2,359 Jews were caught, of whom 106 were killed in battle.
Captured are 2 rifles, 10 pistols, 10 kilograms of explosives, and ammunition of various types.
When a large dug-out was blown up, the entire building collapsed and everyone of the bandits perished. In the ensuing conflagration loud detonations and darting flames showed that the building must have contained large stores of ammunition and explosives. Some sewer entrances were blown up. Two exits discovered outside the Ghetto were also made unusable by blowing them up or walling them up.
The depositions of some of the inmates of the dug-outs are to the effect that these Jews have been unable to leave the dug-outs

H1145-0177

for the last 10 days and that their food, etc. is now beginning to grow short because the large scale operation has lasted so long. Furthermore, the Jews testify that bandits appeared at night who were Jews or sometimes Poles, wearing black masks, who walled the dug-outs up from the outside and admonished them not to give any signs of life, so that they could continue to live in the Ghetto when the action was finished. Some of the armaments factories are being evacuated very slowly. In several cases one gains the impression that this is done intentionally. Thus I discovered with regard to one firm, Schulz and Co., which I had visited on Easter Monday and then instructed to start evacuation at once and to have it completed within 3 days, that up till today, Thursday, nothing had been done.

H1145-0178

Our strength: as on the previous day.
Our losses: none.
Termination of operation at 2100 hrs. Will be continued on 30 April 1943, 0900 hrs.
Total caught or destroyed: 35,760

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Majorgeneral of Police.

Certified Copy
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy

Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw, 30 April 1943.

Ref No. I ab-St/Gr-16 07-Journal No. 579/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto operation.

To: The higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger -- or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 30 April 1943, start 0900 hrs.

Combing out by search parties was continued. Although some giant blocks of buildings now are completely burned out, the Jews continue to stay in the dug-outs 2 to 3 meters below ground. In many cases we are not able to discover those dug-outs unless some Jew, whom we have already caught, gives us a hint as to their whereabouts. Repeatedly, during the last few days, Jews have testified that some armed Jews emerge at night from some hide-outs or dug-outs and threaten the other Jews with shooting if they give any signs of life. We were able to ascertain beyond all doubt that several dug-outs had been closed from the outside by these bandits, who tried in this manner to prove that they meant business. Altogether, 30 dug-outs were discovered, evacuated, and blown up today. Again we caught a great number of bandits and subhumans. Apart from the bombing-out operations effected by small parties, two larger battle groups were occupied with bombing out and destroying by fire several interconnected blocks of buildings.

A total of 1599 Jews were caught today, of whom 179 were killed in battle. The sum total of Jews caught up to date thereby rises to 37,359. 3,855 Jews were loaded today. The number of Jews in possession of arms was much higher than before among the Jews caught during the last few days. Today, we again captured arms and particularly parts of German uniforms from them. The operation against Fort Traugutta did not have any positive results. Inasfar as we were able to discover subterranean exits, we either occupied them or blew them up. In attacking one of the blocks we had to use a gun today.

Our strength:
Used in the operation:

Police	5/133
Security Police	3/36
Waffen SS	6/432
Engineer	2/40
Staff.	3/7

Cordoning forces:

Waffen SS	3/318
German Police	2/89
Trawniki men	200

moreover some Polish Police.

Our losses: 1 wounded (Police)

Termination of Today's large scale action: 2100 hours.

Will be continued on 1 May 1943, 0900 hours.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw

signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral
of Police.

Certified Copy:
SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, May 1, 1943.

Ref:Nr. I ab/St/Br - 16 07 Journal No. 583/43 secret.
Re: Large scale Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger - or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of large scale operation on 1 May 1943, start 0900 hrs.

10 searching parties were detailed, moreover a larger battle group was detailed to comb out a certain block of buildings,

H1145-0179

with the added instruction to burn that block down. Within this block of buildings there existed a so-called armament factory which had not yet been entirely evacuated, although it had had enough time to do so. It was not exempted from the operation. Today's operation a total of 1,026 Jews were caught, of whom 245 were killed, either in battle or while resisting. Moreover, a considerable number of bandits and ringleaders were also caught. In one case a Jew who had already been made ready for transport fired three shots against a 1st Lieutenant of Police, but missed his mark. All the Jews caught today were forcibly pulled out of dug-outs. Not a single one gave himself up voluntarily, after his dug-out had been opened. A considerable part of the Jews caught were pulled out of the sewers. We continued systematically blowing up or blocking up the sewer entrances. In one case the Engineers laid a strong concentrated charge and had to proceed to an adjoining entrance where they had something to do. In the meantime a Jew emerged from the sewer, removed the fuse from the concentrated charge, and appropriated the charge. In the further course of this operation we suceeded in catching this Jew, still in possession of the concentrated charge.

In order to ascertain the movements of the Jews during the night, today I used for the first time 5 scouting parties, each 1/9 strong, at irregular intervals during the night. In general, it has to be stated that our men need estraordinary diligence and energy to discover the Jews who are still in so-called dug-outs, caves, and in the sewerage system. It can be expected that the remainder of the Jews who formerly inhabited the Ghetto will now be caught. The sum total of Jews caught so far has risen to 38,385. Not included in this figure are those who died in the flames or in the dug-outs. One patrol discovered an unascertainable number of corpes floating in a main sewer under the Ghetto. Outside of the Ghetto, in the immediate vicinity of Warsaw, the gendarmerie has shot a total of 150 Jews who could be proved to have escaped from Warsaw.

Again we captured pistols and explosives.

H1145-0180

Our strength: Used in operation:

Police(German)	4/102
Waffen SS	7/350
Engineers(Wehrmacht)	2/38
Engineering Emergency Service.	1/6
Security Police	2/1

Cordoning units:

Waffen SS	300
German Police	1/ 71
Trawniki	250

Our losses: 1 Policeman - wounded yesterday, died from wounds.

Termination of today's large-scale action: 2200 hours.

Will be continued on 2 May 1943, 1000 hours.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Majorgeneral of Police.

Certified Copy
SS- Sturmbannfuehrer.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1061-PS
Contd.

H1145-0181

Copy

Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, 2 May 1943.

Ref.No. I ab St/Gr-16 07 Journal No. 584/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger--or deputy

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 2 May 1943, start 1000 hrs: 9 raiding parties combed out the whole area of the former Ghetto; moreover a larger detachment was detailed to clean out or destroy one block of buildings grouped around the two armament enterprises Transavia and Bischniewski. To find more dug-outs, the raiding parties took along with them some Jews caught on the previous day to act as guides. In these operations the raiding parties pulled out 944 Jews from dug-outs; 235 more Jews were shot on this occasion. When the block of buildings mentioned above was destroyed, 120 Jews were caught and numerous Jews were destroyed when they jumped from the attics to the inner courtyards, trying to escape the flames. Many more Jews perished in the flames or were destroyed when the dug-outs and sewer entrances were blown up. The Jews were removed from two armaments concerns and the managers were requested to evacuate within a short time.

Altogether we caught today: 1,852 Jews.
The sum total of Jews caught thereby rises to 40,237 Jews. 27 dug-outs were discovered, forcibly opened and destroyed, arms and ammunition captured. When the external barricade was shot at and when some Jews who broke out from a sewer entrance outside the Ghetto made an attack, we suffered 7 losses, 4 Policemen and 3 Polish Policemen. The scouting parties used during the night encountered armed resistance from some Jews who under the protection of darkness ventured to emerge from their holes and dug-outs. We did not suffer losses thereby. On the other hand, a considerable number of Jews were killed or wounded in this operation.

Our Strength:

Used in operation:	German Police	3/98
	Engineering Em Service	1/6
	Security Police	3/12
	Engineers(Wehrmacht)	2/37
	SS-Gren	11/409
	SS-Cav.	3/7
Cordoning forces	German Police	2/9
	SS-Gren.	1/300
	Trawniki	200

Our losses: 4 Policemen wounded
3 Polish policemen wounded.

Present at today's large-scale operation was the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police Krueger.
Termination of operation: 2030 hours. Will be continued on 3 May 1943, 0900 hours.

The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral
of Police.

Certified copy
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1061-PS
Contd.

Copy

Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw, 3 May 1943.

Ref. Nr. Tgb-St/Gr- 16 07-Journal Nr. 597/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East.
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger-- or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 3 May 1943, start 0900 hrs. In the combing-out operation of the former Jewish Ghetto today 19 more dug-outs were discovered and the result was as follows:

Pulled out of dug-outs.	1,392 Jews.
shot	95
Evacuated from former armament factories.	177

The sum total of Jews caught thereby rises to 41,806 Jews In most cases the Jews offered armed resistance before they left the dug-outs. We had two casualties(wounded). Some of the Jews and bandits fired pistols from both hands. Since we discovered several times today, that Jewesses had pistols concealed in their bloomers, every Jew and bandit will be ordered, from today on, to strip completely for the search. We captured among other things, one German rifle, model 98 two 08 pistols and other calibers, also home-made hand grenades. The Jews cannot be induced to leave their dug-outs until several smoke candles have been burned. According to depositions made yesterday and today, the Jews were asked during the second half of 1942 to erect air raid shelters. At that time under the camouflage of erecting air-raid shelters, they began to build the dug-outs which they are now inhabiting, in order to use them for an anti-Jewish operation. Some of the scouting parties used in the Ghetto were shot at last night. One casualty(wounded). Thesesscouting parties reported that groups of armed bandits marched through the Ghetto.

Strength: as on the previous day.
Losses: 3 SS-men wounded.
Termination of today's operation: 2100 hrs.
Will be continued on 4 May 1943. 0900 hrs.

3,019 Jews were loaded.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.

Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Majorgeneral of Police.

Certified Copy:
SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

H1145-0182

Copy

Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw, 4 May 1943.

Ref. No. I ab-St/Gr 16 07 Journal No. 603/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger--or deputy

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 4 May 1943, start 0900 hrs.

For mopping up the dug-outs a raiding party was sued, 1/60 strong and reinforced by an Engineers' detachment provided by the Wehrmacht. This raiding party pulled 550 Jews out of dug-outs and killed in battle 188 Jews. Discovering the dug-outs becomes more and more difficult. Often they can only be discovered by betrayal through other Jews. If the Jews are requested to leave their dug-out voluntarily, they hardly ever obey; they can only be forced to do so by the use of smoke-candles.

The main forces were detailed about 1100 hours to comb out, mop up, and destroy two large blocks of buildings, containing the former firms Toebbens, Schulz and Co., and others. After these blocks had been completely cordoned off, we requested the Jews who were still within the buildings to come forward voluntarily. By this measure, we caught 456 Jews for evacuation. Not until the blocks of buildings were well aflame and were about to collapse did a further considerable number of Jews emerge, forced to do so by the flames and the smoke. Time and again the Jews try to escape even through burning buildings. Innumerable Jews whom we saw on the roofs during the conflagration perished in the flames. Others emerged from the upper stories in the last possible moment and were only able to escape death in the flames by jumping down. Today we caught a total of 2,283 Jews, of whom 204 were shot and innumerable Jews were destroyed in dug-outs and in the flames. The sum total of Jews caught rises to 44,089.

As is learned from depositions made by the Jews, today we caught part of the governing body of the so-called "Party". One member of the committee which leads the gang will be used tomorrow for mopping up some more fortified dug-outs with armed Jews inside. When the armament enterprises were evacuated, we again observed that the goods carted away were by no means valuable military equipment, as had been pretended, but trifles, like used furniture and other requisitioned items. We took appropriate measures against this at once.

The scouting parties who patrolled during the night in the former Ghetto again reported movements of the Jews in the burned out and destroyed streets and courtyards. In order to be better able to take the Jews by surprise, the scouting parties at night tie rags and other stuff round their shoes. In skirmishes between the scouting parties and Jews, 30 Jews were shot.

H1145-0183

We captured 1 carbine, 3 pistols, and some ammunition. During the conflagration a considerable amount of stored ammunition exploded.

Our strength:
used in operation:

German Police	4/101
Engineering Bn. Service	1/6
Security Police	2/14
Engineers.	2/41
Waffen SS.	11/407

Cordoning forces:	Day	Night
German Police	2/87	1/11
WaffenSS	25	1/300
Trawniki	200	
Polish Police	1/180	1/180

Our losses: None.

Termination of operation: 2330 hours, will be continued on 5 May 1943, 1000 hours.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Major-general of Police.

Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype message.

Form: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, 5 May 1943.

Ref. Nr. I Ab/St/Gr 16 07 Journal Nr. 607/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.

TO: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger--or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 5 May 1943. Start 1000 hrs. In the beginning of today's operations the raiding parties seemed to have less results than on the preceding days. When the operation terminated, however, quite a number of dug-outs had again been discovered, owing to the tracking ability of the men and to betrayal; 40 of these dug-outs were destroyed. As far as possbile, the Jews in these dug-outs were caught(1070 altogether). The combing out patrols shot about 126 Jews. Today again the Jews resisted in several places until they were captured. In several cases the entrances(hatches) of the dug-outs were forcibly held or bolted from the inside, so that only by using a strong explosive charge could we force them open and destroy the inmates. Today, we again captured arms and ammunition, including one pistol. From one enterprise still in existence(so-called Frosta) 2,850 Jews were caught for evacuation. This figure was included in the sum total

H1145-0184

reported earlier, so that only 1,070 have to be added; the present sum total therefore is 45,159.
Our strength: as on the preceding day.
Our losses: 1 SS man wounded, 1 Policeman wounded.
Sum total of losses to date: 8 dead, 55 wounded.

Termination of operation: 2200 hrs. Will be continued on 6 May 1943, 0900 hrs.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.

Signed; Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Majorgeneral of Police.

Certified Copy
SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

- - - - - ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Copy

Teletype message

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw, 6 May 1943.

Ref. No.: I ab/St/Gt 16 07 Journal No. 614/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto large-scale operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger--or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 6 May 1943, start 0930 hrs.

Today we combed especially those blocks of buildings which were destroyed by fire on 4 May 1943. Although it was hardly to be expected that any living person could still exist in these blocks, we discovered quite a number of dug-outs in which a burning heat had developed. From these dug-outs and from other dug-outs which we discovered in other parts of the Ghetto, we pulled out 1,553 Jews. While resisting, and in a skirmish, 356 Jews were shot. In this skirmish the Jews fired from 08 pistols and other calibers and threw Polish "pineapple" hand grenades. One SS Unterscharfuehrer was wounded and a total of 47 dug-outs were destroyed.

2 men of the external cordoning forces were wounded. The Jews who had broken out from the Ghetto seem to be returning now with the intention of assisting the Ghetto Jews by force or liberating them. One Jew who had escaped from Lublin was caught just outside of the Ghetto wall. He was armed as follows: 1 08 pistol, ample reserve ammunition, 2 Polish "pineapple" hand grenades. It could not be reliably ascertained so far whether the so-called "Party Directorate" of the Jews("PPR") have been caught or destroyed. We are on their traces. It is to be hoped that tomorrow we shall succeed in tracing down this so-called Party Directorate. In order to enable us to intercept more effectively the Jews and ban dits who approach the Ghetto, covering detachments of the

H1145-0185

external barricade were shifted farther inside the aryan part. The former miniature Ghetto "Prosta" was searched by raiding parties today. They caught some Jews who had stayed behind. The firm Toebbens was requested to evacuate, this miniature Ghetto by noon on 10 May 1943. The so-called Library, situated outside the Ghetto, was put at their disposal for temporary storage of their raw materials, etc.

The sum total of Jews caught so far rises to 47,368. The Polish Police take pains to deliver to my office every Jew who turns up within the city, because they are eager to win such premiums as have been paid in earlier cases. The undersigned received some anonymous letters in which he was notified of the fact that some Jews are staying in the aryan part of the city. One anonymous letter draws a parallel between Katyn and the large-scale action within the Ghetto.

Our Strength:

Used in operation:

German Police	4/101
Engineering Em. Service.	1/6
Security Police	2/14
Engineers	3/72
Waffen SS	10/500

Cordoning forces.	Day	Night
German Police	2/87	1/11
Waffen SS	25	1/300
Trawniki	200	-
Polish Police	1/180	1/180

Our losses:

1 Policeman dead
1 " seriously wounded
1 SS Unterscharfuehrer less seriously wounded.

Termination of Operation: 2100 hours, will be continued on 7 May 1943, 0930 hours.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Majorgeneral of Police.

Certified Copy
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

Copy

Teletype message

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw, 7 May 1943.

Ref. Nr. I ab/st/Gr 16 07 Journal Nr. 616/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police.

Krueger--or Deputy

Cracow.

H1145-0186

Progress of large-scale operation on 7 May 1943, start 1000 hrs.

The combing-out parties today obtained the following results: 49 dug-outs discovered. Part of the Jews were caught. A considerable, not ascertainable, number of Jews who refused to leave the dug-outs and offered armed resistance were destroyed when the dug-outs were blown up. Altogether 1,019 Jews were caught alive today, 255 shot. The sum total of Jews caught so far rises to 48,342. Today we again encountered armed resistance in several cases, whereby we lost 1 SS man (wounded) We captured 4 pistols of various calibers and some stores of ammunition.
The location of the dug-out used by the so-called select "Party Directorate" is now known. It is to be forced open tomorrow. The Jews testify that they emerge at night to get fresh air, since it is unbearable to stay permanently within the dug-outs owing to the long duration of the operation. On the average the raiding parties shoot 30 to 50 Jews each night. From these statements it was to be infered that a considerable number of Jews are still underground in the Ghetto. Today we blew up a concrete building which we had not been able to destroy by fire. In this operation we learned that the blowing up of a building is a very lengthy process and takes an enormous amount of explosives. The best and only method for destroying the Jews therefore still remains the setting of fires.

Our strength: as on the preceding day.

Our losses: 1 Waffen-SS man wounded.

Termination of Operation: 2100 hours. will be continued on 8 May 1943 1000 hours.

The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw
signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Majorgeneral of Police.

Certified Copy;
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, 8 May 1943.

Ref. No. I ab St/G r 16 07 Journal No. 624/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger--or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of operation on 8 May 1943, start 1000 hours.

The whole former Ghetto was searched today by raiding parties for the remaining dug-outs and Jews. As reported some days a number of subhumans, bandits, and terrorists still remain in the dug-outs, where heat has become intolerable by reason of the fires. These creatures know only too well that their

H1145-0187

only choice is between remaining in hiding as long as possible or coming to the surface and trying to wound or kill off the men of the Waffen-SS, Police, and Wehrmacht who keep up the pressure against them.

We continued today the operation against the dug-out of the so-called select "Party Directorate" which we had discovered yesterday, as reported in my teletype message yesterday. We succeeded in forcing open the dug-out of the Party Directorate and in catching about 60 heavily armed bandits. We succeeded in catching and liquidating Deputy Leader of the Jewish Military Organization "ZWZ" and his so-called Chief of Staff. There were about 200 Jews in this dug-out, of whom 60 were caught and 140 were destroyed, partly owing to the strong effect of smoke-candles, and partly owing to heavy explosive charges which were laid in several places. The Jews whom we caught had already reported that innumerable Jews had been killed by the effect of the smoke-candles. The fight of the first six days was hard, but now we are able to state that we are catching those Jews and Jewesses who were the ringleaders in those days. Every time a dug-out is forced open, the Jews in it offer resistance with the arms at their disposal, light machine guns, pistols, and hand grenades. Today we again caught quite a number of Jewesses who carried loaded pistols in their bloomers, with the safety catch released. Some depositions speak of 3 to 4,000 Jews who still remain in underground holes, sewers, and dug-outs. The undersigned is resolved not to terminate the large-scale operation until the last Jew has been destroyed.

A total of 1,081 Jews were caught today in dug-outs; about 280 Jews were shot in battle, innumerable Jews were destroyed in the 43 dug-outs which were blown up. The sum total of Jews caught has risen to 40,712. Those buildings which had not yet been destroyed by fire, were set on fire today and we discovered that a few Jews were still hiding somewhere within the walls or in the staircases.

Our strength:

Used in operation;

German Police	4/101
Engineering Em Service	1/6
Security Police	2/14
Engineers	3/69
Waffen SS	13/527

Cordoning Forces:

	Day:	Night:
German Police	1/87	1/36
Waffen SS	-	1/300
Trawniki	160	-
Polish Police	1/160	1/160

Our losses:

2 Waffen SS dead,
2 Waffen SS wounded
1 Engineer wounded.

A Policeman wounded on 7 May 1943 died today from wounds. We captured about 15 to 20 pistols of various calibers, considerable stores of ammunition for pistols and rifles, moreover a number of hand grenades, made in the former armament factories.

Termination of action; 2130 hours, will be continued on 9 May 1943 1000 hours.

H1145-0188

The SS and Police Fuehrer in
the District of Warsaw.
signed; Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Major general of Police.

Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy

Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 9 May 1943.

Ref. No. I ab/St/Gr 1607 Journal No. 625/43
Re: Large scale Ghetto operation

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger -- or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 9 May 1943, start 1000 hours.

The operation carried out today had the following result: The raiding parties at work today discovered 42 dug-outs. From these dug-outs we pulled out alive 1,037 Jews and bandits. In battle 319 bandits and Jews were shot, moreover an uncertain number were destroyed when the dug-outs were blown up. The block of buildings which formerly contained the "Transavia" concern was destroyed by fire; in this operation we again caught a number of Jews, although this block had been combed through several times.

Again we captured some pistols and hand grenades.

Our strength
Used in operation:

German Police	4/103
Security Police	2/12
Engineers	3/67
Waffen SS	13/547

Cordoning Forces.	Day	Night
German Police	1/87	1/36
Waffen SS	0	1/300
Trawniki	160	-
Polish Police	1/160	1/160

Our losses: none

The total of Jews caught up to date has risen to 51,313. Outside the former Ghetto 254 Jews and bandits were shot.

Termination of operation: 2100 hours, will be continued on 10 May 1943, 1000 hours.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
Signed :Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Majorgeneral of Police

Certified copy
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

H1145-0189

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1061-PS
Contd.

Copy

Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw,

Warsaw, 10 May, 1943.

Ref. Nr. I ob St/Gr 16 07 Journal No. 627/43 secret
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger or Deputy.

Cracow

Progress of large-scale action on 10 May 1943, start 1000 hrs.

Today raiding parties again combed out the area of the former Ghetto. As on preceeding days we again pulled out of the dug-outs, against all expectations, a considerable number of Jews. The resistance offered by the Jews had not weakened today. In contrast to the previous days, it seems that those members of the main body of the Jewish battle group who are still in existence and have not been destroyed have retired into the ruins still within their reach, with the intention of firing from there against our men and inflicting casualties.

Today we caught a total of 1,183 Jews alive. 187 bandits and Jews were shot. Again a not ascertainable number of Jews and bandits were destroyed in the blown-up dug-outs. The total of Jews caught up to date has risen to 52,683.

Today at 0900 hours a truck drove up to a certain sewer in the so-called Prosta. Someone in the truck exploded two hand grenades, which was the signal for the bandits who were standing ready in the sewer to climb out of it. The bandits and Jews - there are always some Polish bandits among them - armed with carbines, small arms, and one machine gun, climbed into the truck and drove away in an unknown direction. The last man of the gang, who stood sentry in the sewer and had the duty of closing the sewer lid, was captured. It is he who gave the above information. He testified that most of the members of the gang, which had been divided into several battle groups, had either been killed in battle or had committed suicide because they had realized the futility of continuing the fight. The search for the truck, which was ordered at once, had no results. The bandits testified further that the Prosta is now the refuge for the still existing Jews because the Ghetto has become too hot for them. For this reason, I resolved to deal with the Prosta in the same manner as with the Ghetto, and to destroy this miniature Ghetto.

Today, we again captured small arms and some ammunition. The Security police yesterday succeeded in capturing a workshop outside the Ghetto which manufactured 10 to 11,000 explosive charges and other ammunition.

Our Strength: as on the preceding day.

Our losses: 3 SS men wounded.

Owing to the excellent under standing between us and the Wehrmacht, the detachment of Engineers was reinforced. Moreover,

H1145-0190

a considerable amount of explosives was put at our disposal.

Termination of operation: 2200 hours, will be continued on 11 May 1943, 0930 hours.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw,
signed: Stroop

SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral
Of Police.

Certified Copy
SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw, 11 May 1943.

Ref Nr. I ab-St/Gr 16 07 Journal No. 629/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto large-scale operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police.
Krueger -- or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 11 May 1943, start 0930 hours

The scouting parties sent out last night again reported that there must still be some Jews within the dug-outs, since some Jews were seen in the ruined streets. The scouting parties shot 12 Jews. On the basis of these reports, today I again formed raiding parties who in combing-out operations discovered, captured, and destroyed a total of 47 dug-outs. Today again we caught some Jews who had taken refuge in ruins which were still protected by a roof. The Jews and bandits are still seeking this new refuge, because staying in the dug-outs has become unbearable. One dug-out was discovered which contained about 12 rooms equipped with plumbing, running water, and separate bathrooms for men and women. Considerable amounts of food were captured or secured, in order to make it more and more difficult for them to necessary food.

A total of 931 Jews and bandits were caught. 53 bandits were shot. More of them perished when dug-outs were blown up and when a small block of buildings was destroyed by fire. The total of Jews caught up to date has risen to 53,667. We captured several pistols, hand grenades, and ammunition.

We have not been able to smoke out the sewers systematically once more, since we are short of smoke-candles. "OFK" is ready to provide new smoke-candles.

Our strength
Used in operation:
German Police 6/126
Engineering Bn. Service. 1/6

H1145-0191

Security Police	2/14
Engineers	4/76
Waffen SS	12/308

Cordoning Forces.	Day	Night
German Police	1/112	1/86
Waffen SS	-	1/130
Trawniki	160	-
Polish Police	1/160	1/160

Our Losses: 1 SS man wounded.

Total of Losses up to date: 71 wounded, 12 dead.

Termination of today's operation: 2145 hours, will be continued on 12 May 1943, 0930 hours.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Major General of Police.

Certified Copy
SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy

Telotype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw, 12 May 1943.

Ref No: I ab-St/Gr 16 07 Journal No. 637/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger--or deputy

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 12 May 1943, start 0930 hours.

When the raiding parties combed out the area for remaining dug-outs, in which Jews were hiding, they succeeded in discovering 30 dug-outs. 663 Jews were pulled out of them and 133 Jews were shot. The sum total of Jews caught has risen to 54,463.

Furthermore today the units cordoning off the miniature Ghetto were reinforced and destroyed by fire. Probably a considerable number of Jews perished in the flames, no accurate information in this regard could be obtained since the fire was still burning when darkness set in. One concrete building in the Prosta, from which Jews had been removed, was heavily damaged by blowing-up operations in order to make it impossible for the bandits to use it as a base later.

H1145-0192

It is noteworthy that the Poles, without having been warned, took appropriate measures for protecting their window-panes, etc., before the blowing-up started.

The transports of Jews leaving here will be directed to T.II beginning today.

Our strength:

Used in operation:

German Police	5/126
Engineering En. Service	1/6
Security Police	2/14
Engineers	4/74
Waffen SS	12/508

Cordoning forces	Day	Night
German Police	1/112	1/86
Waffen SS	-	1/300
Trawniki	160	-
Polish Police	1/160	1/160

Our losses: 1 Waffen SS man wounded.

Termination of today's operation: 2100 hours, will be continued on 13 May 1943, 1000 hours.

The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw
signed: Stroop

SS Brigadefuehrer and
Major General of Police

Certified copy:
SS Sturmhannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, 13 May 1943.

Ref. No. I ab/ St/Gr 16 07 Journal no. 641/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Police
Krueger -- or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 13 May 1943, start 1000 hours.

In combing out the Ghetto and the miniature Ghetto(Prosta) today we found 234 Jews. 155 Jews were shot in battle. Today it became clear that the Jews and bandits whom we are catching now belong to the so-called battle groups. All of them are young fellows and females between 18 and 25 years of age. When we captured one, a real skirmish took place, in which the

H1145-0193

TRANSCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1061-PS
Contd.

Jews not only fired from 08 pistols and Polish Vis pistols, but also threw Polish "pincapple" hand grenades at the Waffen-SS men. After part of the inmates of the dug-out had been caught and were about to be searched, one of the females as quick as lightning put her hand under her shirt, as many others had done, and fetched from her bloomers a "pincapple" hand grenade, drew the safety-catch, threw the grenade among the men who were searching her, and jumped quickly to cover. It is only thanks to the presence of mind of the men that no casualties ensued.

The few Jews and criminals still staying in the Ghetto have for the last few days been using the hide-outs they can still find among the ruins, retiring at night into the dug-outs whose location is known to them, to eat and get provisions for the next day. Lately we have been unable to extract information on the whereabouts of further dug-outs from the captured Jews. The remainder of the inmates of that dug-out where the skirmish took place were destroyed by using heavier explosive charges. From a Wehrmacht concern we evacuated 327 Jews today. The Jews we catch now are sent to T.II.

The total of Jews caught has risen to 55,179

Our Strength:
used in operation.

German Police	4/182
Engineering Em. Service	1/6
Security Police	2/14
Engineers.	4/74
Waffen SS.	12/517

Cordoning forces.	Day	Night
German Police	2/137	1/87
Waffen SS	-	1/300
Trawniki	270	-
Polish Police	1/160	1/160

Our losses; 2 Waffen SS dead
3 Waffen SS wounded
1 Policeman wounded.

The 2 Waffen SS men lost their lives in the air attack against the Ghetto.

33 dug-outs were discovered and destroyed. Booty: 6 pistols, 2 hand grenades, and some explosive charges.

Termination of today's operation 2100 hours, will be continued on 14 May 1943, 1000 hours.

My intention is to terminate the large-scale operation on 16 May 1943 and to turn all further measures over to Police battalion III/23. Unless ordered otherwise, I am going to submit to the conference of SS and Policefuehrers a detailed report of the operation, including an appendix containing photos.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Major General of Police.

Certified Copy
SS Sturmmannfuehrer.

H1145-0194

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1061-PS
Contd.

Copy

Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw 14 May 1943.

Ref. No. I ab/St/G 16 07 Journal No. 646/43 secret.
Re : Large-scale Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Kruemer--or deputy

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 14 May 1943, start 1000 hours.

The raiding parties formed today went to work within the areas allotted to each of them under orders to force open further dwelling dug-outs and to catch the Jews. In this way a considerable number of bandits and Jews were caught, especially as some traces had been discovered during the night which were now followed up with good results. The night patrols clashed with armed bandits several times. These bandits fired a machine gun and small arms. In this operation we had four casualties, 3 Waffen-SS men and 1 policeman. Repeatedly, shots were fired from the aryan part against the external barricade. In the skirmishes about 30 bandits were shot and 9 Jews and bandits, members of an armed gang, were captured. One dug-out was taken during the night, the Jews captured, and some pistols, among them one of 12-mm caliber, were captured. In one dug-out inhabited by 100 persons, we were able to capture 2 rifles, 16 pistols, some hand grenades and incendiary appliances. Of the bandits who resisted, some again wore German military uniform, German steel helmets and "Knobelbecher". Apart from the carbines, we captured 60 rounds of German rifle ammunition. One raiding party had a skirmish with a gang, 10 to 14 strong, on the roofs of a block of buildings at the border of the Ghetto(aryan part). The bandits were destroyed; we suffered no losses.

The captured bandits repeatedly testify that still not all persons in the Ghetto have been caught. They confidently expect that the action will soon be over, and that they will then be able to continue to live in the Ghetto. Several bandits stated that they had long been in a position to kill off the leader of the action, the "General", as they call him, but that they would not do so, since they had orders to that effect to avoid the risk of a further intensification of the anti-Jewish measures.

Today again some concrete buildings in which the bandits find refuge time and again were blown up by the engineers.

In order to force the bandits in the sewers to come to the surface, 183 sewer entrances were opened at 1500 hours, and smoke-candles were lowered into them at an ordered x-time; thereupon the bandits, seeking escape from what they supposed to be poison gas, crowded together in the center of the former Ghetto, and we were able to pull them out of the sewer entrances there.

I shall come to a decision after tomorrow's operations regarding termination of the action.

H1145-0195

Today SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant General of Waffen-SS von Hoffff was present during the operations.

Our strength :

Used in operation:

German Police	4/184
Engineering Em. Serv.	1/6
Security police	2/16
Engineers.	4/73
Waffen-SS	12/510

Cordoning forces	Day	Night
German Police	2/138	1/87
Waffen SS	-	1/300
Trawniki	270	-
Polish Police	1/160	1/160

Our losses: 5 wounded, 4 Waffen SS, 1 Police

A total of 398 Jews were caught today, furthermore 154 Jews and bandits were shot in battle. The total of the Jews caught has risen to 55,731.

Booty: rifles, pistols, and ammunition. Further, a number of incendiary bottles(Molotov cocktails.)

Termination of action; 2115 hours, will be continued on 15 May 1943 0900 hours.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.

Certified copy
SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy

Teletype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, May 15th 1943.

Ref. No. I ab/St/Gr - 16 07 Journal No. 648/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger -- or deputy.

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 15 April 1943, start 0900 hours.

The 5 scouting parties who patrolled the Ghetto last night reported that they encountered Jews only sporadically. In contrast to the preceding nights, they were able to shoot 6 or 7 Jews. The combing-out actions today also had little result. 29 more dug-outs were discovered; but part of them were no

H1145-0196

longer inhabited. A total of 87 Jews were caught today and 67 bandits and Jews were shot in battle. In a skirmish which developed around noon, and in which the bandits again resisted by using Molotov cocktails, pistols, and home-made hand grenades, the gang was destroyed; but subsequently a Policeman was wounded by a shot through the right thigh. A special unit once more searched the last block of buildings which was still intact in the Ghetto, and subsequently destroyed it. In the evening the chapel, mortuary, and all other buildings on the Jewish cemetery were blown up or destroyed by fire.
The sum total of Jews caught has risen to 55,885.
Our strength:
Used in operation:

German Police	4/184
Engineering Em. S.	1/6
Security Police	2/16
Engineers.	4/74
Waffen-SS	12/510

Cordoning forces.	Day	Night
German Police	2/138	1/87
affen-SS	-	1/300
Trawniki	270	-
Polish Police.	1/160	1/160

Our losses: 1 Policeman wounded.

We captured 4 pistols of larger calibers, 1 infernal machine with fuse, 10 kilograms of explosives, and a considerable amount of ammunition. Termination of operation: 2130 hours. Will be continued on 16 May 1943, 1000 hours.

I will terminate the large-scale operation on 16 May 1943 at dusk, by blowing up the Synagogue, which we did not succeed in accomplishing today, and will subsequently charge Police Battalion III/23 with continuing and completing the measures which are still necessary.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.

Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral
of Police

Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy

Telotype message.

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw

Warsaw, May 16th 1943.

Ref. No. I ab-St/Gr 16 07 Journal Nr. 652/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.

H1145-0197

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger-- or deputy

Cracow

Progress of large-scale operation on 16. May 1943. start 1000 hours.

18[illegible] Jews, bandits, and subhumans were destroyed. The former Jewish quarter of Warsaw is no longer in existence. The large-scale actionswas terminated at 2015 hours by blowing up the Warsaw Synagogue.
The measures to be taken with regard to the established banned areas were handed over to the commander of police battalion [illegible]/23, whom I instructed carefully.

Total number of Jews dealt with 56,065, including both Jews caught and Jews whose extermination can be proved.

No losses today.

I will submit a final report to the Conference of SS Police Fuehrer on 18 May 1943.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in
the District of Warsaw.
signed: Stroop

SS-Brigade Fuehrer and Major general
of Police.

Certified Copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

- -

Copy Teletype Message:

From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.

Warsaw 24 May 1943.

Ref. No. I no- St/Gr 16 07 Journal Nr. 633/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.
Ref: Your teletype message Nr. 946 of 21 May 1943.

To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
Krueger--or deputy.

Cracow

I beg to reply to the above teletype message:

No. 1:

Of the total of 56,065 caught, about 7,000 were destroyed in the former Ghetto during large-scale operation. 6,929 Jews were destroyed by transporting them to T.II; the sum total of Jews destroyed is therefore 13,929. Beyond the number of 56,065 an estimated number of 5 to 6,000 Jews were destroyed by being blown up or by perishing in the flames.

No. 2:

H1145-0198

A total of 631 dug-outs were destroyed.

No. 3 (booty)

7 Polish rifles, 1 Russian rifle, 1 German rifle
59 pistols of various calibers.
several 100 hand grenades, including Polish and home-made ones.
a few 100 incendiary bottles,
home-made explosive charges,
infernal machines with fuses,
large amounts of explosives, ammunition for all calibers, including machine-gun ammunition.

With regard to the bag of arms one must take into consideration that in most cases we were not able to capture the arms themselves, since the Jews and bandits before they were captured threw them away into hide-outs and holes which we could not discover or find. The smoke which we had developed in the dug-outs also prevented our men from discovering and capturing the arms. Since we had to blow up the dug-outs at once we were not in a position to search for the arms later on.
The hand grenades, explosive charges, and incendiary bottles captured were used at once against the bandits.
Furthermore, we captured:

1,240 used uniform tunics(partly equipped with medal ribbons, Iron Cross and East Medal)
600 pairs of used trousers.
pieces of equipment, and German steel-helmets,
108 horses, 4 of them in the former Ghetto(hearse)

We counted up to 23 May 1943.:

4.4 million Zloty. We captured moreover about 5 to 6 million Zloty, not yet counted, a considerable amount of foreign currency, including:

$ 14,300 in paper.
$ 9,200 in gold.
large amounts of valuables(rings, chains, watches etc.)

No. 4:

With the exception of 8 buildings,(Police barracks, hospital and accomodations for working parties) the former Ghetto has been completely destroyed. Where blowing-up was not carried out, only partition walls are still standing. But the ruins still contain enormous amounts of bricks and scrap material which could be used.

The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
signed; Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Major-general of Police.

Certified CopY;
SS-Sturnbannfuehrer.

H1145-0199

Pictorial Report.

(Translator's note: captions of photos follow in order)

1. The building of the former Jewish Council.
2. Out of the factories!
3. Discussion of the evacuation of a factory.
4. The Jewish section chiefs of the armament factory Brauer.
5. Brauer Company!
6. Column marching to the railway station.
7. On the way to the transhipping place.
8. Search and interrogation.
9. Jewish Rabbis.
10. Jewish Rabbis.
11. a patrol.
12. Drops of humanity.
13. Forcibly pulled out of dug-outs.
14. Just pulled out of a dug-out.
15. Just pulled out of a dug-out.
16. These bandits resisted by force of arms.
17. Bandits destroyed in battle.
18. A dug-out is opened.
19. Jewish traitors.
20. Bandits!
21. Smoking-out of the Jews and bandits.
22. A place which had been prepared for escape and jumping down.
23. Destruction of a block of buildings(2 photos)
24. Destruction of a block of buildings.
25. (no caption)
26. On the way to the transhipping place.
27. Jews are marched away.
28. On the way to the transhipping place.
29. Photos showing parts of so-called dwelling dug-outs.
30-33. (no caption)
34. Measures for covering a street.
35. They were found in underground dug-outs.
36. (1) These bandits are avoiding arrest by jumping down.
(2) Bandits after having jumped down.
37. The radio car of the command post.
38. Asiaris who were used in the operation.
39. The C.O. of the large-scale action.
40. This is how the former Ghetto looks after having been destroyed.
41-48. (no caption.)

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1061-PS

I, Virginia von Schon, 046318, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document no. 1061-PS.

Virginia von Schon
046318.

H1145-0200

H1145-0201

Exhibit USA 552
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1279-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

WFSt/Qu (Admin. 1)
No. 007893/44 Most Secret
(The number is changed, in pencil, to 009074/44)

One copy has been destroyed (remainder of pencil note illegible) 27/7

22.7.1944

Most Secret

2 Copies
2nd Copy

Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.

Minutes of a meeting

1). The Führer has decided that members of Anglo-American and Soviet-Russian so-called "military missions", captured in the partisan fighting in the South-East, are to be treated in the same way as those taking part in a commando-operation and not as prisoners of war.

2). Independently of the above, the Ag. Ausl., following queries made by the RSHA - Military Section - has put forward for decision the question of how British and American soldiers, captured with the partisan groups are to be treated.

The following are the resulting opinions:

a). C-in-C, South-East

The members of allied military missions are to be handed over to the SD, should the opinion below (b) be inapplicable.

(Armed Forces Ops Staff b). /Op (Army) is erased, marginal note see document 2235)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Prisoners of war general in conjunction with Supreme Command of the Army/Army General Staff/Alien Armies in the West and Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op. (Army) (?)

Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op (Army) No. 03408/43 Secret, dated 18.8.43.

(Armed Forces Ops Staff/Org Org I c). is erased, marginal note: see document 2235)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Chief of Prisoners of War Section in conjunction with Armed Forces Reserve (WR) and Armed Forces Ops Staff/Org I (?)

Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops Staff/Org II No. 02958/43 Secret, dated 8.7.43, which disregards differences of nationality. The only exception made is in the case of commando operations. (then they are handed over to the Security Service SD.)

d). RSHA/Section IV

Fundamentally treatment as prisoners of war under the directives mentioned in b) and c), but a more definite ruling is required to decide whether and in what circumstances, they are to be handed over to the Security Service (SD.)

H1145-0202

e). RSHA/Military Section

Considers that the Commando-Order cannot be applied to partisan fighting in the south East, that to do so would be dangerous in that it might imperil those taking part in our own operation (Brandenburg).

No opinion on the question of foreign missions.

f). Ag. Ausl.

Fundamentally, treatment as prisoners of war, that implies that members of missions were taking part in a commando-operation.

g). Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op. (Army)

(The whole of g) is crossed out)

Treatment as the members of partisan groups themselves, i.e. as prisoners of war if they are in uniform and are captured or surrender in open battle, or executed if they are in civilian clothes or are captured in a sabotage- or commando-operation.

3). Opinion and proposal of the Armed Forces Ops Staff

According to the orders issued to date, even for example, the British captured in the "Rosselsprung" operation must be treated as prisoners of war. This is especially evident in the Op. (Army)-Order dated 18.8.43.

(This last sentence is put in parenthesis, underlined, Op (Army) crossed out and a large query inserted in the margin).

The Commando-Order has never yet been applied to such missions, its extended application to cover them has not yet been ordered. If the missions are to be treated otherwise than in accordance with the orders to date, it must first be decided whether a foreign mission acting with the partisan groups in the South-East is to be called a commando-operation and therefore treated as such. Such a decision seems to be indicated even if it does not correspond completely to the wording of the commando-Order or to the previous definition of a commando operation (as an especially under-hand and still unusual form of warfare which must be combatted with the appropriate counter measures). The principle must be adopted from the start that all members of partisan groups, even in the South-East, are fundamentally guerrillas. Indeed they are treated as prisoners of war for reasons of expediency, in order to obtain the largest possible number of deserters and workers. There is no reason for this with regard to the members of foreign missions who are not numerous. There is therefore no necessity to treat them, in every case, in the same way as the members of partisan groups themselves. Basically, it would be far more appropriate to consider Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian military missions as commando-operations and to treat their members accordingly.

The appended Order is therefore proposed.

(Initialled by Warlimont)

H1145-0203

WFSt/Qu (Admin. 1)
No. 009074/44 Most Secret

27.7.1944

Most Secret

2 Copies
1st Copy

Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.

K (initialled in pencil by Keitel)

Minutes of a meeting

1). The Führer has decided that members of Anglo-American and Soviet-Russian so-called "military missions", captured in the partisan fighting in the South East, are to be treated in the same way as those taking part in a commando-operation and not as prisoners of war.

2). Independently of the above, the Ag. Ausl. following queries made by the RSHA - Military section -, has put forward for decision the question of how British and American soldiers, captured with the partisan groups, are to be treated.

The following are the resulting opinions:

a). C-in-C, South East

The members of allied military missions are to be handed over to the SD, should the opinion below (b) be inapplicable.

b). Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Prisoners of War General in conjunction with Supreme Command of the Army/Army General Staff/Alien Armies in the West:

Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op. (Army) No. 03408/43 Secret, dated 18.8.43.

c). Supreme Command of the Armed Force/Chief of Prisoners of War Section in conjunction with Armed Forces Reserve (WR):

Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops Staff/Org II No. 02958/43 Secret, dated 8.7.43 which disregards differences of nationality. The only exception made is in the case of commando-operations (then t they are handed over to the Security Service (SD).

d). RSHA/Section IV

Fundamentally treatment as prisoners of war under the directives mentioned in b) and c), but a more definite ruling is required to decide whether, and in what circumstances, they are to be handed over to the Security Service (SD).

e). RSHA/Military Section:

Considers that the Commando-Order cannot be applied to partisan fighting in the South East that to do so would be dangerous in that it might imperil those taking part in our own operations (Brandenburg).

No opinion on the question of Foreign Missions.

H1145-0204

f). Ag. Ausl.

Fundamentally, treatment as prisoners of war, that implies that members of missions were taking part in a commando-operation

3). Opinion and proposal of the Armed Forces Ops Staff

According to the Orders issued to date, even, for example, the British captured in the "Rösselsprung" operation must be treated as prisoners of war.

The Commando-Order has never yet been applied to such missions, its extended application to cover them has not yet been ordered. If the missions are to be treated otherwise than in accordance with the orders to date, it must first be decided whether a foreign mission acting with the partisan groups in the South East is to be called a commando operation and therefore treated as such. Such a decision seems to be indicated even if it does not correspond completely to the wording of the commando-order or to the previous definition of a commando-operation (as an especially under-hand and still unusual form of warfare which must be combatted with the appropriate counter measures). The principle must be adopted from the start that all members of partisan groups, even in the South East, are fundamentally guerrillas. Indeed, they are treated as prisoners of war, for reasons of expediency, in order to obtain the largest possible number of deserters and workers. There is no reason for this with regard to the members of foreign missions who are not numerous. There is therefore no necessity to treat them in every case, in the same way as the members of partisan groups themselves. Basically, it would be far more appropriate to consider Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian military missions as commando-operations and to treat their members accordingly.

The appended Order is therefore proposed.

sgd. Warlimont

Distribution:

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
via the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff. 1st Copy

Qu. (Draft) 2nd Copy

(The second copy of the above dated 27.7.1944 marked "Draft" is also contained in 1279-PS it is initialled at the end by Warlimont and has an illegible pencil note at the top. In the second copy the first words of 2) and of 3) are underlined in pencil. The type-script of both copies is identical).

H1145-0205

Draft

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 007893/4 Most Secret/Armed Forces Ops Staff/QU (Admin. 1)

(The nuber is changed to 009074/44)

Führer Headquarters 22.7.1944

Most Secret

.. Copies
. Copy

Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.

The Special Orders for the treatment of captured members of partisan groups do not apply to members of foreign so-called "military mission" (Anglo-American or Soviet-Russian) captured in the fight against partisan groups in the areas under the command of the C-in-C South East and South West. They are therefore to be treated, not as prisoners of war, but in accordance with the Führer's Order on the extermination of terrorist and sabotage troops, dated 18.10.1942 (OKW/WFSt No. 003830/42 Most Secret).

This order is not to be distributed beyond the divisional or equal-ranking staffs of the other branches of the Armed Forces. Any papers distributed to Army Headquarters and equal-ranking staffs, of the Armed Forces are to be recalled, when read, and destroyed.

(This last sentence is changed to "This order is not to be distributed beyond General Headquarters and equal-ranking staffs of other branches of the Armed Forces and is to be destroyed when read.").

Distribution:

C-in-C South East	Copy 1
C-in-C South West	Copy 2
Army General Staff	Copy 3
OKM/Naval War Staff	Copy 4
OKL/Air Force Ops Staff	Copy 5
Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police - Headquarters Staff of the Reichsführer SS - for the attention of SS Brigadeführer and Major-General of the Waffen SS Rohde, also for RSHA	Copy 6
OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept.	Copy 7
/Chief of P.W. section	Copy 8
/Armed Forces Reserves (WR)	Copy 9
/WFSt/W Pr	Copy 10
/Op (Army-Air Force-Navy)	Copy 11
/Org	Copy 12
/War Diary	Copy 13
/Qu (Draft)	Copy 14
Reserve	Copy 15 - 25

- - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1279-PS

5 November 1945

I, HIERONIM TROMBALA, Capt., General List, 204771, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1279-PS.

HIERONIM TROMBALA
Capt., General List
204771

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1541 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Military Secret

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces High Command/armed forces.
Command Staff/ armed forces
Section L Nr. 33 406/40

Top Secret

Matter of Chief
Only through Officer

Fuehrer #9
13 December 1940

(illegible notations)

12 Copies
9th Copy

Direction Number 20
Operation Marita

1.) The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is double necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create an bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.

2.) My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months.

(b) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.

.) For the concentration of the task force in Rumania are necessary:

(a) The 16th Panzer Division which arrives in December on an army mission, and whose task remains unchanged.

(b) Following will be a task force of about seven divisions (final wave) to be dispatched to Southern Rumania. Engineers in the required strength for the preparation of the Danube crossing can conveniently be attached for transport to the 16th Panzer Division (as instructional troops). The field commander of the army will await my decision for the proper moment for them to be employed on the Danube.

(c) Preparations are to be made for further transport to take in the calculated maximum for the operation Marita (total of 24 divisions)

(d) It is the mission of the Air Force to give air protection to the concentration, as well as preparing the necessary primary and reserve installations on Rumania soil

4.) The Operation Marita itself is to be prepared on the following basis:

(a) The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast, and the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth.

(b) Flank protection against Turkey will be the task of the Bulgarian forces, although it is to be secured and strengthened through the alerting of German Forces.

(c) It is not certain whether the Bulgarian forces will take part in the attack. Likewise the Yugoslavs position cannot yet be clearly determined.

(d) It will be the mission of the Air Force to support the drive of the army in all phases, to liquidate the opposing air force, and, as far as possible, to occupy British strongpoints on the Greek Islands through airborne landings.

(e) The question in which fashion the Operation Marita is to be supported by the Italian forces, and how coordination of the operations is to take place, awaits a later decision.

5.) The military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demands the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff.

The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported

step by step by the General Staff of the armed forces and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the Germany Army mission in Rumania.

Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties.

6.) After the completion of the operation Marita it is contemplated to use the access of the forces use therein for a new undertaking.

7.) I anticipate reports of the Chiefs concerning their plans, which has already taken place as regards the Army. I want to be presented with exact timetable for the planned preparations, as well as for the necessary recallings from the armament industry, (reconstruction of Furlough Divisions).

Signed: Adolf Hitler

Witnessed
(Signature unreadable)
Captain in the General Staff

Distribution

Commander of the Armies (Operational Section)	1st Copy
Commander of the Navy (Sea War Direction)	2nd Copy
Commander of the Air Force (Air Force General Staff	3rd Copy
Chief of the German Army Mission to Rumania	4th Copy
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces:	
Command Staff	5th Copy
Section L.	6-9 Copies
WNV	10th Copy
Chief of Army Transport Forces	11th Copy
Foreign Counter Intelligence Office	12th Copy

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1541 PS

10 November

I, PFC ERNST W. COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1541 PS.

ERNST W. COHN,
PFC 33925738.

H1145-0207

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1746-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Conference between Field Marshal List and representatives of the Bulgarian General Staff.

(Agreement between Germany, Bulgaria and Rumania for attacking Greece and eventually Turkey). dated February 8, 1941

PART I
(partial translation)

PAGE 1, LINE 5-14:

MINUTES

of questions discussed between the representatives of the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German Supreme Command - General Field Marshal List - in connection with the possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she should involve herself in the war.

PAGE 1, LINE 19 - PAGE 2, LINE 24:

1). During the operations of the German troops against Greece or Turkey, the Bulgarian army will not be committed in an offensive way against the two mentioned countries, according to an agreement between the two governments. It will be reinforced, in order to safeguard the new order on the Balkan.

2). Up to the arrival of German troops on the Bulgarian South and Southeast border, the Bulgarian army will alone defend its territory with its own troops for the beginning, with about the following deployment:

at least 6 Bulgarian divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border,
sufficient forces for the protection of the border, on the Greek border,
reinforced border protection on the Yugoslavian border.

Later on, the Bulgarian army is also responsible for adequate protection along those fronts where German forces will not become offensive.

The mobilization and the deployment of these forces may start immediately in a camouflaged way. However, in order that these measures will have the desired effect, the deliveries to Bulgaria must be fulfilled immediately by Germany (enclosure I).

The German supreme command will do everything in its power, so that its troops will appear on the Bulgarian-Turkish and Bulgarian-Greek border in sufficient numbers in the shortest time.

For this purpose, from the beginning a sufficient amount of German forces - mainly armored and motorized divisions - will be moved in the shortest time behind the Bulgarian border protection troops. This move will start with the deployment of the two armored divisions which already are in the Dobrudscha as well as with the armored and motorized divisions which are in Walachia. The other forces provided for the operations, that means more infantry and armored divisions, will follow behind, depending on weather, road, and bridge situation.

PAGE 3, LINE 3 - 12:

3). The Bulgarian and the German general staff will take all measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the operations and to assure in this way the most favorable conditions for the execution of the German operations as planned.

The representatives of the two general staffs consider it to be suitable to inform their governments that it will be good to take the necessity of secrecy and surprise into consideration, when the three-power treaty is signed by Bulgaria in order to assure the success of the military operations.

PAGE 3, LINE 13 - PAGE 4, LINE 27:

4). In order to protect Bulgaria from any possible enemy before and after the beginning of the operations, the German supreme command will take the following measures:

a) Against Turkey:

From the beginning, sufficient German forces, mainly armored divisions, will be thrown against the Turkish border behind the Bulgarian defensive front. At the same time, the German air force will stand ready for active defense.
If Turkey should attack Bulgaria, while the German operations against Greece are being carried out, the Bulgarian army will defend itself, supported by sufficient German forces. The German supreme command will take all necessary measures immediately, in order to beat and throw back the Turkish army with German troops, so that an extended defense by Bulgarian troops will be avoided on the Turkish front.
The same also goes for Greece, if the Greeks should attack Bulgaria during the German operations against Turkey.

b) Against Greece:

Motorized advance units shall thrust immediately against the Greek-Bulgarian border as fast as possible, in order to stand there as support for the protection of the Bulgarian border.

c) Against Yugoslavia:

If Yugoslavia should attack, the columns of the German infantry divisions would take over the protection against the West, at first, which are deployed on the right flank to the rear. Other German forces would get at Yugoslavia from another side, too. It is assumed in this case, that a reinforced Bulgarian border protection exists also along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border.

d) Against Russia:

Sufficient German forces are ready on the German Eastern border, to be used for any purpose. Moreover, German instructor troops are available in Rumania, in addition to the Rumanian army.

e) Against landing attempts:

The German troops are in a position to take a hand at any time in the defense against a possible landing on the Black Sea coast, in cooperation with the air force. Besides, the supreme command of the army List will make its suggestions at the competent German navy office, in order to strengthen the protection of the two ports Varna and Burgas, according to the already known wishes of the Bulgarian supreme command.

The Bulgarian army will also do its part to guarantee the protection of the two ports by providing forces there.

PAGE 4, LINE 32 - PAGE 5, LINE 27:

6). The supply of the German troops on their march through Bulgaria and during their operations against Greece or Turkey will be provided from the own German stocks. However, in order to relieve the railroad and transportation system, especially with regard to feeding facilities, assistance from the Bulgarian side is necessary. This assistance will only be within the limits of the so-called "Contingents". ("Kontingent"). The details about the installation of the necessary dumps, about purchases, payment of work, etc., as well as export and import control, will be regulated by a special commission.

(Remark in pencil) (L IV Is taken care of)

H1145-0209

7). It will be necessary to use the Bulgarian national installations (railroad, postal system, etc), for the purposes of the German armed forces, as far as it will be bearable for the Bulgarian economy. The details about it will be regulated by the special commissions which are already in Sofia. It is presumed that especially the railroad net and the rolling stock will be placed at the disposal of the German army for its requirements. For that purpose it is necessary that the Bulgarian railroad receives an extra allowance of about 100 locomotives, 1500 freight cars and 30 km rail material, in order to satisfy all requirements of the Bulgarian army, the Bulgarian economy and the German army. Operation and management of the Bulgarian national railroads, postal and telegraphic service are to remain in Bulgarian hands. Transportation required by the German army will be organized by the Bulgarian general staff. The details about the service of the railroads, postal and telegraphic systems will be discussed and regulated by a special commission.

PAGE 6, LINE 6 - 11:

10). The activity of the counter intelligence service (Abwehr dienst) of the German and Bulgarian general staffs is already regulated by a special commission.

11). The question of command function in Bulgaria could not yet be finally settled. The German high command will come back to this question in the near future.

PAGE 6, LINE 15 - 26:

13). Questions which might come up later will be taken care of by further conferences.

14). The conditions laid down above, as far as political questions are concerned, will be in effect only after the approval by the German supreme command of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the preparations for the execution of the operations will be made with all energy, regardless of the above fact.

In order to enable the Bulgarians to carry out in time the last preparations for the deployment, it is necessary that the Bulgarian general staff should be informed of the crossing of the border by the Germans 10 days ahead of time.

Finis

PART II
(partial translation)

Conference of Hitler and the German High Command
on the situation in Yugoslavia. Dated March 27, 1941

PAGE 1 - PAGE 4, LINE 13:

W F St

Berlin, March 27, 1941

Top Secret
Only for general officers

1st copy W F St
2nd copy L
3rd copy W Kr G

To be transmitted by officers only.

Discussion about the situation in Yugoslavia

Present:
Führer
Reich Marshal
Chief OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces)
Chief W F St
Major General Bodenschatz
Colonel Schmundt

(stamp)
OKW/W F St
Dept L (I M I)
29 March 1941
No 44391/41 top secret
(illegible)

(several pencil marks and initials)

H1145-0210

Present: (cont'd)

Commander von Puttkamer
Lieutenant-Colonel Scherff
Major von Below
Major Christian
Later on the following persons were added:
Supreme commander of the army (Ob.d.H,)
Chief of the General staff of the army (Chef Gen St d H)
Colonel Hensinger
Lieutenant-Colonel Sieverth
Reich Foreign Minister
Ambassador Hewel
Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Walden
Colonel Schmidt
Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Rintelen.

BDC-OKW-1631
(remark in pencil at right lower corner of first page)

The Führer

describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup d'etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming Marita-action and even more in regard to the Barbarossa-undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-German. These governments never sit securely in the saddle, because of the nationality problem and the officers caste (Kamarilla), which is always inclined to start a coup d'etat. In the present time, the country had only one strong man, namely Stojaldinowitsch, and Regent Prince (Prinzregent) Paul had him thrown over, to his own disadvantage.

The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country's attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the government would have happened during the Barbarossa-action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious.

The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav government which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.

It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Roumania's main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day, a message will still be addressed to the Duce.

Politically, it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightning like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.

This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest time.

H1145-0211

H1145-0212

In this connection, the beginning of the Barbarossa-operation will have to be postponed up to 4 weeks.

The military operations are to be carried out in the following way:

1). Begin of the operation Marita as early as possible with the limited aim to capture Greek-Thracia and the basin of Saoloniki and to win the high terrain of Edessa; for that purpose march (Ausholen) across Yugoslav territory.

2). Push from neighborhood South of Sofia in direction Skoplje in order to relieve the flank of the Italian front in Albania.

3). Push with stronger forces from the area around Sofia in direction towards Nis, then towards Belgrad, in cooperation with

4). Stronger German forces penetrating from the area around Graz and Klagenfurt in direction South-East with the aim to destroy the Yugoslavian army.

PAGE 5, LINE 3 - 9:

3). The main task of the airforce is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian airforce ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrad in attacksby waves: besides, the air force has to support the advance of the army.

For this purpose, it is possible to make use of the Hungarian ground installations.

PAGE 6, LINE 7 - 12:

The Führer
orders the immediate starting of all preparations. He expects the plans of the different parts of the armed forces during the evening of March 27th. General von Rintelen is ordered to receive the message and verbal orders from the Führer during the night of March 27.

(illegible pencil initial)

PART V
(full translation)

SUBJECT: Tentative plan for the coordination of the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia. Dated: March 28, 1941

The Chief of the leading staff of the Armed Forces (Wehrmachtsführungsstab) of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Berlin, March 28, 1941

(in pencil)
(Handed over to Gen. von)
(Rintelen on March 28,1941)
(at 4 P. M.)

Only for general officers

To be transmitted by officers only

KW/W F St
Stamp

(several pencil marks)

Tentative Plan

for the coordination of the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia.

(several pencil marks)

H1145-0213

1). In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory.

2). For this purpose, the following units are being formed:

a) One assault group South of Sofia for the advance in direction Skoplje and South, in order to occupy the Southern part of Yugoslavia as basis for the combined attack against Greece and to remove the danger for the rear of the Italian front in Albania.

b) One assault group which will be deployed around Graz and under certain circumstances also in Southwest Hungary, in order to penetrate into Yugoslavia later in the direction Belgrad and Westward.

c) Probably an Hungarian attack group reinforced by German forces which will be committed in the general direction towards the Danube on both sides of Belgrad.

3). If the weather situation permits, the operation against Greece will start on April 2nd or 3rd. In this operation, the right flank will move across Yugoslavian territory. In the beginning, its aim will be limited to the occupation of the basis of Saloniki and the high terrain of Edessa.

4). Therefore, the following tasks result for the participation of the Italian armed forces:

a) Flank protection for the German attack group Graz by advancing towards the line Split-Yajole, with forces as strong as possible.

b) Shifting to the defense on the Greek-Albanian front and deployment of an attack group, in order to join with the German forces committed around Skoplje and South.

c) Elimination of the Yugoslav naval forces.

d) Later on, resumption of the attacks against the Greek front in Albania.

For the inner-political integration of the Yugoslav national territory it is especially desirable to favor the Croat independence movements in every respect and to treat the Croats as friends of the Axis. It will therefore be opportune to avoid any air attacks against Croat territory, as long as it is not a question of commitment against enemy troops fighting there.

5). The following chronological schedule of the German operations may be expected:

a) Attack against Greece: April 2nd-3rd
b) Attack from the area South of Sofia on April 3rd or April 4th
c) Attack from the area around Graz and East of it: April 12th.

(illegible initial)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1746-PS

19 November 1945

I, WALTER R. SELIGSON, 1st Lt., Ord., O-1558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpts from Document No. 1746-PS.

WALTER R. SELIGSON
1st Lt., Ord.,
O-1558904

H1145-0214

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1775-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The OKW is asking the Fuhrer's decision, concerning the following proposals:

Orders will be given immediately, after the detailed numbers and letters have been released by the Leader, for accomplishment.

1.) To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

2.) Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria,

a.) through V-men (V-Mannner) in Austria,

b.) through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier,

c.) through travelling agents.

3.) Such news could be:

a.) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the Sector of the VII A.K.

b.) (Rolling stock) is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and Regensburg.

c.) Major General Muff, the Military Attache in Vienna has been called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter of fact, this is the case).

d.) The Police Stations located at the frontier of Austria, have called up reinforcements.

e.) Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade (Gebirgsbrigade) in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and Berchtesgaden.

4.) Order a very active make-believe-wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich.

5.) Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier.

6.) Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.

7.) An answer is requested to Lt General Keitel through the Reich-Chancery.

Signed - Keitel.

14.2 7:30 Captain Eberhardt gives the information by phone, that the Führer has given his approval in all points.

Answer came only around 2 at night through Reich-Chancellory.

9:00 Telephone message transmitted to Admiral Canaris in Munich

H1145-0215

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1775-PS

8 November 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 1775-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL,
2nd Lt., Inf.,
O-1335567.

H1145-0216

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1780-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation of Excerpts from Jodl Diary

1937

4 February:

Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the Commissioner of four-year plan.

Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary. Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders previously placed with them.

The sentence "Money is an unimportant factor" has come true, even in another sense. The main part is the raw materials.

Bad harvest and (illegible), especially bread grain (Brotgereide), demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the people.

31 March:

Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear (on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as "Armed Forces Maneuvers" (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war, i.e., two maneuvers, should be presented.

5 November:

Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) (des Chef WA (R Kr. Min)) and by Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).

Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the Services (C-in-C, Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization instructions.

1938

11 February:

In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General v. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

13 February:

In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1780-PS. Continued

14 February:

At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the different measures.

The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.

15 February:

In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.

16 February:

Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.

22 February:

At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about the planned advances (vorstosse).

3 March:

The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.

10 March:

By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District leader (Gauleiter) Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 9:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.
"Prepare case Otto."

1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.

Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer to take action.

1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.

Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets. In addition, one Pursuit Squadron (Jagdgruppe), 3 bomber groups (Kampfgeschwader) and two companies as airborne troops with transport planes are held ready at civilian airports (Friedensflugplatze) in Bavaria.

Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn., Regt General Goering.

11 March:

Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without signature; at 1300 hours with his signature.

The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V.T.) by regiments, 40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper-Bavaria as second wave.

1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.

1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced. Frontier will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans large scale propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any case and will be mixed with the troops.

1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started.

Decision: yes.

2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place.

Later undated entry.

After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.

The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it.

Because of Germany's self restraint, its consequences lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for "green" on 30 May.

22 May:

Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see enclosure).

23 May:

Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)

30 May:

The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions

of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.

10 August:

The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams (die er noch dazu dem General Adams in den Mund legt) that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. "I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years." The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough held very widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the Generals' opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that (?) the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes.

21-26 August:

Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (Reichsverweser). Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz (?).

They arrive with the idea, that in the course of a great war, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude.

6 September:

Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.

Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer - especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.

8 September:

General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the overall meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE).

General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is reserved.

I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.

In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.

1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).

We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl) (x-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, x-1 day, 7 o'clock). The "Y time" has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.

10 September:

General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Fuehrer signed decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command, as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would be taken by two other divisions (3 words illegible).

11 September:

In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.

The joint preparations for refutation (wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important.

15 September:

In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.

H1145-0221

16 September:

General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in Godesberg.

With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.

In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September.

17 September:

Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Fuehrer issues order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein.

19 September:

Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.

20 September:

England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the border). By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.

Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.

21 September:

The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect.

1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, Captain Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by Captain Eberhardt). "The Fuehrer has received news five minutes ago that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally."

1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to continue preparation for "Green", but nevertheless to get ready with everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force; General Stumpf to be informed.

22 September:

1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General von Stulpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be ascertained (D-Day)(x- Tag); continue preparations according to plan. In case "Green" occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs sooner, it will probably be improvised.

25 September:

By order of the Fuehrer, two Death Head (Totenkopf) SS battalions have moved into the Panhandle territory near Asch (Ascher Zipfel) to the rear of the Free Corps.

26 September:

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.

In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.

Question by department "Foreign Countries" whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.

1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer's opinion. In no case will x day be before the 30th.

It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.

A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.

The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is to have priority.

The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.

2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportpalast..

27 September:

1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.

28 September:

Stapf (?) reports about a conference with Goering where the latter states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7 years, and we will win it.

1700 hours: Tension relaxes. The Fuehrer has decided on a conference with Chamberlain, the Duce and Daladier in Munich.

H1145-0222

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1780-PS. Continued.

29 September:

The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.

1939

23 August:

Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive Office. (WFA).

1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. X day has been announced for 26 August. Y time has been announced for 0430 hours.

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1780-PS.

22 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of excerpts in Document No. 1780-PS.

Ludwig Hartman
T/4
37446052

1786-PS

Exhibit USA 561
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

H1145-0224

EXTRACT FROM W AR DIARY OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OPERATIONS STAFF

WF.St. KTB (1) 1943
14 Mar. 1943

The treatment of captured partisans has been laid down in the combat directive for the combatting of partisans in the East (Kampfanweisung für die Bandenbekämpfung) of 27.11.42 (cf. 27.11/1) and Hitler's order (Führerbefehl) of 16.12 (cf. 16.12/1). On the basis of the foregoing the Reichsführer SS ordered on the 30.12 that persons suspected of being partisans or their assistants, who are not to be executed, are to be transferred to concentration camps in Germany.

This order, which corresponds to the terms of reference already decreed, differs from an order already given on the 30.10.42 by the Commander in Chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the 18th Army, which calls for the shooting without discrimination of all members of partisan groups and which is covered by the subsequent orders of the 15.11 and 16.12 only on their strictest interpretation. The Reichsführer SS therefore sent to the Armed Forces Operations Staff (Wehrmachtführungstab) on the 21.1 a letter of the Chef der S.P. and S.D. in which it is requested that, in the area of the 18th Army also, partisan helpers and persons suspected of such activity, should be dealt with in accordance with the terms of reference of 30.12.

The Armed Forces Operations Staff (Wehrmachtführungstab) handed the matter over on the 25.1 to the Army General Staff (Generalstab des Heeres) competent for the combatting of pa rtisans, and thereby conforming with the ruling given by the Reichsführer SS. This decision was confirmed by the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht).

Since the ruling of the combat directive, figs. 85, 86, & 104, provides for work in Germany as a punitive measure for partisan helpers and suspects and has proved to be disadvantageous for the enlistment of voluntary workers, the General Plenepotentiary for Labour (Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz), has requested that no threat of forced labour in Germany as a punitive measure should be made, or that at least, suspects should be described as such to the labour authorities for the purpose of supervision.

The General Quartermaster (General Quartiermerster) together with the Economic Staff (East) (Wirtschaftsstab Ost) has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison ca mps or to "training centres in their own area", and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.

In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff (Wehrmachtführungstab) this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the "peaceful population" which has been called upon to work. He recommends therefore transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the

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Reichsführer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader (Höherer SS und Polizeiführer) and orders that the difference between "punitive work" and "work in Germany" is to be made clear to the population.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT

I, WALTER H. RAPP, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of above extract of OKW war diary, dated 14 March 1943.

(Signed) WALTER H. RAPP
Captain, CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Copy

Translations of General Jodl's Diary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from 1 February to 26 May 1940

1 February 1940: The Fuehrer requests that Major Kieritz be sent from here in good time with special mission.

Col. Schmundt and Capt. Deyhle are back from the West.

Conclusion:

1) Morale and discipline - excellent
2) Tactical mobility is impossible because of the weather. One cannot withdraw more than 15 km. Army group B, on the contrary, deems weather excellent to overcome floods.
3) In all divisions, formerly committed in the East, the automative position is very bad. Up to 40% are missing --each of these 40 divisions should be provided with up to 100 vehicles.

1700 hours General Jeschonnek.

1) Attitude of parachute units. In front of the Hague, they have to be strong enough to break in even forcibly. The 7th Div. intends to drop units near the town.
2) Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action against the Dutch air force.
3) Walcheren Iceland will have to be occupied as soon as possible.
4) Immediate use requires some arrangements.
   To be eliminated
   Committment of K against Eben Emael
   against bridge C
   "Fieselor Stork" airplane in front of Army Group A.
   The ground Forces already will take up position at dusk, if possible.
   7th Fl. Division is to be in readiness, but will not take up position without further orders.
5) Question about general intentions? Time.
6) Is it not possible to tackle H alone; that would already be a tremendous improvement in conducting aerial warfare.
7) The Air Force wants permission to attack every kind of commercial shipping in the 30 mile-zone as well as everything anywhere making use of arms: French vessels, cargo boats.

2 February: Fuehrer is furious about presentation by Ordnance Bureau which needed 8 days to demonstrate to him-not by actual constructing but only theoretically-that the Czech 4.7 cm anti-tank gun is not usable with armored car 3.

Fuehrer decides as to Jeschonnek's questions of 1 February:

a) one has to employ in the Hague (d.H.) forces of such strength that they will be able to take over command there. In order to achieve that, a landing can be made in the center of the Hague.

Unlimited use of arms against airfields and antiaircraft guns is authorized.

Relative to an attack against all ships, found between the English East Coast and the English mine fields, as desired by air, the Foreign Office is still to be consulted.

and Admiral Schuster) Chief Air Force, 1700 hours, states in that matter that he does not want any exception.

Italian and Japanese ships to be considered, which were sailing to Newcastle, until a short time ago.

(Translator's note: In German text, it is not clear if "Admiral Schuster" belongs to first or second phrase. My assumption is that the sentence should read as follows: "Admiral Schuster wants to bear in mind the Italian and Japanese ships, which were sailing to Newcastle, even a short time ago."-)

Important, that, though we signed an agreement about submarine warfare, we never signed one about manner of air war-

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fare.

Reported to the Fuehrer on 3 February

The Spanish have supplied a German submarine and convoyed a merchant ship from Bilbao to Santander.

Opinions of the newspapers: Spain is not ungrateful. Photos of Church Services, does Fuehrer agree with them?

The Foreign Office wants that within the 30 mile zone the Air Force shall not attack

a) Japanese and Italian ships
b) Danish Maltesian cross ships
c) all passenger boats which do not fire.

3 February: General Gerke: Railroads are unable to accomplish big tasks. No reaction to our transports. It seems possible that he got news about the reliefs. Opportune to keep movement going. Proposal to prepare again an A-movement to deceive the enemy. Empty rolling stock for 6 divisions available, organization transports are rolling. Will head of transportation service be able to release state of readiness, so that he can gather empty rolling stock for 4 days less. (Translator's note: Could be-that he can gather fewer rolling stock during 4 days). To consult Fuehrer. The chief of Transportation Corps West requires one week's time (225 trains). 70 trains are at the disposal of the armies.

315 trains are needed for second echelon. An order will be issued on this matter on D-day.

Afterwards remain 3rd, 4th, and 5th echelon.

Total 660 trains, including 80 for tanks and 70 for armies (among them 10,000 army cars).

Altogether 60 fewer trains ready than before.

Air raid protection

Ammunition train has no special protection. If machine gun car is added, the enemy flier will be aware of the fact, that this is an important train. The wave before the trains should attack the enemy plane with best results. Ammunition trains often remain for weeks, personnel for its protection become demoralized.

Ammunition trains, regulating stations and storage areas to be spread out and protected. Assembly stations are enlarged to assembly areas.

Maintenance units are kept in readiness in the most endangered areas between the Rhine and the line Kassel-Hanover.

Ruhr area has 15 different ways to give way.

Romania wants to get supply of rail track materiel (from Poland).

1340 locomotives and 40000 cars will be manufactured by the end of 1940 or maybe beginning of 1941. Stock 23000 locomotives, 8000 of which are heavy freight train locomotives for Armed Forces transports. This will only replace the loss.

4 February: Will the Court-Martial be re-activated?

Bodenschatz: Army Group C should not get out of hand (Keinen zauber machen) on minus-1 day.

Fuehrer gives his agreement that 225 trains in position of readiness may be used for other purposes by the chief of transportation corps until 12 February

Proposal to the Fuehrer about continuation of aerial warfare within the 30 mile zone. Fuehrer agrees with proposal and talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the afternoon.

5 February; Special staff "Weser Exercise" meets and is welcomed by Chief of Armed Forces High Command, gets instructions.

Representative of Air Force is still missing.

6 February: Consumption of gasoline is not reduced. Stocks further diminshed by 30000 tons.

Deception even of Armed Forces High Command.

Office Reinicke and Thomas, that is to say Chief of Armed Forces High Command,

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W Pr that is to say Chief of Armed Forces Operational Office. Fuehrer leaves in the evening.

15:30 hours conference with General Jeschonnek, Col. v. Waldau and Col. Warlimont.

Air Force submits following questions:

Does X time remain unchanged? Yes. Deceptive action intolerable for Army Group C on A-1 day. Navy is not interested in Walcheren. Does not see any danger from the English side. New idea: carry out actions H and Weser Exercise only and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war.

Discussed once more affair Risberg with Chief of Armed Forces High Command.

8 February: Chief of Transportation Corps reports: Reich Railroads (Reichsbahn) now admit that they cannot handle any additional burden at this moment. They are not ready for war. Although they hardly got any military requests, they cannot supply the domestic economy right now.

It is only a question of engines,now, there are enough cars available everywhere.

Transportation 80% railroad
18% water transport
2% road transport

Transportation by water has to be brought to double of ourrent capacity.

Radio receivers can be transformed into transmitters without particular difficulties.

Paris probably only by Gen. F....(Fermont?), rue de Louvre.

9 February: Chief of Armed Forces High Command received by Field Marshal Goering at 10 o'clock, Newspaper correspondents from the Protectorate may be sent to the West Wall (Fuehrer gave permission on 10 Febr.)

10 February: The difficult situation in Transportation is presented by me in written form to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.

13:00 hrs: Conference of Fuehrer with General Halder. Before that, inspection of 4.7 tank destroyer on tank I, chassis satisfying (befriedigt) (Translator's note: should perhaps be: befestigt--fixed).

Field Marshal has explained, that he is able to start at night anyhow. Flying into the area of .....from the sea.

During the world war, we have dropped 28000 tons. Thus, the Air Force does not want to anticipate, but prefers start at night. Planes shall not fly over Lüttich and Eben Emael in order to avoid any alarm there.

113000 trucks driving in the W.....

45,000 of them are suited for Armed Forces.

We are able to produce 4000 trucks.

Fuehrer states, all the iron has been taken away from Todt, even that put aside by him (he wanted to build 3000 additional ones).

<u>For the first time, the problems of transportation, motor vehicles and gasoline have been reported to the Fuehrer more impressively.</u>

Fuehrer agrees that the 225 trains for the first wave of Army High Command reserves may still be used further on by the Chief of the Transportation Corps.

11 February: First report from France about our troop movements and reinforcements in the west, which were terminated on 1 February already.

12 February: Fuehrer has a cold. No report.

13 February: The Army requested survey about the strength of the a armies and reserves, divided into batteries, battalions and tanks (Btn. Btlen u. Kampfwagen), induces the Fuehrer again to open the question of the center of gravity.

He says:

Most of the armed tanks (Geschützkampfwagen) have been directed to areas of secondary importance. Armored Divisions at 4th Army can do little in barricaded and fortified area.

They will be stopped at the latest on the Maas river and must be withdrawn. The 16th or 12th Army will then miss them. One should lead them together in direction of Sedan. The enemy does not expect our main assault there. The documents of fliers, who landed, have convinced them (the enemy) still further in their opinion that our intention is only to take possession of the Dutch and Belgian channel coast.

A great number of tanks with 8th Tank Division does not seem necessary, a mechanized division in 3 or 4 parts with tanks assigned, should suffice. (It may be that this is a wish of the SSV division)

I hand over to the Fuehrer a summarized report, from which the great possibility for formation of a center of gravity south of the line Lüttich-Namur becomes obvious (at least 5 times the strength of the forces committed north of that line). I bring to his attention that the thrust against Sedan is a tactical secret path, where one can be surprised by the God of War. If the French attack from the south flank, we must veer to the south.

Fuehrer still thinks it possible, that the enemy will not engage the battle at all. Anyhow he will not do it automatically. After half a day the news from Holland and Belgium may be so threatening already that he will decide to stand still.

I don't believe it.

At 17:30 hours Col. v. Greifenberg and Lt. Col Heusniger are summoned to discuss these questions.

The Fuehrer disapproves of the wearing of regular army uniforms by persons who are not members of the army or the Fuehrer's Headquarters.

Recommends taking care of motor vehicles and fuel. Higher speeds result in doubled tire consumption.

Chief of Armed Forces High Command has a cold and will remain at home in the afternoon.

Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the echelon Reivel is to be put to use against the Caucasus with bulk from Bulgaria. The Air Force must explain with whom this false idea originated.

Inquiries made to the Chief of the Operational Division: whether there is a sufficient quantity of cloth for flags on hand? Change of position of the Army High Commands

Proper designation of own troops:

(a) front line: white
(b) in line of company CPs: swastika flag
(c) rear echelons: yellow rectangle.

Communicated Fuehrer's ideas to Col. Warlimont, von Greifenberg and to Lt.Col. Heusniger, at 17:30 hours. Instructions requested how we should proceed in future.

14 February: Ziegenberg plant cannot be completed before June due to technical difficulties. Emergency installation can be made ready for operation by the middle of March, but in that case the Air Force must be in Nauheim or on the train.

Colonel Schmundt must make a report on the distribution of personnel to WNV.

Copper advance from Wifo stocks now to WNV, later back to W Wifo.

Political action against the increase in frontier roadblocks (?) in Luxemburg.

Dr. Dorpmüller telegraphed to the chief of the Transportation Corps: The condition of the Reich Railroads (Reichsbahn) requires that all non-essential transportation of the Armed Forces be postponed until warmer weather sets in.

15 February: The Fuehrer approves my article on the Finnish-Russian conflict. Is to be published in the Völkischer-Beobachter. Backlog congestion of railroads increased by 200 trains.

Certainty that nothing will happen to W.

Instructions to the 18th Army.

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16 February: Corps on left flank of 16th and not 6th Army.
Landing at the Hague.....
Capture Fort Hendrik
10 divisions of the 8th wave (must receive 3 batteries)

To the Chief of the Luftwaffe (taken care of) No off-standard types of vehicles must be permitted to be used at the front, as long as standard army models are still being used in industry, air raid protection.....

Speakers for troops, danger if commanders order the speeches themselves

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.

WNV) training of 300 to 400 men
) land postal clerks at Verst. (?)
)

from the Chief of the Air Force Not yet at present

6 new German consuls appointed in Scandinavia.

C. has given orders for large-scale preparations for offensive.

Fortress (Fest) drill of "Grafenwöln"

Special security by counter-intelligence co-ordination of press.

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Bried reports in the provincial newspapers for enemy intelligence service. Request authorization to Land at Myden with a load of machines. Alternative preparation at C should work in the same direction.
W Pr battleships "Repulse" in dock. Complete flop of this report.
Altmark in Bergen. British submarines expected. Burgedeyk submarine.
48 Schultz unsuccessful (?) submarine.

Chief of Armed Forces High Command

Press conference at Foreign Office

Chief of the Navy High Command wishes to talk the Halifax problem over once more and then speak with the Fuehrer. Now applications of minds only. Chief of the Navy High Command will take this matter up again with the Fuehrer.
L. Ask, what with report of General Staff officers.
17 February Incident with tankship "Altmark", 6 killed, 4 seriously injured.
1700 hours: newly promoted commanding generals and General Rommel at Fuehrer's table for dinner. (Geyr, Manstein, Schmidt, Reinhardt Glumn)
Complaints that guns in armored cars III only.....have not a range up to 2000 m.
After dinner Manstein reports his ideas about the operations of Army Group A. He says, the decisive blow will not fall west of the Maas, but it must be overcome between Sedan-Charleville. If the enemy crosses the river Maas, we are able to beat him and cross river Maas together with him. In the south therefore we must have strong armor or none at all. What is in the rear can not reach the battlefield in time.

18 February
On the basis of my discussion with Greifenberg on 13 February Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and General Halder report to the Fuehrer the following intentions:

1. To change the demarcation line between Army Group A and B in line Luettich-Namur.

2. To employ stronger armored forces in front of the 12th and 16th army, weakening by that measure Army Group B.
(1st and 5th Armored) and ground force reserves (9th Armored Division)

3. Intention, to go to the front anyway with a very small staff one night preceeding A Day.

Fuehrer approves all three suggestions but insists that in distributing the heavy tanks III, IIIt and IV due cinsideration should be given to the task to be expected. That is to say not such a large number of heavy tanks as it is the case now with the 8th armored.and 6th armored division.
19.11 Fuehrers displeased with behavior of Graf Spee crew on the Altmark. No resistance,no British losses
Fuehrer presses for the Weser Exercise energetically, equip steamships. Put units in readiness.
Will talk to staff.
In order to speed up the preparations I advise to appoint one of newly promoted commanding generals with his staff as leader.
Fuehrer approves.
Chief of Army reports about problems of organization.
20 February. Discussion and consideration how case "Weser Exercise" is to be carried through. Equipment is to be taken on board already ahead of the troops. Designation of units depends on equipment on hand.
1500 hours Discussion concerning that matter through Chief of Armed Forces High Command with General Fromm. Intention, to take two divisions with technical equipment as second wave.
21 February: Fuehrer talks to General von Falkenhorst accepts gladly.

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Commander Junge informed about proposed points in his report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Important 3 points:
a) submarines into the Mediterranean
b) Esthonian submarines.
c) Discordance Navy - Airforce about the moment for the beginning of mine laying. Air force beginning 1 May with 3000, Navy with Heinckel 115 now, already 1845 hours Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informed.
Noon Todt reports to the Fuhrer concerning extension of railroad guages (?) (Schienenhoehen.) Fuhrer approves that extension (Anschluss) will be built according to schedule.
23 February: Navy High Command reports that during last night 2 destroyers were sunk by our own planes (Leberecht Maas and ..) Navy High Command stresses that this is the consequence of uncoordinated conduct of sea warfare, regardless whether it is conducted under, on or above the sea. One takes pains not to get excited; what would happen if there should be heavy losses. Fuhrer is furious. he is right. He says: "I would not say anything if the whole Navy were sunk in battle with the enemy, but it is inexcusable if that happens on account of lack of coordination!"

Gasoline reserve for motor vehicles.
24 February: Clear up, whether Navy is authorized to start already now with mine laying. Who will ask Duce, whether our own submarines have to enter the Mediterranean?

Engle informs a bout inquiry results Todt and Schmundt. The latter calls long distance from Munich. Fuhrer has ordered completion of Eagle's Nest for Armed Forces Operational Staff and Air Force. (Zug) (air group ?) Heinrich will have to stay east of the Rhine.

Army High Command as strongly as possible in forests. Officer from the General Staff and an officer from Intelligence Service are to go to Eagle's Nest 26 February. There to reconnoiter together with Todt.
1430 hours Orally transmitted to Chief of Operational Department and to Lieutenant Colonel Heusinger the matter. Chief of the High Command informed. Staff Falkenhorst arrives in Berlin and starts to function XXIst Corps.
25.II. Disturbing reports from Turkey. Communication apparently cut off.

Chief of Armed Forces High Command inform General Halder about Fuhrer's intention to have an Operational Staff of the Army High Command near the Eagle's Nest also.
26.II. Fuhrer raises the question, whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case "Yellow"

Chief of the Air Force charged with examining this problem. Fuhrer decides that Navy will have to wait with starting of mine laying by means of planes. until situation will permit large-scale employment of air force. (transmitted to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

Talked with Chief of Air Force and Chief of Staff about work on and about housing of Air Force near Eagle's Nest at the beginning. Air Force to Rodert or Muenstereifel or train nearby.
27 February 60 Tons of leaflets shall be dropped down in the near future. Fuhrer approves the schedule but will not issue proclamation to Armed Forces from here on A Day.
28 February I make the following proposition to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and after that to Fuhrer: Case "Yellow" and Weser Exercise have to be prepared in such a manner that they will become quite independent from another regarding time and strength. Fuhrer completely agrees with that proposition if there is any possibility for it.
1500 hours, staff Falkenhorst reports about preparations made so far. In this connection I explain to him the new basis of preparations.

Proposition for employment of forces

N	4 airborne companies	22 infantry divisions less
	2 Mountain divisions	2 division, 7th wave.
D	1 corps headquarters	pol. (Police?) division
		1 div. 3rd wave
		regional defense unit.

It has yet to be decided, whether reinforcement 11th rifle brigade is to be directed first to group D and then to group N or to group N immediately

Proposition as regards combat planes too high.
29 February, 1500 hours Report of staff Falkenhorst with Kranke, Buschenhagen, Dnaus very satisfactory to Fuhrer. He approves the suggestions.

Fuhrer wishes also to have a strong group at Copenhagen and detailed elaboration in which way the individual coastal batteries are to be overpowered. Commander-in-Chief of Air Forces is instructed to make out immediately the order

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Brief reports in the provincial newspapers for enemy intelligence service.
Request authorization to land at Myden with a load of machines. Alternative preparations at ' C should work in the same direction.
WPr battleship "Repulse" in dock. Complete flop of this news report.
Altmark in Bergen, British submarines expected. Burgedeyk submarine 48
Schulzw unsuccessful (?) submarines.
Chief of Armed Forces High Command
Press conference at foreign office.
Chief of the Navy High Command wishes to talk the Halifax problem over one more and then speak to the Fuehrer. Now applications of minds only. Chief of Navy, High Command will atke this matter up again with the Fuehrer.
L. Ask , what with report of General Staff officers.
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1700 hours: Newly promoted Commanding generals and General Rommel at Fuehrer's table for dinner. (Geyr, Manstein, Schmidt, Reinhardt Glumne). Complaints that guns in armored cars III only.....have int a range up to 2000 m.
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18 February: On the basis of my discussion with Greifenberg on 13 February Chief of the Armed Forced High Command and General Halder reported to the Fuehrer the following intention:

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2. To employ stronger armored forces in front of the 12 th and 16 th army, weakening by that measure Army Group B (1st and 5th armored) and ground fo forces reserved (9th armored division)

3. Intention to go to the front anyway with a very small staff one night preceeding A Day.

Fuehrer approves all three suggestions but insists that in distributing the heavy tanks III, III t and IV due consideration should be given to the tasks to be expected. That is to say not such a large number of heavy tanks as it is the case now with the 8th Armored and 6th Armored Division.
19.II Fuhrer displeased with behavior of Graf Spee crew on the Altmark. No resistance, no British losses.

Fuhrer presses energetically preparations for the Weser Exercise energetically. Equip steamships. Put units in readiness. Will talk to staff.

In order to speed up preparations I advise to appoint one of newly promoted commanding generals with his staff as leader.

Fuhrer approves.

Chief of Army reports about problems of organization.
20 February Discussion and consideration how casw "Weser Exercised" is to be carried through. Equipment is to be taken on board ships already ahead of the troops. Designation of units depends on equipment on hand.
1500 hours discussion concerning that matter through Chief of Armed Forces High Command with General Fromm. Intention, to take two divisions with technical equipment as second wave.
21 February Fuhrer talks to General von Falkenhorst and charges him with preparation of the Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts gladly. Instructions to each of the 3 branches of the armed forces.
m Proposal from Fromm to use only units with German materiel. Therefore 7th Fl. Div., 22nd Division, one regiment of the 1st mountain division, Two divisions of the 7th wave, motorized brigade, (11th rifle brigade 11 with armored cars 1).

Fuhrer wishes that western esetcusion of the "Spicherer Hoehen" be advanced and fortified with pillboxes.

Colonel v. Greifenberg transmits that desire.
22 February Fuhrer expresses his intention to go to Munich for Sunday.

At the beginning of operations he does not want to go to Ziegenberg but to the Eagle's Nest.

Colonel Juppe ordered:
a) tchave a drawing make of the chain of command.
b) to consider, in what way the communications can be technically improved at the Eagle's Nest and vicinity.

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for Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Chief "WZ"order concerning increasing of the staff.

According to my proposal fit out transport ships immediately and with them bring horses over here from East Prussia.

1300 Hours Order to Jurpe to speed up construction of Eagle's Nest, 11 March according to interim solution (operational staff of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in hunting lodge and at the same time permanent solution (Army High Command with operational department and parts of O.A.IV.

The same evening order concerning personal requirments of the staff and requisition to the branches of the armed forces.

1 March: Fury at Army High Command because transfers. Consultation with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. After my discussion with Jeschonnek scaling-down of requisitions.

2 March: Agreement with Army. Field Marshall rages and gets unfriendly towards Chief of Armed Forces High Command, goes to see Fuhrer at 1300 hours. During the afternoon new requisitions are put forward which are somewhat reduced after consulting with Army and Air Force.

1100 Hours: Assistant Secretary of State Welles with the Fuhrer. The appointmen of a new Minister for Ordnance is to be expected because Fuhrer is dissatisfied with production of equipment and munition.

Letter from the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to the Field Marshall.

3 March: Fuhrer expresses his opinion about the necessity of prompt and strong action in Norway very sharply. No delay by branches of Armed Forces. Rapid acceleration is necessary.

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force is against any proposition to subordinate Air Force units to XXI Corps.

Fuhrer decides to undertake Weser Exercise before case "Yellow", with several days interval.

4 March: Discussion with General Jeschonnek. All units of the Air Force are subordinated to X Fl. K. This receives its orders through High Command of the Air Force, upon demand of the Staff of XXIst Corps.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

JODL's DIARY

(Page 18 - 24)

Fuehrer orders that the Air Force shall provide the anti-aircraft battalion for the Weser exercise South.

3rd montain division to be in Berlin already on March 6th.

10.00 hours: Chief of the Air Force is informed.

13.00 hours: Chief WNV is charged with securing communications from Falkenhorst to us. The former has to go to Luebeck to the X Fl. K.

15.00 hours: Chief WNV is instructed to set up ... platoon company only after X-day. After that time, use expedients and send some men with the tactical troops.

17.00 hours: General Bodenschatz complains about exclusion of the Field Marshal from Weser exercise. He said that 110 officer of the Air Force had been consulted in advance. Such subordination (Unterstellung) is intolerable.
Mad at General K (Generaloberst K).
I certify this error.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is informed that General (Generaloberst) Rundstedt is supposed to feel sick. Intend to talk about it with Commander - in - Chief of the Army. If it is true, v.R. would have to be replaced by List in good time.

Himmler or Canaris are to provide personnel who are familiar with the Hague. These to Wenninger and are grabbed there by Kiertz (werden dort von Kierutz gegriffen)
Proclamations: a) faked ones,
b) proclamations that everything is going well.

Student wants seperate proclamations for Holland.

March 5th:
15.00 hours: Big conference with the 3 Supreme Commanders about Weser exercise. Field Marshal vents his spleen, became he was not consulted beforehand. He dominates the discussion and tries to prove that all previous preparations are good for nothing.
Result: a) Stronger forces to Narvik,
b) Navy shall leave warships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in Trondheim),
c) Christiansand may be excluted, for the beginning,
d) 6 divisions should be figured with for Norway.
e) to get a foothold immediately in Copenhagen, too.

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After this, the following make a report: General von Kesselring, Student, Sp.... Richthofen, Daptain Koch, 1st lieutenant Witzig about the case "Festung" (fortress" and actions by glider-borne troops against the bridges of Vroenhofen and Veldvezelt, furthermore against Fort Eben-Emael. Accusations are made that Army Group B is supposed to have said that is would take 3-4 days until forces of the army could attack the fort.

March 6th:

March 7th: Falkenhorst with Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. The preparations have now materialized. The Fuehrer signs a directive containing all changes subsequent to the conference of March 5th. Nothing is to be changed anymore now.

March 8th: Fuehrer wishes to have issued special orders for the Weser exercise in another form. They are to be divided into military orders which have to be made known to the tactical troops and into general instructions concerning actions of the Plenipotentiary of the Reich.

Fuehrer is outraged about report of the Field Marshal that the Army does not care for occupation of the area in front of the left wing of the Army led by Busch by airborne troops dropped from "Stark" planes, because divisions can get there only after several days. I object that it will naturally be better to employ these troops there, where armored divisions will arrive faster.

March 9th: Fuehrer is outraged when he learns that Prince Oskar is commanding officer of a regiment.
Schmidt was just about to suggest that he is should be given command of a division, but he managed not to mention it.
Buschenhagen reports to me about the preparations for W and submits the schedule.
Fuehrer does not appear at table.
In the evening of March 8th, I again bring seriousness of the gasoline situation to the attention of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. Nothing efficacious has been done to improve the situation. Industry regularly uses up 80.000 tons a month.
There is pressing need for the appointment of a Deputy-General for Fuel Economy (General von Schell).

March 10th: Fuehrer makes his wonderful speech in the arsenal on the occasion of Memorial day.
The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations are very favorable, from a political point of view.

The French Press rages about it because they consider it necessary to cut Germany off from the Swedish ore. In a military way, the situation is disturbing for us, because, if peace should be concluded soon, the motivation for the prepared action of the group Falkenhorst will be difficult.

March 11th: Fuehrer has objections against the iron cross in gold (color effect black-gold), as it means abandoning tradition. Rather create a new decoration.
On the other hand, he agrees with the Oak-Leaves for the Knight's Cross. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presents a list of the tanks at hand in the armed forces.

Fuehrer wants a basic ruling that only such people should be appointed in the Armed Forces and in Civil Service who lave no relatives abroad. The danger is too great that they will get into conflict with their own conscience. The schedule (for the Weser exercise) is presented to the Fuehrer. Also the special orders which the Fuehrer takes along.

March 12th: Fuehrer is very much satisfied with Ribbentrop's conference in Rome. Duce remains steadfast, wants to talk with Fuehrer personally next week on the Brenner. Conclusion of peace between Finland and Russia deprives England, but us, too, of any political basic to occupy Norway.
The preparations are ready to the extent that March 20th could be W-day. However, imfavorable ice-conditions compel postponement by 1-2 days.

March 13th: Fuehrer does not yet give order for "W". He is still looking for some justification.

March 14th: English keep vigil in the North-Sea with 15-16 submarines; the reason is doubtful, either to prevent a German action. Fuehrer has not yet decided, how to justify the Weser exercise. Wrong news report in the American newspapers.

Commander - in - Chief of the Navy is in doubt, whether it is still important to play at preventive war (?) in Norway. The question is, if it wouldn't be better to carry out case "Yellow" before the Weser exercise.
The danger in that case is that the English will immediately get a foothold in Narvik, because we would have started with neutrality violation.

At noon, Colin Rosz visits the Fuehrer. Interesting explanations about Japan-China and Russia.

March 15th: Fuehrer wants the following material for the

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conference with the Duce on March 18th:
1.) Large-scale map of the distribution of our own forces (207 divisions).
2.) Maps about the distribution of enemy and neutral forces.
France, England, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary.
3.) Terminal map of the Finnish-Russian conflict.
4.) Strength of our own Air Force.

13,30 hours: Lunch with Army Group A and with Chief of the General Staff.

15,00 hours: Reports of Army Group Commander and of Army Commanders, including Group Kleist; very satisfactory.

March 16th: Worries that the English will proceed against Norway, as overheard radio messages indicate. As the English have retired 7 submarines, such an action does not seem probable any longer.
Army Group B reports about its evaluation of the situation and its intentions.
Detailed preparations are done very well. Displeasure about disconnection of the 4th army. Mutual assistance is eliminated.
Lack of reinforcements, if the 6th army should be successful, after all. 6th army shifts its center of gravity to 4th Corps, and also draws 3 armored divisions of the 2nd echelon there.
10th and 9th Corps have no anti-aircraft protection.
Jeschonnek transmits that Army Bush needs another 25 "stork" planes.

March 17th: Fuehrer leaves at noon for conference with Duce on the Brenner.
News of the successful raid of the Air Force against Scapa Flow. Fuehrer is in high spirits.

March 18th: Nothing important.
Commander - in Chief of the Air Force (Chef L) is informed about the report of the commanders in the West.

March 19th: Fuehrer returns from the conference with the Duce beaming with joy and very much satisfied. Complete harmony, Duce is resolute; but he cannot fight a long war. Duce is highly impressed and agrees with the opinion of the Fuehrer's that the decision against France is being made. Whatever happens at the periphery in the meantime, is unimportant. At the end, Duce told Ciano: "My decision is made. Did you hear, Fuehrer?" Balkan should and must remain quiet. Complete understanding for Fuehrer's cooperation with Stalin.

Fuehrer deeply moved by enthusiasm of the Tyrolians, England song ("We will sail against England ....."; translator's note).
Chief of Armed Forces High Command very much depressed because of Todt's appointment. I try to persuade him not to insist on the "agreement". It is much better, to seperate the tasks clearly. The quests of the Armed Forces are laid down by the Fuehrer and transmitted to Dr. Todt by the the Armed Forces High Command. Dr. Todt has full powers to fulfil these requests.

March 20th: During the night, the English attack Sylt and Hoermann (?) No success.
At noon, the Fuehrer signs an order which appoints Todt as Minister for Ordnance.
Wedel is instructed by the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to celebrate the 40th anniversary of service by the Commander - in Chief of the Army in a modest way only. The achievements of individual personalities can be appreciated only during or after the war.
In the evening, annihilating blow against an English convoy; 42000 tons of big boats (10-12000 tons) have been sund.

March 21st: Objections of Group 21 (Grp. XXI) about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 05,30 hours and finishing of the diplomatic action. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotations, became otherwise calls for help will be offered, it has to be broken ruthlessly. The political plenipotentiaries will have to strougly emphasize the military measures taken, and will even have to exaggerate them.

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March 22nd:

Reported to Fuehrer, how we want to proceed at the proposed discussions with the Italian General Staff. First, inquiry by attache in Rome, how they believe they can take some burden of us. Only then to proceed to possibility of an operation across the Upper Rhine. Discussion with General Staff only wonce our cards are on the table.

American newspaper correspondents inspect the small damage on Sylt.

March 24th - 25th:

Fuehrer at Obersalzberg.
No special events.
The English start to molest our merchantmen in the Danish and Norwegian territorial waters, or even fire at them.

March 26th :

The Fuehrer is back.

Discussion about deadlines for operations.
Fuehrer sticks to it: first Weser exercise, dark nights necessary for it. Thus about 4-5 days later. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports, urges to start laying mines with planes, as 1270 mines will already be at hand by end of April. Fuehrer wants to think it over some more.

March 27th:

Our own submarine stranded near Lindesnais, one submarine and boat 37 come to help. Are to ask for permission to stay in Norwegian waters, if necessary, 230 Mr Discussion of the Fuehrer with Commander-in-Chief of the Army and of Army Group C. First and Seventh army.

Fuehrer explains his intentions with the Italians about to strike. Operational aim plateau of Langres.

Deceptive actions of First Army in case of Yellow agreed to. Attacks proposed in case of 95th, 93rd, 75th, 268th, 215th, and 246th divisions. These have favorable effect, but deceptive measures of the 7th army will not take place, because of the preparation of case Brown (Ital.)

March 28th:

Duce attaches importance to General Staff talks, Graziani intends to send General Roatta to B. in April. The Norwegians are interning U 21, seemingly because of awkward statements of the commander, who did not claim engine trouble but mistaken navigation. But it may also be a mistake made in translation. Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser exercise and need stimulers. The three chiefs von Falkenhorst are also pondering matters which are none of their business. Kranke sees more disadvantages than advantages.

In the evening, the Fuehrer steps into the map room and explains sharply that he will not be content with the Navy again quitting the Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval forces. Bad impression on ground forces.

March 29th:

Talk with Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, 1200 hours. Wants

decision about commitment of air mines.

Fuehrer talks to him alone about retaining of ships. Admiral of the Fleet (Grossadmiral) rejects Narvik, but wants to examine, if Trondheim cannot be set up as a baseimmediately.

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy draws attention to the fact that they want fuel from him, because the army will run out of it by the end of Mai. This is the consequence of the wrong arrangements with Shell and not to buy in Mexico, like the Navy did it.

3 MM: Commander-in-Chief of the Force with the Fuehrer.

March 30th:

U-21 not set free yet by the Norwegians. Negotiations under way.

Fuehrer thinks about activation of another 10-12 new divisions. Where are the mortars committed?

L II ordered to present an outline of personnel and material, from which it could be determined, if and when new activations are possible.

March 31st:

Nothing of importance.

April 1st:

German fighters shoot 7 enemy fighters down. 1300 hours: Falkenhorst again gives general report about Weser exercise. 1300 hours: Breakfast, then discussion with all commanding officers primarily concerned.

Fuehrer has a very good impression about thoroughness of preparations.

April 2nd:

1530 hours: Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander- in-Chief of the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm end of the preparations. Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser exercise for April 9th.

Protests of the commanding officer of the Air Force that some warships leave ports again right away. Fuehrer, too, disapproves of that, but does not want to intervene too much in anexclusive concern of naval warfare.

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force agrees to plan to start aerial torpedo war (LM-Krieg) now.

Fuehrer wants that Luetzow shall be used for the transport of troops to Trondheim, in spite of tasks later on.

Find out, if it is not possible to land debarkation troops by fishing boat, in order to capture the bridge strong point of Vordingborg.

April 3rd:

Movements of the first 3 ships of the leading echelon (Ausfuhrstaffel) started at 0200 hours. Lt. Commdr. Junge reports at 1600 hours that the 3 ships have instructions how to act against Norwegians. I immediately instruct Councillor of Legation Hewel in order to inform the Foreign Minister what the situation is, in case one of the ships of the leading echelon should be examined by Norwegians. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command also informs the Fuehrer at 1815 hours about it.

1830 hours Reich Foreign Minister informed by Fuehrer. Chief of Armed Forces High Command asked to join discussion.

[redacted] April 4th:

Slight alarm, as some news from Norway indicate increased preparedness. Sweden has asked what preparations for troop shipments

[redacted]

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in Stettin are supposed to mean (boats under Reich Naval Ensign (Reichsdienstflagge).

Fuehrer drafts the proclamations. Riepenbrock, Chief of Counter-Intelligence service 1 , (Chef Abwehr 1) returns with good results of the talk with Quisling from Copenhagen.

News that 2 armored coastal vessels (Kuestenpanzer) are in Narvik and that 2 submarines are expected.

April 5th:

Weser exercise runs according to plan. Some alarm report from the source of a Belgian agent (V-Mann) appear unworthy of belief. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command instructs General von Rintelen at 1930 hours.

April 6th:

Weser exercise runs according to plan. The high-pressure weather areee (Hochdruckwetterlage) over the Northern North-Sea, which was predicted yesterday, is not taking place and that favors the action of the navy. Fuehrer puts great imphasis on the fact that the families of all deserters will be checked carefully. Navy records long English radio massage, but is unable to decipher it.

1500 hours: General Gerke reports that his movements according to plan.

1600 hours: Talks in room of the Chief of the section for Foreign Countries (Chef Ausl) in presence of Chef L and Military Attache in Rome with General Marras.

1700 hours: Report that Luetzow is dropping out and can go to Oslo only, because auxiliary engines did not take part. Fuehrer agrees to this decision.

April 7th:

No disquiesting news. Hipper with destroyers seems to have been reported by an English submarine on Sunday morning, April 7th.

Prince Axel of Denmark has the intention to visit Field Marshal Goering on Monday.

April 8th:

Day of highest tension. The English put 3 mine fields in the Norwegian territorial waters and make that public.

Leading echelon is far off with several ships because of lack of pilots.

Only 1 ship near Narvik, everything else seems to be hardly beyond Bergen.

Boat Rio de Janeiro is terpedoed; since horses and men in uniform are landed, the impending project becomes known to the Norwegians.

Group Hipper gets into a battle with an English destroyer and her annihalates.

April 9th:

The surprise effect succeeds in Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, and from the air in Stavanger, Not at Christiansand and in Oslo.

Bluecher sinks after a herioc fight, Commanding Admiral and Commander 103 (Kdr 103) of it, on deck up to the last moment, swim to land.

Luetzow has to take over lead and lower boats.

Heavy fighting for coastal fortifications. Fortress Christiansand fought to surrender by planes and Karlsruhe.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

April 10th:

Chief of naval forces (Flottenchef) report 2 turrets gone, only 25 miles.

First breaking through of British destroyers in Narvik.

The Koenigsberg destroyed by enemy dive bombers. Bornholm occupied.

April 11th:

Luetsow on voyage home. Oslo hit by torpedo.

Norwegians warships are put into service.

Denmark does not belong any longer to jurisdiction of XXIst Corps. Railroads Oslo - Bergen and Oslo - Drontheim destroyed.

April 12th:

Still 6 destroyers left ready for use in Narvik, Freightor (Treckdampfer) Jan Wellem in N., otherwise no ship of the leading echelon. (Ausfuhrstaffel). Bulk of the submarines ordered outside the ports occupied by us.

Hundalen on the iron-ore railroad reached. Strong enemy air attack on Bergen.

April 13th:

..... Mountain battery flown to lake near Narvik with Ju 52 planes. Concentration of strong English naval forces near Harstadt in process.

Much booty in Oslo.

1650 hours naval battle in Narvik.

Battleships and Hipper arrived in home ports.

April 14th:

Dietl is not being attacked, but is seperated from Northern group. Terrible excitement. All details are to be ordered from here.

Steamship Baerenfelsis sunk in the course of attack on Bergen.

Another 3 air-force antiaircraft batteries on board ship torpedoed by submarine.

Fuehrer wants that Dietl tries to fight his way through to the South. I argue against this impossible idea.

April 15th:
April 16th:

Reproaches against the navy, especially

because the battle was not engaged by battleships and because she does not succeed in speeding up the transports (Unjustified - I strongly argue against it).

April 17th:

During the night from the 16th to 17th Staff Officer from Admiralty arrives in Narvik and delivers written report by Dietl with call for help from Stavanger, since English naval forces are firing there. Air - Force notified. The Fuehrer again states in a temperamental way that the Gr. Dietl will have to march South or will have to be picked up. I advocate again in a very strong way that

a) a march South is impossible,
b) even a transport can evacuate only very small units, leads to the loss of many planes and breaks the moral backbone of the Dietl group.

They will continue to fight on the Swedish border for a long time. A thing should be considered lost only when it is actually lost.
1200 hours: Field Marshal with Jeschonnek. Has to be regrouped. Draws combat teams to Ralburg and transport groups back into Slesvig.
1530 hours: Admiral of the Fleet (Grossadmiral) with Admiralty Staff Officer from Narvik who reports verbally about his experiences in Narvik. The fight what order group Narvik is supposed to receive starts again. Each piece of bad news leads to the worst fears. Chief of Air-Force and of L IH (Army Air-Forces?) presents an evaluation of the situation I fully agree to.
I present to the Fuehrer this and the proof that we do not have enough longrange planes to pick up troops from Narvik, anyhow. Furthermore, an order which is delivered by courier and composed in our sense.
To fight and tie down forces and not to give up.
Even a professor who knows Norway is fetched from Innsbruck and asked whether mountain troops can get from Narvik to Fauske is impossible judging from my mountain experience.
In the evening, the Fuehrer signs the order to Dietl which I had prepared, to hold out as long as possible.

April 18th:
Fuehrer is again calm. He gives orders to Captain von Sternburg in a way conforming entirely with our point of view. It might even be possible to change last night's order even more towards a sense of holding out and tying down forces.
The situation, too, looks better. The strong shipping losses of the English give them something to think about.
Quiet day which does our somewhat strained nerves good.
Sternburg leaves by plane with additional verbal orders.
1600 hours: General Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should to Bardufoss I refuse that. The troops cannot hold out.
Important is..... of the forces on hand, most important the thorough destruction of the railroad.
2) He expresses doubts whether the landing of the 22nd division which takes several days still runs satisfactorily in view of the preparations in Holland. I emphasize that we have to open for ourselves at least the entry into the Southern front of the fortress Holland and that we have to keep it open.
April 19th:
Renewed crisis.
Political action has failed. Envoy Braner is recalled; since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Offices is finished. According to the Fuehrer's opinion, force has to be used. Gauleiter Terboven is supposed to be put in charge.

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Field Marshal works in the same direction; he critizises that the behavior against the civilian population is not energetic enough, that is was possible to occupy the electrical plant, that not enough troops are brought up by the navy. The Air-Force cannot do everything.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command leaves room, leadership chaos is again threatening, because even details are being overruled from above, and all orderly work of the competent military leadership(Navy High Command and Gr. XXI) is in vain.
In the evening, Terboven arrives; after supper, the Fuehrer instructs him alone.
It is doubtful, if it will be possible to limit him to the activity of a Civilian Commissar (Zivilkommissar), as I suggest it; we will have to talk to him personnally.

April 20th:

Fuehrer's birthday. Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and the Supreme Commanders congratulate. All the tempests has quieted down.
The movements to Oslo and Narvik make progress. No English landings.
Fuehrer has a discussion with the Field-Marshal, with Himmler, Terboven, Reichsleiter Bormann.
Before that, the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command has told the Fuehrer about all possible points of friction between an independent head of the government and the Military Commander in Norway. It seems that reports of the Air Force have induced the Fuehrer to form the opinion that the Norwegians are already conducting guerilla warfare and sabotage on a large scale.
Already on the 19th I contradicted such an opinion. We must not lead the Norwegians to passive or even active resistance, because that is precisely the aim of the English, after all.

April 21st:

Reports about landings on a larger scale near Andalsnes and Namsos become more tangible.
On the evening of April 20th, the General (Generaloberst) leads a long fight in order to word the text of the order to Therboven in such a way that the military necessities are taken into account.
Fuehrer would like to bring big vessel with personnel and materiel to Trondheim.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy considers that to be impossible, especially now.

April 22nd:

Fuehrer is increasingly worried about the English landings and the consequent impossibility to set up ground communications with Trondheim. Without success, I compare the difficult situation of the English, who have no usable port and no airdrome attheir disposal.
The Field-Marshal somewhat quieter, in view of the good weather forcasts for the Air Force today.

April 23rd:

The excitement grows, because the 163rd and 196th divisions are making small progress towards the North and new bridge demolitions are being reported.
Fuehrer orders that no more motorized units. (11th rifle brigade) are to be sent to Stavanger, but immediately 2 mountain divisions instead. 3rd is to be brought up to full strenght again. 4 ships of the Iller class, in addition a 5000t steamer, later 2 larger East Asia boats are to be brought to Bergen convoyed by capital ships, in order to make the troops there mobile and ready for battle.
Forces in Narvik to be reorganized right away, in order to make the 3rd mountain division again steadfast for battle (kampffest).
No heavy artillery is to go to Norway for ground combat. The heavy battalion of the 2nd mountain division remains in the West, those of the 3rd mountain and 69th divisions are at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

Fuehrer talks to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

a) Anti-aircraft reinforcements for Stavanger.
b) Bombers for ground fighting in Oslo,
Fighters " " " "

In the evening Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossberg returns from Oslo. He reports the favorable situation in a somewhat schoolmasterly way, but does not know any details. He brings along an English battalion order.

April 24th:

The situation looks much more favorable, a fast advance on the right flank is to be expected with mechanized Battalion Goering.
Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme confirms that picture after his return from the front. He brings collected orders of the captured English brigade detachment (Brigadekdo) along. Very great political success to be anticipated with that.
1130 hours: Field-Marshal reports, especially the situation in Trondheim. Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme, back from the battle field, reports favorably, rapid progress. Fuehrer regrets the halting of the 11th rifle brigade. I refuse to send them again now.
2300 hours: Schmundt back, even more favorable news. Boehme brings English orders for the entire project of Norway's occupation by the English. Complaint about lack of clear orders in the Air Force.

April 25th :

Optimistic mood continues. Fuehrer very happy about Schmundt's report and about exact orientation. Talks adversely about Lossberg to Bodenschatz; Lossberg's somewhat braggard report has created displeasure, although he did not know any details. Preparation of an action on the basis of the orders found on captured Englishmen.
Order to Kraatzer W Pr and Counter Intelligence Bureau for foreign countries (Amt Abwehr/Ausland).
Report by Sternberg about his task in Narvik.
Order by me to Chief L to give out a strong directive that nobody but Armed Forces High Command will give orders to Gr. Narvik. All men there are subordinated General Dietl exclusively.
The Belgian government resigned.

April 26th:

Suggestion to the Fuehrer to omit naval transport to Bergen with battleships and to bring these mobile parts of the 69th division back to Oslo.
Italian ambassador Attolico is recalled, because he does not take a clear pro-German attitude.

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At 1500 hours the Commander = in = Chief of the navy reports.

Führer drops request for transporting troops to Bergen convoyed by heavy naval forces.

Commander = in = Chief of the Navy reports that everything which could be possibly thought of has been done for the safeguarding of ....., the Westwall will be extended ..... Sp ..... solidified.

Major Soltman reports about the interrogation of the Englishmen, and delivers additional important documents, among them the secret chain of command (Rangliste). At noon, the first prisoners arrived in Ber=lin.They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks (Alexander=Kaserne) and confirm the authenticity of the orders.All material is handed over to the Foreign Office.

Until 0330 in the Reich Chancellery, where Führer formulates the go=vernment statement together with Foreign Minister.It will be publi=shed on the 27th April :

Führer voices intention to start with case "Yellow" between 1 th and 7 th May. I point out that the Air Force and the Transportation Chief have to be initially notified 3 days ahead of time.

Motor column (Mot.Kol.) Fischer gets stuck 100 miles (Km ?) south of Drontheim in front of many destroyed bridges.

Group (Gr) XXI is crying for engineers and cross=Country motor ve=hicles.They will have to get along with their own engineers.After all, there are 19 engineer companies.Order to get all engineers up to the front.

April 28 th :
Advance movement direction Drontheim is halting. Nevertheless the E English are retiring far, according to their communiques.

April 29 th :
Führer decides:
Air Force can commit another 2 groups (now) in Norway on Tuesday and Wednesday, but must be ready for Yellow on Sunday.

Commander = in = Chief of the Navy commits heaviest flat .... for the safeguarding of .... (?)

Emden still to be left in Baltic (0). Employ 2 East Asia steamboats for Oslo=transport.

Falkenhorst wants his motorized and mountain battalion with engi=neer platoon and battalion brought to Drontheim by air.

Commander = in = Chief of the Army has to be compelled first to set up the missing regiment for the 3rd mountain division so rapid=ly than it can roll immediately behind the 2nd mountain division.

Führer is worried about Drontheim and is not quite to be dissuaded yet from readying heavy artillery and also the 1st mountain divi=sion for Norway.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. 1809 =PS
CONT'D.

April 30 th :
At 13.35 hours I am able to report to the Führer that line of communi= cation on land between Oslo and Drontheim has been established. Führer is happy with joy. At noon, I have to sit next to him.

The special communique is released right away. It remains to be deci= ded now, whetherto keep in readiness the 1st mountain division (no) and heavy artillery (no). At 18.30 hours the report comes in that Dombaas has been reached , too, and that the enemy is retiring. Opdal on the railbroad Dronthaim = Dombaas also has been occupied. Führer releases order of the day to the soldiers in Norway.

May 1 st :
More big successes in Norway on land and in the air.

Führer orders that starting Saturday, May 4th, everything must be in readiness to start operations for case Yellow the following day, when ordered.

May 2nd :
Victory report from Norway. Pursuit direction Andalsnes. The English flee to the boats. Norwegians give up the Commander of Möre = , Romsdal, Gen, Hang, offers capitulation.

Field Marshal with Kesselring, Jeschonek, Student, Sponek again re= port about case "Festung" (fortress). It will be carried out. Landing on super=highway possible.

Difficulty is the strong echelonment in depth (Tiefenstaffelung) of the bridge position near Moerdyk and North of it.

Air Force is to get order on the 3rd at noon, whether to guide in (einweisen) or not to guide in, that whether means to use or not to use parachutists and airborne units.

May 3rd :
After evaluation of weather, Führer decides that X = day will not be before Monday, 6 May,

Air Force notified by code word "Do not guide in !" ("Nicht einweisen")

Field Marshal protests against draft of the comprehensive description of operations in Norway, where Armed Forces High Command is mentioned and where the name Pellengahr appears, but not Milch.

Führer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening post (Horchstelle) in the Causasus.

Prepared White Book concerning unneutral actions of Holland and Bel= gium does not seem to satisfy the Foreign Office completely. To my mind the material is more than sufficient.

A new order goes out to group XXI, especially as several foreign news reports say that Namsos, too, will be evacuated.

Dr. Todt transmits exact details.

May 4 th :
Reports about evacuation of Namsos by the English. Great successes of the Air Force against the English fleet. Battleship, heavy cruiser and de= stroyer, in addition 12000 ton transport sunk.

Führer himself wants to make comprehensive report about the compaign in Norway. He is furious about it that people other than himself meddle with this reporting. He stated that the Armed Forces High Command is his staff. Führer designates Tuesday, May 7th as X=day.

The flanks of Gr. Dietl are being pressed hard in Narvik. I am afraid he remains too long in front.

May 5 th:
Field Marshal reports that an English 1500 ton submarine minelayer (1500 t =U=Minenboot) was sighted on the Swedish coast. He makes an onslaught aimed at subordinating all Naval Air units under the Commander=in=Chief of the Air Force.

Führer has finished justification (Begründung) for case "Yellow". Wednesday, May 8th, is designated as A=day.

May 6 th:
Detailed orders for May 8th for A=day are issued, and for transmission of the codewords Augsburg and Danzig.

May 7 th:
Führer railroadtrain was scheduled to leave Finkenkrug at 16.38 hours.

But weather remains uncertain and therefore, the order valid up to this time is rescinded. Next decision May 8th until 12.00 hours.
11.00 hours: The Field Marshal with Bodenschatz and Jeschonek at the Führer's.
15.00 hours: Admiral of the Fleet (Grossadmiral) Raeder.

Mine damage of the Gneisenau only very insignificant. One destroyer may be recalled from Drontheim, as a second one is still ready for sailing.

Führer very much agitated about new postponement, as there is danger of treachery particularly in brown leaflets (in braunen Blättern). Talk of the Belgian Envoy to the Vatican to Brussels permits the deduction that treason has been committed by a German personality who left Berlin for Rome on April 29 th.

Führer again emphasizes that the greatest achievement of endurance (Dauerleistung) is that of the foot=slogging combatsoldier (Erdkämpfer).

May 8 th:
Alarming news from Holland, Cancelling of furloughs, evacuations, road=blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the counter=intelligence service (Abwehrmeldungen) the British have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.

According to reports the measures of the Dutch are partly directed against the coast and partly against us. It is not possible to obtain a clear picture, whether the Dutch don't work hand in hand with the English or whether they actually want to defend their neutrality against the first attacker. Evaluation of the weather shows slow improvement of the whole situation, but developement fog in the next days still have to be taken into consideration.

Führer does not want to wait any longer.
Field Marshal wants postponement until the 10th, at least.

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presses for early action. Führer is very agitated; then he consents to postponement until May 10th, which is against his intuition, as he says. But not one day longer.

[illegible] 16.37 hours,

Departure of Envoy Kiewitz, who was scheduled to leave at 12.57 hours is stopped at the last minute.Is not supposed to leave until May 9th.

In the evening, I arrange the different telegrams with him.

May 9 th :
Führer decides to fall in on May 10 th for sure.Departure with Führer train at 17.00 hours.from Finkenkrug.

After report Jeschonnek that weather situation will be favourable on the 10 th, the code word Danzig is given at 21.00 hours.

The same to Commander=in=Chief of the Air Force.

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May 10th:

Morning arrival in Emskirchen still during darkness.
At 0530 hours in the Eagle's nest.

May 11th - 13th:

The operations take a course favorable beyond expectation. The Dutch offer desperate resistance. Bridges at Maastricht, and all bridges north of it, are blown up. Only the railroad bridge at Gemrep falls into our hands undamaged. Fort Eben Emael is taken and the bridges in Nordeyk south of Dortrecht as well as the important ones over the Albert Canal west of Maastricht are taken over by parachutists and glider-borne personnel and are held by them. Airborne operation of the Sponek Division is met by heaviest resistance and is badly mauled. However, the different units hold out. On the N., the junction of the 9th armored division with them is effected. The citadel of Luettich is being broken into.

May 14th:

Order number 11 issued, which orders the concentration of all armored and mechanized units in front of the 4th army.
Holland capitulates.

May 16th:

Fuehrer insists very much on transfer of all armored and mechanized units from Army Group B to A, and on speediest bringing up of strong reserves behind the 4th and 12th army. OKH gives orders to pull these units out from B and to add them via F.....
to the fifteenth corps as new Armored Group Hoeppner. According to report Reichau, there are indications that the enemy is giving up the Dyle Prosition or its Southern part, at least. Therefore, Army High Command receives the option to carry out the junction of Armored Group Hoeppner also in front, of Namner, which the enemy seems to be evacuating.
Engel reports after visit at 4th army that that army has reached the French-Belgian border near Beauchmont, after a heavy tank battle.

1600-1830 hours: Field Marshal Goering with the Fuehrer, talk with Jeschonnek about forthcoming tasks of the Air Force and intentions concerning Navik, utilizing the new airdrome near ...

May 17th:

May 18th:

Day of great tension. The commanders-in-chief of the Army has not carried out the intention of building up, as quickly as possible, a new flanking position to the South. Instead of turning march to the west. For this reason the 10th Armored Division and the 2nd and 29th Motorized Divisions are still entrenched in defansiue flanking positions.
The commandes-in-chief of the Army and General Holdes are called immediately and ordered peremotorily to adopt, the necessary measures immediately. (see note in the files)
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is Flying immediately by plane to General Rundstedt at Bastogne.

I further give an order supplementing the previons directive. It veersthe 1st Mountain Division and the rear echelons of the 4th Army, to the South and South-West for an attack.

19th May:
20th May:

Break-through becomes more and more clearly outlined. True, Army Group "B", respectively Chief are very vexed because their Armored Corps was taken away from them, but it was the right thing to do. On the 20th, we already have all armored and mechanized divisions, exept the 9th one, in the middle of the break-through wedge. While we were still affraid on the 19th that the bulk of the French-English army might have escaped to the South, it becomes increasingly evident on the 20th that more than 20 divisions are still north of the Somme.

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Now everything depends on sealing off the abbeville gap and the Army Corps Kleist reaches it in the evening of the 28th. In the forenoon of the 20th, at the Army High Command's conference, the FUEHRER declares the new directive for continuation of operations against the French Army.

I. Anihilation of the enemy north of the Somme and gaining of the sea coast.
2. Sudden thrust forward between Oise and sea, until SEINE river is reached.
3. Pricipal Attack on both sides of REIMS in SOUTH-WESTERLY direction, accompanied on the right flank east of PARIS by Reavy forces.
4. For secondary reasons penetration of the Maginot line by lighter forces between St. Avold and Sarreguemines indirection of Nancy-Luneville.

General von STUELPNAGEL is ordered, not to follow up anymore former intention, to attack the PLATEAU OF LANGRES with 20 Italien Divisions crossing the UPPER RHINE. The Italiens rather should at tack the French Alpine Front and pin down French forces on the Upper Rhine. This they can prepare already now, without having commenced hostilities.

FUEHRER is besides himself with joy. Talkes in words offhighest appreciation of the German Army and its leadership. Is working on the Peace treaty, which shall express the tenor only: Return of territory sobbed over the past 400 years from the German people, and of other values.

First negotations in the forrest of Compiegne like in 1918.

Britishers can get a separate peace any time after restitution of the colonies.

A special memorandum of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command containing the emotion - chocked words of the FUEHRER when receiving the telephone report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army about the capture of Abbeville, is in the files.

21 May: Commander in Chief of the Army together with Halder reports at 09.45 about situationsand later intentions. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army wants to operate by-passing Paris on the West with the entire Armored and mechanized units under Reichman's Command, and inaaddition to this to attack with he wants to attack the Upper Rhine with 18 divisions. This would change the intentions of the Fuehrer, expressed by him on the 20th . FUEHRER declares his agreement for the time being.



Plan of Commander in Chief of the Army

In the afternoon the FUEHRER explaines to Chief of the Armed Forces High Commadn and to me, that he had changed his mind. He believes, that it is wrong to employ all Armed and Mechanized Divisions West of Paris, that it would be better to direct the main thrast, also with the balk of Armored forces, to by-pass Paris in the east, (transmitted by me to Greifenberg in the evening).

Report of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to Fuehrer at I200hours. In the afternoon Field Marshal and Jeschonnek.

The Fuehrer is a little nervous in the evening about the fact, that Infantry Divisons are not pushed forward fast enough. Possibly they are being held back in order to obtain improvements of position of the VIth and VIIthe Corps. If possible, one must employ transport groups.

Fuehrer stays in map room until 0I30 hours.
22.May: Chief of the Armed Forces High Commadd decides after that to fly to Army Group A in Charleville early on the 22nd. Brings back a report much more pleasant than the situation map indicates. It becomes apparent that Headquarters of 4th Armym has ordered General Kluge to commit the Ist Army Corps south of the SMBRE, so that it willbe infront rather than in the rear of the French Border fortifications.

The FUEHRER approves at I300hours directive, submitted by me, concerning sparing of human lives of the I0th Army by disengagement from the Maginot line, cessation of unneccessary attacks, bringing up of all Divisions and mobile CHQ troops to the rear of 4th Army.

Sharp pressure of Army Group B towards the West. The Fuehrer furthermore approves commitment of an airborne Battalion already in readiness and of 2 companies Mountain troops, with short training, in Narvik.

Army High Commad draws a very optimistic picture of the situation at I700hours and intenden to continue at I200 hours on left wing West of Arras towards North.

But JESCHONNEK reports at I900 hours, that French tanks reached point 3 kilometer in front of Arras and were stopped only there by dive bombers, pursuit planes and Anti AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY.

24.May: The FUEHRER flies together with me and SCHMUNDT to ARMY GROUP A to CHARLEVILLE.

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He is very happy about the measures of the Army Group, which correspond entirely with his ideas. He learns to his surprise that the Army High Command, without informing the Fuehrer and the High Command of the Armed Forces, has subordinated the 4th Army and a number of Divisions to its rear, to Army Group B. Fuehrer is very much displeased and thinks this regulation is a mistake not only in Military respect but also psychologically wrong. Commander-in-Chief of the Army is ordered to report, and shifting of dividisy-line is rescinded. New crisis of confidence, especially since Field Marshal reports earlier that an order of the Army High Command in no way pushes the Army Group B onward, but even invits it to make available reserves that can be spared.

For that reason a new order is issued in the evening
a) not to advance beyond the line Sandez-St.Omer-Graveline towards the East. Besides that each change regarding the 6hain of command among the Armies is subject to approval of the Fuehrer.

The Fuehrer signs Order # 13 regarding continnation of operations.

He prohibits the proposed talk by General von MELSCH in the Foreign Office to foreign journalists about the warsituation, if necessary this shall be done by W Pk (Armed Forces Propaganda ?)

Very favorable report of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and the Commander in Chief of the Army about the situation.

It becomes obvious, that the surrounded enemy is no longer capable of concerted actioh.

Situation in the East becomes threatening because of Russian concentration of forces against Bessarabia.

25. May: In the morning the Commander-in-Chief of the Army arrives and asks permission armored mechanized divisions to push forward from the High terrain Vimi-St.Omer-Graveline towards the West into the level terrain. Fuehrer is against it, leaves decision to Army Group A. They decline for the time being because tank, shall rest a while, to be ready for tasks in the South.

At noon, Commander of 22 Divisions (Parachute Divisions) Count Sponek, reports about his experiences between the Hague and Rotterdam. He had heavy losses, but accomplished the incredible.

Air Force reports great successes near Narvik.

The unlimited expansion plan of the SS causes general apprehension. Lutze protests in a letter to the General (Generaloberst) against mentioning of the Armed-SS (Waffen-SS) in Armed Forces High Command communiques. But this came from the Fuehrer in a proclamation to the troops in the Dutch theater of operations. General Dietl has received parachuted mountain troops in Narvik after a course of training lasting only 10 days, no losses.

26.May: In the morning the Fuehrer sends for Commander-in-Chief of the Army and agrees because 18th and 6th Army advance slowly and because resistance in the South in front of the 2nd Army Corps has stiffened, that tank units and infantry divisions push forward in direction of Towmai, Cassel and Dunkerque from the West, especially because the enemy on their part do not advance against the mountain positions but dig themselves in defensive positions and improve them. In conjanction their with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army reports about his intentions

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for further conduct of the operations (All sketch). Of the 12 Divisions, committed for the first push northwest of Paris, 6 shall join Army Group B (9th and 4th Army). First push possible around 31 May. 2nd push 6 to 8 days later (Main attack A and B), 3rd push at C will be in readiness starting 15 June.

The problem Paris is to be considered, not only from a military, but also from a political point of view.



If Paris is surrendered or if revolutionary features come to the fore, then Paris must be occupied at once. If Paris is defended, we will strongly disengage ourselves for the time being.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS

November, 23, 1945

I PAUL W. FREEDMAN, S/SGT., 33199122 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1809-PS.

PAUL W. FREEDMAN
S/SGT.
33199122.

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TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT 1919-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Speech of the Reichsführer - SS
at the meeting of SS Major-Generals
(SS-Gruppenführer) at Posen
October 4th, 1943

"The 1941 attack (p. 3)

In 1941 the Führer attacked Russia. That was, as we can well see now, shortly, - perhaps 3 to 6 months - before Stalin prepared to embark on his great penetration into Central and Western Europe. I can give a picture of this first year in a few words. The attacking forces cut their way through. The Russian Army was herded together in great pockets, ground down, taken prisoner. At that time we did not value the mass of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, as labour. What after all, thinking in terms of generations, is not to be regretted, but is now deplorable by reason of the loss of labour, is that the prisoners died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and hunger."

(p. 22)

"it is basically wrong for us to infuse all our inoffensive soul and spirit, our good-nature, and our idealism into foreign peoples. This is true since the time of HERDER who clearly wrote "Voices of the Nations" ("Stimmen der Völker"), in a state of drunkenness, thereby bringing (p. 23) on us, who come after him, such immeasurable sorrow and misery. This is true for instance, of the Czechs and the Slovenes to whom we gave their consciousness of nationality. They were just not capable of it themselves; we had to discover it for them.

One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS man: we must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian, to a Czech does not interest me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death* interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished. We shall never be rough and heartless when it is not necessary, that is clear. We Germans, who (p. 24) are the only people in the world who have a decent attitude towards animals, will also assume a decent attitude towards these human animals. But it is a crime against our own blood to worry about them and give them ideals, thus causing our sons and grandsons to have a more difficult time with them. When somebody comes to me and says, "I cannot dig the anti-tank ditch with women and children, it is inhuman, for it would kill them," then I have to say, "You are a murderer of your own blood because if the anti-tank ditch is not dug, German soldiers will die, and they are sons of German mothers. They are our own blood." That is what I want to instil into this SS and what I believe have instilled into them as one of the most sacred laws of the future. Our concern, our duty is our people and our blood. It is for them that we must provide and plan, work and fight, nothing else. We can be indifferent to everything else. I wish the SS to adopt this attitude to the problem of all foreign, non-Germanic peoples, especially Russians. All else is vain, fraud against our own nation and an obstacle to the early winning of the war."

"Foreigners in the Reich (p. 43)

We must also realise that we have 6 to 7 million foreigners in Germany. Perhaps it is even 8 million now. We have prisoners in Germany. They are

* i.e. Verrecken = to die (used of cattle) - Translator's note.

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none of them dangerous so long as we take severe measures at the merest trifle. It is a mere nothing today to shoot 10 Poles, compared with the fact that we might later have to shoot tens of thousands in their place, and compared to the fact that the shooting of these tens of thousands would then be carried out even at the cost of German blood. Every little fire will immediately be stamped out and quenched, and extinguished, - otherwise - as in the case of a real fire - a political and psychological surface-fire may spring up among the people.

The Communists in the Reich

I don't believe the Communists could attempt any action, for their leading elements, like most criminals, are in our concentration camps. And here I must say this - that we shall be able to see after the war what a blessing it was for Germany that, in spite all the silly talk about humanitarianism, we imprisoned all this criminal sub-stratum of the German people in concentration camps: I'll answer for that. If they were going about free, we should be worse off. For then the sub-humans would have (p. 44) their NCOs and Commanding Officers, then they would have their councils of workers and military. As it is, however, they are locked up, and are making shells or projectile cases or other important things, and are very useful members of human society."

"The SS in war-time (p. 51)

Now I come to our own development, to that of the SS in the past months. Looking back on the whole war, this development was fantastic. It took place at an absolutely terrific speed. Let us look back a little to 1939. At that time we were a few regiments, guard units (Wachverbände) 8 to 9,000 strong, - that is, not even a division, all in all 25 to 28,000 men at the outside. True, we were armed, but really only got our artillery regiment as our heavy arm two months before the war began. We will recapitulate which tasks, which duties, and which assignments we have been given in the last 4½ years. But first I would like to enumerate and make known once more some outward changes.

Changes in Personnel

The following changes have taken place at the Main Offices:

Our comrade, SS Lieutenant General (Obergruppenführer) Kaltenbrunner has succeeded our fallen friend Heydrich. Unfortunately he is ill today. He has phlebitis, but it is, I am glad to say, not dangerous. That (p. 52) is why he could not come.

Our old friend Daluege has such severe heart trouble that he has to undergo courses of treatment and now has to retire from active service for 1½ to 2 years. - I would like this evening to send our two friends, Daluege especially, and Kaltenbrunner too, a teleprint or a telegram in the name of all of us. As I have said, we may hope that Daluege will have recovered in about two years, and can then return to the front and get into harness.

SS-Obergruppenführer Wünnenberg is in charge as his deputy. He has been in charge of the police division up till now, and was then appointed to be Officer Commanding IVth SS armoured corps. He is General of the Waffen-SS and the police, and is in charge of the uniformed regular police (Ordnungspolizei) as their Head.

SS-Gruppenführer Breithaupt has succeeded our old comrade and friend Scharfe as Chief of the SS - court of justice.

SS-Obergruppenführer Hofmann has made a change. He has given up the Main office for race and settlement (Rasse - u. Siedlungshauptamt) and has

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Senior
become/ Executive SS and Police Officer (Höhere SS - und Polizeiführer) for the South-West.

(p. 53)

SS-Obergruppenführer Hildebrandt has left Oberabschnitt# Weichsel, and has become Chief of the Main Office for race and settlement.

SS-Obergruppenführer Schmidt has left the Head Office for Personnel at his own request and has joined my personal staff for special duties. He is succeeded by SS-Gruppenführer von Herff.

One of my closest and most long-standing colleagues, SS-Obergruppenführer Wolff, has now, I am glad to say, recovered completely from a severe illness which greatly endangered his life - (it was an operation for removing stones from the kidney) - and is now, - this is a new appointment - Supreme Executive SS and Police Officer (Höchste SS - und Polizeiführer) for the whole of occupied Italy. He therefore has charge of 25 to 30 million people. Under him he has SS-Gruppenführer Globocnik as Senior Executive SS and Police Officer for the coastal area. He too could not come today.

Senior Executive SS and Police Officers have since been appointed as follows: for Croatia - Kammerhofer, who on account of the Croatians is not called Senior Executive SS and Police Officer, but Commissioner of the Reichsführer SS; for Serbia Meyszner was appointed earlier, for Greece - (p. 54) Stroob at the moment but - I would like to tell you this now - I am transferring him from there to Schimana. Officials/ in Greece will become Senior Executive SS and Police Officers, and thus not command the Galician SS - Volunteer Division. SS-Gruppenführer Panke is to become Senior Executive SS-and Police Officer for Denmark."

"Chief of the Anti-partisan Units (Bandenkampf-Verbände) (p. 57)

In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of the anti-partisan units. Our comrade SS-Obergruppenführer von den Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsführer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly political one. Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful.

It is notable that, by setting up this department we have gained (p. 58) for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army, and the next step, which is the High Command of an army or even of a group - if you wish to call it that.

Regular uniformed Police and the Sipo

Now to deal briefly with the tasks of the regular uniformed police and the Sipo. They still cover the same field. I can see that great things have been acheived. We have formed roughly 30 police regiments from police reservists and former members of the police - police officials, as they used to be called. The average age in our police battalions is not lower than that of the Security battalions of the Armed Forces. Their achievements are beyond all praise. In addition, we have formed Police Rifle Regiments by merging the police battalions of the "savage peoples" (der "wilden Völker"). Thus we did not leave these police battalions untouched but blended them in the ratio of about 1 : 3. That is why we have, at the present moment of crisis, a far greater stability than could be seen among the other units made up of natives or local inhabitants. - - - - - -"

"SS-industrial concerns (p. 63)

I now come to other individual great spheres of activity, of which it is

Largest regional sub-division of the SS - Translator's note.
/ Obscure sentence - Translator's note.

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important for you all to know. We have huge armament works in the concentration camps. This is the sphere of activity of our friend SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl. Every month we put in many millions of hours of work for armaments. We tackle the most thankless tasks and - I must give this its (p. 64) due - whether in the concentration camps, in Pohl's industrial works, or outside at the offices of the Senior Executive SS and Police Officers or in the workshops of the Head Office of SS administration (SS-Führungshauptamt), one thing is obvious: wherever we are, we are SS-men. Where things are in a bad way, we act. I want every subordinate trained to this end. We want to help, unhampered by quibbles regarding authority, (Kompetenzen) for we want to win the war. What we are doing, we are doing for Germany. Whether it is a question of building a road, if a tunnel is not going ahead somewhere, or if it is an invention which for sheer red-tape does not come to fruition, or anything else; where we can get to work, we get to work. What we are doing in our armament works will be a remarkable and noteworthy achievement, even if we can only assess it and prove it when the war is ended.

The Clearing out of the Jews

I also want to talk to you, quite frankly, on a very grave matter. Among ourselves it should be mentioned quite frankly, and yet we will never speak of it publicly. Just as we did not hesitate on June 30th, 1934 to do the duty we were bidden, and stand comrades who had lapsed, up against the wall and shoot them, so we have never spoken about it and will never (p. 65) speak of it. It was that tact which is a matter of course and which I am glad to say, is inherent in us, that made us never discuss it among ourselves, never speak of it. It appalled everyone, and yet everyone was certain that he would do it the next time if such orders are issued and if it is necessary.

I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish race. It's one of those things it is easy to talk about - "The Jewish race is being exterminated", says one party member, "that's quite clear, it's in our program - elimination of the Jews, and we're doing it, exterminating them." And then they come, 80 million worthy Germans, and each one has his decent Jew. Of course the others are vermin, but this one is an A 1 Jew. Not one of all those who talk this way has witnessed it, not one of them has been through it. Most of <u>you</u> must know what it means when 100 corpsss are lying side by side, or 500 or 1000. To have stuck it out and at the same time - apart from exceptions caused by human weakness - to have remained decent fellows, that is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history which has never been written and is never to be (p. 66) written, for we know how difficult we should have made it for ourselves, if - with the bombing raids, the burdens and the deprivations of war - we still had Jews today in every town as secret saboteurs, agitators and troublemongers. We would now probably have reached the 1916/17 stage when the Jews were still in the German national body.

We have taken from them what wealth they had. I have issued a strict order, which SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl has carried out, that this wealth should, as a matter of course, be handed over to the Reich without reserve. We have taken none of it for ourselves. Individual men who have lapsed will be punished in accordance with an order I issued at the beginning, which gave this warning; Whoever takes so much as a mark of it, is a dead man. A number of SS men - there are not very many of them - have fallen short, and they will die, without mercy. We had the moral right, we had the duty to our people, to destroy this people which wanted to destroy us. But we have not the right to enrich ourselves with so much as a fur, a watch, a mark, or a cigarette or anything else. Because we have exterminated a bacterium we do not want, in the end, to be infected by the bacterium and die of it. I will not see so much as a small area of sepsis appear here or gain a (p. 67) hold. Wherever it may form, we will cauterize it. Altogether however, we can say, that we have fulfilled this most difficult duty for the love of our people. And our spirit, our soul, our character has not suffered injury from it.

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The bearing of the SS-man

If I make a statement for us all and in the presence of all of us of all that we have done this year in the form of - I would almost say - a statement of accounts, then there is one thing that I must not overlook and pass over: the significance of the bearing of the SS-man. - - - - -."

"The Principle of Selection (p. 70)

We are a product of the law of selection. We have made our choice from a cross-section of our people. This people came into being aeons ago, through generations and centuries, by the throw of the dice of fate and of history. Alien peoples have swept over this people and left their heritage behind them. Alien blood-streams have flowed into this people, but it has, nevertheless in spite of terrible hardships and terrible blows of fate, still had strength in the very essence of its blood to win through. Thus this whole people is saturated with, and held together by Nordic-Phalian-Germanic blood, so that after all one could, and can, still speak of a German people. From this people, of such varied hereditary tendencies, as it emerged from the collapse after the years of the battle of liberation, we have now consciously tried to select the Nordo-Germanic blood, for we could best expect this section of our blood to contain the creative, heroic and life-preserving qualities of our people. We have gone partly by outward appearances, and for the rest have kept these outward appearances in review by making constantly new demands and by repeated tests both physical and mental, both of the character and the soul. Again and again we have sifted out and cast aside what was (p. 71) worthless, what did not suit us. Just as long as we have strength to do this will this organisation (Orden) remain healthy. The moment we forget the law which is the foundation of our race, and the law of selection and austerity towards ourselves, we shall have the germ of death in us, and will perish, just as every human organisation, every blosson in this world does some time perish. It must be our endeavour, our inner law, to make this blossoming and fructifying last for our people as long as possible, bringing as much prosperity as possible, and - don't be alarmed - if possible for thousands of years. That is why, whenever we meet and whatever we do, we must be mindful of our principle: blood, selection, and austerity. The law of nature is just this: What is hard is good; what is virgourous is good; whatever wins through in the battle of life, physically, purposefully and spiritually, that is what is good - always taking the long view. Of (p. 72) course sometime - and this has happened often in history - someone can get to the top by deceit and cheating. That makes no difference to nature, to the fate of the earth, to the fate of the world. Reality, that is, Nature, Fate, removes the imposter after a time - time not reckoned in generations of man but in historical periods. It must be our endeavour never to deceive ourselves but always to remain genuine, that is what we must continually preach and instil into ourselves, and into every boy and each one of our subordinates.

The SS after the war

One thing must be clear, one thing I would like to say to you today: the moment the war is over, we will really begin to weld together our organisation, this organisation which we have built up for 10 years, which we imbued and indoctrinated with the first most important principles during the 10 years before the war. We must continue to do this - we, - if I may say so, we older men - for twenty years full of toil and work, so that a tradition 30, 35, 40 years, a generation, may be created. Then this organisation will march forward into the future young and strong, revolutionary and efficient to fulfil the task of giving the German people, the Germanic people the super-stratum of society which will combine and hold together this Germanic people and this Europe, and from which the brains which the people needs for industry, farming, politics, and as soldiers, statesman and technicians, will emerge. In addition this super-stratum must be so strong and vital that every generation can unreservedly sacrifice two or three sons from every family on the battle-field, and that nevertheless the continued flowing of

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the bloodstream is assured.

The Virtues of the SS-Man

I will speak now of the most important virtues which I began years ago to preach and to impress on this organisation, on this whole General-SS (Allgemeine-SS) - for that is the basis of this organisation - and which are just now in the 5th year of war of such decisive significance and importance.

1). Loyalty

We have, I am glad to say, not had a single case among our ranks so far, of an SS-Man being disloyal. Let this one thing be our guiding principle: If within the sphere of your knowledge there is ever anyone who is disloyal to the Führer or to the Reich, even if it is only in thought, you must see to it that this man is thrown out of the organisation and we will see to it that he departs this life. (p. 74) For everything, - I have said this once already and repeat it today, - everything can be forgiven in this world, but one thing cannot be forgiven among us Teutons: that is disloyalty. It would be unforgivable and is unforgivable. Downfalls, like the downfall of Badoglio in Italy must not and will not happen in Germany. The name Badoglio will in future be the name for bad dogs, the name of abuse for four-legged mongrel curs, just as in the olden days the name Thersites was the name of abuse for traitors. - We can only say one thing and preach it constantly: Let the German people show, by unparalleled and wholehearted loyalty on the part of each one of its men and each one of its women that it is worthy of being permitted to live at the time of an Adolf Hitler, and worthy of this leader having arisen for it, who has dedicated his life full of care, full of responsibility, full of work, to our German Teutonic people.

2). Obedience

Obedience is demanded and given in the soldier's life morning, noon, and night. And the little man always obeys or usually does. If he does not, he is put in prison. The question of obedience in (p. 75) the case of senior officials in the state, party and the army, and even here and there in the SS, is more difficult. I would like here to state something clearly and unequivocally: It is a matter of course that the little man must obey. It is even more a matter of course that all the senior leaders of the SS, that is, the whole corps of Gruppenführer, are a model of blind obedience. If anyone thinks that an order is based on a misunderstanding on the part of the superior or on a false basis it goes without saying that it is his duty and responsibility - that is, the duty and responsibility of every one of you - to say so, and also to state his reasons truthfully like a man if he is convinced that they deprecate the order. But the moment the superior concerned or the Reichführer-SS - that applies to the Corps of Gruppenführer in most cases - or even the Führer has made the decision and given the order, it must be carried out, not only in word and letter, but also in spirit. Whoever carries out the order must do so as a good steward, as a true representative of the authority giving the command. If you thought at first that this would be right and that that would not be right or even wrong, then there are two alternatives. Thus if a man thinks that he cannot be answerable for obeying an order, then he should say quite honest-(p. 76) ly: I cannot be answerable for it. I beg you to excuse me from it. Then the order will usually be: You must still carry it out. Or you think: his nerve has gone, he's weak. Then you can say: Good, retire on a pension. But orders must be sacred. If the Generals obey, then the armies obey automatically. The more our territory grows, the more does this sacredness of orders apply. It was not all difficult to enforce an order in our little Germany. But to enforce an order

once we - and I am convinced of this - have garrisons in the Urals, - that is more difficult. Here it will not always be possible to make sure that the order is carried out. Our controlling authority may not, may never be, - as in Russia - the Commissar. The only Commissar we have must be our own conscience, devotion to duty, loyalty, obedience. If you lead the way with this example, gentlemen, every subordinate will follow this example. But you will never be able to demand obedience of your men, if you do not give the same obedience to authority over you, and give it blindly and without reserve.

3). Bravery (p. 77)

To bravery, I think we need least to exhort ourselves, for our leaders and men are brave. - - - - -."

"4). Truthfulness (p. 80)

I now come to a fourth virtue which is very rare in Germany, to truthfulness. One of the greatest evils which has spread during the war is the lack of truthfulness in messages, reports, and statements which subordinate departments in civil life, in the state, the party and the Services send in to the departments over them. The message, the report is the basis of every decision. It is actually the fact that one can now in many spheres assume in war-time that 95 out of 100 messages are untrue or only half true or semi-correct. - - - - -."

"While on the subject of truthfulness I now come to another (p. 83) matter. It must so come about in war and in peace - in peace this will be above all a training task - that we SS-men no longer conclude written agreements, but that among us, as used to be the case formerly, the giving of one's word and the hand-shake signify the contract, and that the hand-shake of one SS-man is - if necessary - certainty for 1 million or more. It must so happen that the hand-shake or the promise of an SS-man is more proverbially reliable than mortgage upon the greatest value of anybody else's. It must be so!

If we conclude agreements, we must keep them. If I make a contract with an agent, even with a blackguard, I keep the contract. I take my stand unreservedly on this point of view. If I announce in the General-gouvernement, that anyone who informs against a Jew who has sought shelter and gone into hiding, shall have a third of the Jew's property, then it often happens that Secretary Huber or Second Lt. (SA) (Untersturmführer) Huber who - when he can - makes illegal trips, or does not hesitate (p. 84) to order a new telephone or new pencils, who, that is, never saves, - suddenly begins to save for the German Reich. He says for instance: This Jew has 12000RM. What, that means I would have to pay out to the Pole who denounced him 4000 RM. No, I'll save that for Germany. The Pole shall only get 400 RM. So a little man goes and breaks the promise of a whole organisation. That sort of thing should be impossible.

If we make a promise, it must be kept. If the Reichsführer-SS pledges to anyone support for his organisation - as may very often be the case now in the Balkans - this pledge must be kept. We must acquire such a reputation for the keeping of contracts in the whole world, we in the SS, that we thereby gain for Germany advantages of the greatest value, namely faith through confidence. Many will come to us, who will not approach official departments. The Balkans are always in a state of confusion. That is a blessing. If they were united it would be terrible. Things are chaotic in the Caucasus and in Russia. We can only see to it - this is also a (p. 85) precept, - that the territories we have occupied and the peoples we rule over never become united, that they always remain disunited. For they would only be united against us. If therefore we pledge our protection to a party (Splittergruppe) who approaches us, it must be quite out of the question for any member of the SS or the police, any member of the whole organisation to go and break the promise. This promise must be sacred.
- - - - -."

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"Practical Tasks" (p. 102)

"In the way of practical duties for the Senior SS executive and (p. 103)
Police Officers I see above all one task, which applies at the same time to the Heads of the Main Offices as well. For me the Senior SS Executive and Police Officer is the representative of the Reichsführer-SS in his area. It would be an evil day if the SS and police fell out. It would be an evil day if the Main Offices, performing their tasks well meaningly but mistakenly made themselves independent by each having a downward chain of command. I really think that, the day of my overthrow would be the end of the SS. It must be, and so come about, that this SS organisation with all its branches - the General-SS which is the common basis of all of them, the Waffen-SS, the regular uniformed police (Ordnungspolizei), the SIPO, (with the whole economic administration, schooling, ideological training, the whole question of kindred), is, even under the tenth Reichsführer-SS one bloc, one body, one organisation. Alas if we do not bring them together. Alas if the individual main offices, the individual chiefs had a false conception of their duty here, if they believed they were doing a good thing, whereas in fact they were taking the first step towards the end. We have come a long way on the road to amalgamation. In the hard battles of this year the Waffen-SS has been welded together in the bitterest hours from the most varied divisions and sections, and from these it formed: body-guard units (Leibstandarte), military SS (Verfügungstruppe), Death's head units, and then the Germanic SS. Now when our "Reich", Death's Head Cavalry Divisions and "Viking" Divisions were there, everyone knew in these last weeks: "Viking" is at my side, "Reich" is at my side, "Death's Head" is at my side, - "Thank God", now nothing can happen to us. - The regular uniformed police and Sipo, General-SS and Waffen-SS must now gradually amalgamate too, just as this is and (p. 105)
must be the case within the Waffen-SS. This applies to matters concerning filling of posts, recruiting, schooling, economic organisation, and medical services. I am always doing something towards this end, a bond is constantly being cast around these sections of the whole to cause them to grow together. Alas, if these bonds should ever be loosened, - then everything - you may be sure of this - would sink back into its old insignificance in one generation, and in a short space of time. It could then be said that that would be no pity; if it wasn't worth keeping alive, it should come to an end. That is right. I would not hear of anything being kept, even if it is my, our SS which is so dear to us, if it was not worth keeping alive.

Only I think that we could not be answerable for it to Germany, and to Germania, for this Germanic Reich needs the SS organisation. She needs it at least for the next few centuries. Then, in a hundred, a thousand, or two thousand years another form will surely be found. When we are dead and gone, some remnant of us with a few of our fundamental ideas will pull through and carry on. Out of this will grow something new again, just as here and there we took over, and now bear, a torch from the time of the Teutons, from the age of chivalry, from the Vehmic organisation, and from the (p. 106)
Prussian army, in order to light a great light from it. It will be just like that later on. I believe that today we could not afford to let anything happe to this SS. That is why I urge one thing on all of you, on you, my heads of the main offices, my Senior Executive SS and Police Officers, and on this whole corps of Gruppenführers, the highest gradation in this hierarchy of the SS organisation: Always see the whole, always look at the whole organisation, never at your branch of it only, or only your Oberabschnitt but always see the SS, and above it the Germanic Reich, and above that our Führer who has created and is still creating this Reich."

"The Future" (p. 110)

"When the war is won, - then, as I have already told you, our (p. 112)
work will start. We do not know when the war will end. It may be sudden, or it may be long delayed. We shall see. But I say to you now, if an armistice and peace comes suddenly, let no-one think that he can then sleep the

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sleep of the just. Get all your Commanders, Chiefs and SS-Führers attuned to this; only then, gentlemen, shall we be awake, for then, so many others will fall into this sleep. I am going so to rouse the whole SS, and keep it so wide awake that we can tackle reconstruction in Germany immediately. Then Germanic work will be begun immediately in the General-SS, for then the harvest will be ripe to be taken into the granary. We shall then call up age-groups there by law. We shall then immediately put all our Waffen-SS units into excellent form, both as regards equipment and training. We shall go on working in this first 6 months after the war, as though the big offensive were starting on the next day. It will make all the differ- (p. 113) ence, if Germany has an operative reserve, an operative backing, at the peace or armistice negotiations, of 20, 25 or 30 SS-divisions intact.

If the peace is a final one, we shall be able to tackle our great work of the future. We shall colonize. We shall indoctrinate our boys with the laws of the SS-organisation. I consider it to be absolutely necessary to the life of our peoples, that we should not only impart the meaning of ancestry, grandchildren and future, but feel these to be a part of our being. Without there being any talk about it, without our needing to make use of rewards and similar material things, it must be a matter of course that we have children. It must be a matter of course that the most copious breeding should be from this racial super-stratum of the Germanic people. In 20 to 30 years we must really be able to present the whole of Europe with its leading class. If the SS, together with the farmers, - we together with our friend Backe, then run the colony in the East on a grand scale, without any restraint, without any question about any kind of tradition but with nerve and revolutionary impetus, we shall in 20 years push the national boundary (Volkstumsgrenze) 500 kilometers Eastwards.

(p. 115)

I requested of the Führer today, that the SS - if we have fulfilled our task and our duty by the end of the war - should have the privilege of holding Germany's most Easterly frontier as a defence frontier. I believe this is the only privilege for which we have no competitors. I believe not one person will dispute our claim to this privilege. We shall be in a position there to exercise every young age-group in the use of arms. We shall impose our laws on the East. We will charge ahead and push our way forward little by little to the Urals. I hope that our generation will successfully bring it about that every age-group has fought in the East, and that every one of our divisions spends a winter in the East every second or third year. Then we shall never grow soft, then we shall never get SS members who only come to us because it is distinguished or because the black coat will naturally be very attractive in peace-time. Everyone will know that: "if I join the SS, there is the possibility that I might be killed." He has contracted in writing that every second year he will not dance in Berlin or attend the carnival in Munich, but that he will be posted to the Eastern frontier in an ice- cold winter. Then we will have a healthy élite for all time. Thus we will create the necessary conditions for the whole Germanic people and (p. 115) the whole of Europe, controlled, ordered and led by us, the Germanic people, to be able, in generations, to stand the test in her battles of destiny against Asia, who will certainly break out again. We do not know when that will be. Then, when the mass of humanity of 1 to 1½ milliards lines up against us, the Germanic people, numbering, I hope, 250 to 300 millions, and the other European peoples, making a total of 600 to 700 millions -(and with an outpost area stretching as far as the Urals, or, a hundred years, beyond the Urals) - must stand the test in its vital struggle against Asia. It would be an evil day if the Germanic people did not survive it. It would be the end of beauty and "Kultur", of the creative power of this earth. That is the distant future. It is for that that we are fighting, pledged to hand down the heritage of our ancestors.

We see into the distant future, because we know what it will be. That is why we are doing our duty more fanatically than ever, more devoutly than ever, more bravely, more obediently and more thoroughly than ever. We want to be worthy of being permitted to be the first SS-men of the Führer, Adolf Hitler, in the long history of the Germanic people, which stretches before us.

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Now let us remember the Führer, Adolf Hitler, who will create the Germanic Reich and will lead us into the Germanic future. (p. 116)

Our Führer Adolf Hitler

Sieg Heil!

Sieg Heil!

Sieg Heil!"

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"Speech of Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler at Kharkow April 1943

My SS-Führer, (p. 1)

It is perhaps very strange, that we should meet in a university of the Russian State, here at Kharkow, - at this Kharkow, which has played so great a part, and really will play a still bigger part in the history of the war. Until last year it was of no very great significance. This year it has become, like Stalingrad, but in the reverse sense, a city of destiny in German war history, in German history. I have asked you, the Commanding Officers of the three SS-Divisions, who took part in this campaign from the Dnjeper to Kharkow and carried out this campaign practically alone and forced a decision, to come together here in order, as has been the custom for many many years, as long as there has been an SS, to meet each other again, and in order once more to establish a few facts about the past and the future.

I would like, in a few words, to outline the whole position and situation with regard to the war.

Today, Germany is on the borders of Europe everywhere. These European frontiers stretch up as far as the North Cape, down the Norwegian coast, through Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and France and jump over to Africa, continue to Tunis to form a bridgehead, run across as far as the frontiers formed by the sea, then from Greece and Crete up to the borders of the neutral states of Turkey and Bulgaria, to join hands again here in the East. I would like to give it a name: it is the great fortress of Europe.

It will undoubtedly happen, that the enemy will make the attempt, today, tomorrow or the next day, at some time, to break into this fortress of Europe at one point or another. That will undoubtedly be the case. Possibly he will be able to force an entry for a shorter or longer period at one point or another in places which we do not have in our personal and responsible control, or which we are not defending with our arms. (p. 2) One thing is certain: wherever the enemy lands, if once we can get to grips with him on the Continent, where we are not dependent on supplies from overseas, that ought to be, and will be, all right with us. On the whole, however, it is here in the East that the decision lies. The fortress of Europe with its frontiers, must be held and will be held too, as long as is necessary. The decision, therefore, lies here in the East; here must the Russian enemy, this people numbering two hundred million Russians, be destroyed on the battle field and person by person, and made to bleed to death."

"It is my opinion - and here, I believe, I am speaking to men (p. 3) who already understand this - that we must conduct the war and our campaign on these lines: - how can we take the most men from the Russians - dead or alive? We shall do it by killing them or taking them prisoner and (p. 4) really putting them to work, by endeavouring to gain as much control as possible over any territory we occupy, and by leaving empty of people any territory we dispose of, any area we make over to the enemy. Either they must be deported and will be used as labour in Germany for Germany, or they will just die in battle. To hand people back again, giving the enemy workers once more and enabling him to recruit again, - that I think, taking the broad view, would be absolutely wrong. That could not be advocated."

"On the other side, one thing goes on the same as ever, the U- (p. 5) boat war, this dreadful stranglehold on the throat of the enemy. I have good reason to be convinced that this stranglehold will never be relaxed, but will tighten. I cannot help feeling that things are beginning to go worse with England these last few months in matters of supply. That by no means indicates that England will collapse today, tomorrow or the next day, but it does mean that we will just be approaching the time when one or other of our opponents, once Russia is conquered and eliminated as a factor, will

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come to the conclusion that it is not worth carrying on the war. The result - and I am convinced of this, I believe it and I know it - the result, the end of this war, regardless of however many months or even years it lasts, will be this: that the Reich, the German Reich or the Germanic Reich of the German nation, will with just title find confirmation of its evolution, that we have an outlet and a way open to us in the East, and that then, centuries later, a politically Germany- a Germanic World Empire will be formed. That will be the result, that will be the fruit of all the many, many sacrifices, which have been made and which must still be made."

"We have, - I would say, as very consistent National Socialists, (p. 7) taken the question of blood is our starting point. We were the first really to solve the problem of blood by action, and in this connection, by problem of blood, we of course do not mean anti-semitism. Anti-Semitism is exactly the same as delousing. Getting rid of lice is not a question of ideology. It is a matter of cleanliness. In just the same way, antisemitism, for us, has not been a question of ideology, but a matter of cleanliness, which now will soon have been dealt with. We shall soon be deloused. We have only 20,000 lice left, and then the matter is finished with in the whole of Germany. But for us the question of blood was a reminder of our own worth, a reminder of what is actually the basis holding this German people together. Just as is the case in the years between 1938 and 1943, in exactly the same way as now, the same ill-founded reproaches were made then: well, if you bring the Nordic man so much to the fore, you're creating a new split, a new class-distinction, - it's a new class hatred. We're overcoming the social barriers, so I've been told by important party members, and now you're setting up racial ones. My reply to these people has always been: If you want to look at things in a negative way, there is nothing in the world which you cannot see in a negative way. From the negative angle, of course, you can argue that way. I see it differently, for I see it on this plane: What is the binding factor which holds the man in East Prussia and the man in the Black Forest together, the man in Schleswig - Holstein and in Hamburg and the man in Munich, in Graz, in Pomerania, in Berlin (p. 8) and in the Rhineland? What is then the factor or the element which contains all that is dear and precious and valuable to us? It is in fact what we Germans call inherent Kultur, it is this Germanic, this Nordic component of our blood."

(p. 10)

"In one operation those peoples must and will be incorporated in the Germanic Reich which, at one time, were part of Germany, part of the German Empire (the Roman Empire and the German nation) and belonged to us up to 1806 or only till 1648, - that is Flanders, Wallonia, and the Netherlands. They were a part of the Reich. Over and above this, we must have the power to bring into the fold, and make a part of our community in a second operation, those Germanic peoples and states too, which have never been part and parcel of the German Reich, - I mean Denmark and Norway, the Danish and Norwegian people."

(p. 11)

"I very soon formed a Germanic SS in the various countries. We very soon got Germanic volunteers from them. It has not always been liked and is still not liked today by many of the political leaders in these countries. From the beginning, I have said to them, "You can do what you like and leave what you like. I leave everything entirely to you, but you may be sure, that an SS will be set up in your country, and there is but one SS in Europe, and that is the Germanic SS, led by the Reichsführer-SS. You can resist, or you can offer no resistance, it's all the same to me. We shall do it in any case!" We have told them that curtly and plainly and clearly from the beginning.

I have said to the SS-men from the beginning too: We do not expect you to renounce your nation, or do anything which a proud and self-respecting fellow who loves his nation cannot do. We do not expect you to become German out of opportunism. But we do expect you to subordinate your national ideal to the greater racial and historical ideal, to the Germanic Reich.

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TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT 1919-PS
(cont.)

In addition, one thing is quite obvious. All of us, who are members of the Germanic peoples, can be happy and thankful that once in thousands of years fate has given us, from among the Germanic peoples, such a genius, a leader, our Führer Adolf Hitler, and you should be happy to be allowed to work with us.

Although I do not wish to discuss any individual official matters here, I would still like to mention in a slightly official way, in my capacity as a military man, what I said before about racial Germans, I beg you never to commit the psychological error of speaking of Germans who came from Roumania or Hungary or Croatia, as Croats, Roumanians or Hungarians, I also beg you never to make the mistake of letting a man who speaks (p. 12) German badly or cannot speak and read German, sense this, or let him sense the thought: "You are a second-rate German, for you can't read or write German properly." I beg you rather, (and here too I am stating a very sober opinion), to think in this case of these Germans in the whole of the Balkans, still more of those overseas, in America, when one day we must fetch over here in millions, - and we shall succeed in doing so - who have held out for centuries. I am certainly of the opinion that if a mighty German Reich with an incredible upward urge in its very being and a great German Führer had not now come into being at this time and in the last few decades, it would have been the end of these Germans (Deutschtum). A person with a very strong character can personally rise above his surroundings for years and perhaps for decades. A race, if it is in small groups, cannot in the long run hold out against its surroundings. And we must never forget this: these Germans do not usually live together in hundreds of thousands, but a thousand here in a few villages, and two thousand there, and 20 thousand at the most somewhere else. But they do not live together in large numbers. So they are always encircled by a foreign nation (Volkstum), and surrounded by its influence, but are above all surrounded by the influence of the people of the country. They are not the people of the country, those are the others. They are subjects of a state of foreign nationality, which, in any moment of doubt, is their enemy, or at the very best, as, shall we say, Roumania, a tolerably neutral and impartial observer. But on the whole these Germans have lived, throughout the centuries of German weakness, from the Thirty Years' War up till now, in surroundings calculated not to strengthen their consciousness of German race (Deutschtum) but to destroy it.

There was something else besides this. If one of these Germans wanted to get anywhere he could only do so by entering the state system of the foreign people as an official or an officer. It is no mere chance - (p. 13) I am not making spiteful assertions now but merely stating the facts - that, for instance, among Hungarian generals there is such a considerable percentage of men of German origin, who of course had, in most cases, to alter their names if they wanted to get anywhere. In many cases, if they did not do so, and remained obdurate about it, they were subsequently removed from office. I quote here as an example the present Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Sombaché, who in his youth at the Austrian Military Academy still had the thoroughly good German name of Knaus. May I remind you of Feldmarschall or Feldmarschall-Leutnant Raab, who as we all know, has now retired. Both are of German descent, and one could name countless hundreds of leading men in these South-Eastern States who are all of German origin, had to become part of the alien nation (Volkstum), and were then drained (eine Auslaugung bildeten) of their own most valuable national characteristics.

If, then, we get sons of these racial Germans (Volks-deutschtum) who have still survived there - (some are genuine volunteers, and others come as a result of a levy, for we have organised the racial groups from within the Reich through the SS, so that without possessing political power we have in fact, morally such strength and power among these people (Volkstum) that we can compel a man, compel him morally, to serve with us in Germany,

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due entirely to the power of the whole German national community) - if we therefore get these men, you must not make it difficult for them to enter our community by calling him by the name which you judge he will not wish to hear. A Saxon from Siebenburg will never let it be said that he is a Roumanian. It's just against that that he and his fathers have fought for 700 years. And a German from Hungary will never let it be said that he is a Hungarian. If you know how he has been thrashed by many a Hungarian gendarme, before he come to us, how his Mother was thrashed, and his parents driven from hearth and home, you can imagine how bitter it is for him if he now joins German service-men and they say: here comes a Hungarian. Or you can imagine how bitter it is for him when he is reproached for something which he cannot help. If we had not been to a German school we should not be able to read and write German either. If we had been forced, shall we say, to go to a Polish school, we should write Polish too, although we profess to be Germans. And that is often the case with these men. I must therefore expect of you understanding and human sympathy in this matter, and must expect. that the leaders in addition to their many other duties, will undertake to see that additional German instruction in reading, speaking and writing, be given to these men at every opportunity that is offered. I lay special emphasis on this matter, because by negotiations, we have now managed to make an arrangement enabling us in future to enlist even those Germans who up to now have been serving in the Roumanian army. So we can expect a great influx from the Germans of the South-East."

"We know that these clashes with Asia and Jewry are necessary (p. 16)
for evolution. They give the cue (Auftakt) for the European Continent to unite. These clashes are the only evolutionary possibility which will enable us one day, now that Fate has given us the Führer Adolf Hitler, to create the Germanic Reich. They are the necessary condition, for our race, and our blood to create for itself and put under cultivation, in the years of peace, (during which we must live and work austerely, frugally and like Spartans), that settlement area in which new blood can breed, as in a botanical garden so to speak. [Sic!] Only by this means can the Continent become a Germanic Continent, capable of daring to embark, in one or (p. 17)
two or three or five or ten generations, on the conflict with this Continent of Asia which spews out hordes of humanity. Perhaps we shall also have to hold in check other coloured peoples who will soon be in their certain prime, and thus preserve the world, which is the world of our blood, of our children and of our grandchildren. Now it is just this world we like the best, the Germanic world, the world of Nordic life. We know that this conflict with the advancing pressure from Asia, with the 200 million Russians, is necessary. And we shall win as sure as I am speaking here in the University of Kharkow. We shall have to pass through many a valley, many a narrow defile. Many will grow tired on the way. Of course they will mostly be those who have no reason to do so. To put it vulgarly, many will do something in their trousers. Many people will get shaky at the knees. The only thing that matters is that we stand firm. This is what is important for us as SS-men, for our province of duty and our mission (it is a task additional to those of the whole German Armed Forces and the whole German people): That is what I would like to impress upon you, this is what I beg you, as Commanding Officers, as Chiefs, and as leaders to teach the young men again and again in their ideological instruction. That is what I demand and exact of you, - that you really concern yourselves with the man, the young fellow of 17 to 18 who comes to us, and with many who are in our ranks not as volunteers but as conscripts. I ask you to look after them, and guide them, and not let them go before they are really saturated with our spirit and are fighting as the old guard fought before us - that is what I request and demand of you.

We have only one task, to stand firm and carry on the racial struggle without mercy. I will now say again something which I have already today said to the men elsewhere: we will never let that excellent weapon, the dread and terrible reputation which preceded us in the battles for (p. 18)

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for Kharkow fede, but will constantly add new meaning to it. They can call us what they like in the world, the main thing is that we are the eternally loyal, obedient, steadfast and unconquerable fighting men of the Germanic people and of the Führer, the SS of the Germanic Reich."

- - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT
NO 1919-PS

13 November 1945

I, ESME SHERRIFF, 2/O, W.R.N.S., 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Extracts of Document 1919-PS.

ESME SHERRIFF
2/O, W.R.N.S.
36482

H1145-0271

Exhibit U.S.A. 539
Filed Jan. 4, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2327 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Third Army Group
Ia Nr. 150/39 g.K. Chiefs

Dresden 6.14.1939

Re: Fall Weiss

TOP SECRET

Top Secret (Chefsache)
"Only by officer"

20 Copies
Control No. 8

1. The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out of a plan of deployment against Poland which takes in account the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war by surprise and for quick success.

2. The order of deployment by the High Command, "Fall Weiss" authorizes the Third Army Group (in Fall Weiss 8th Army Headquarters) to give necessary directions and orders to all commands subordinated to it for "Fall Weiss".

3. Enclosed are sent:
   a. Aims of the operation (Enclosure 1)
   b. Organization of the forces (Enclosure 2)
   c. Survey of arrival (Enclosure 3)
   d. Signal Communication (Enclosure 4)
   e. Regulations for the supply (Enclosure 5 will follow)
   f. Enemy situation (Enclosure 6)
   g. Directions for execution (Enclosure 7)

4. The order of deployment "Fall Weiss" will be put into operation on 20 August 1939; all preparations have to be concluded by this date.
The former deployments "Case West" and "Case East" are valid until 19 August 1939.

5. For the instruction on the tasks due to this order for deployment, the principles of order OKH Genstb d.H. - 1 Division (Ib Nr. 2000/36 top secret of 12.19.36) are to be applied.

The instruction can be carried down to the responsible officers of the corps commands to the Division Commanders (G-3 (Ia) and G-4 (Ib) of the divisions and the commandants and staff officers of the Garrison Headquarters. Permission to inform further persons must be requested by names. Communication with the SS - Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler must be instituted only by special order. The order for their commitment is to be prepared.

6. Tenth Corps Command (Gen KdX) and XIII Corps and 1o. Div. can perform the necessary reconnaissance in Silesia while observing the appropriate precautionary measures (civilian clothes, motor vehicle with civilian license number).

7. The whole correspondence on "Fall Weiss" has to be conducted under the classification Top Secret (Chefsache). This is to be disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgement of the chief of the responsible command is harmless in every way - even in connection with other documents.

8. For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered later on. Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army Group before 10 July.

9. I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to limit the extent of the information, and ask that all suitable measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting information.

The Commander-in-Chief of Army Group 3

Signed F. Blaskowitz.

H1145-0272

Exhibit USA 548
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

DOCUMENT 2610-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NURNBERG,)
) SS
GERMANY.)

FREDERICK W. ROCHE being duly sworn deposes and says:

I am a Major in the Army of the United States.

I was the Judge Advocate of the Military Commission which tried Anton Dostler for ordering the execution of the group of fifteen United States Army personnel who comprised the "Ginny Mission". This Military Commission consisting of five officers was appointed by command of General McNarney, by Special Orders No. 269, dated 26 September 1945, Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 512.

The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945 and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed four days and the findings and sentence were announced on the morning of 12 October 1945. The charge and specification in this case are as follows:

"Charge: Violation of the law of war.
Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then General, commanding military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war, order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army personnel consisting of two officers and thirteen enlisted men who had then recently been captured by forces under General Dostler, which order was carried into execution on or about 26 March 1944, resulting in the death of the said fifteen members of the Army of the United States identified as follows:

First Lieutenant Vincent Russo, 01109637
First Lieutenant Paul J. Traficante, 01308399
Technical Sergeant Livio Vieceli, 33037797
Sergeant Alfred L. DeFlumeri, 31252071
Sergeant Dominic C. Mauro, 32650582
Technician Fifth Grade Liberty J. Tremonte, 31329179
Technician Fifth Grade Joseph M. Farrell, 31329187
Technician Fifth Grade Salvatore DiSclafani, 32297264
Technician Fifth Grade Angelo Sirico, 32542008
Technician Fifth Grade John J. Leone, 32577443
Technician Fifth Grade Thomas N. Savino, 32540701
Technician Fifth Grade Joseph A. Libardi, 31212732
Technician Fifth Grade Joseph Noia, 32536119
Technician Fifth Grade Rosario F. Squatrito, 32542038
Technician Fifth Grade Santaro Calcara, 36131251".

I was present throughout the entire proceeding. I heard all the testimony, and I am familiar with the record in this case. The facts developed in this proceeding are as follows: On the night of 22 March 1944,

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two officers and thirteen enlisted men of the 2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All fifteen men were members of the Army of the United States and were in the military service of the United States. When they landed on the Italian coast they were all properly dressed in the field uniform of the United States Army and they carried no civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail line was being used by the German Forces to supply their fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead fronts. The entire group was captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a patrol consisting of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of the German Army. All fifteen men were placed under interrogation in La Spezia and they were held in custody until the morning of 26 March 1944 when they were all executed by a firing squad. These men were never tried nor were they brought before any court or given any hearing; they were shot by order of Anton Dostler, then General Commanding the 75th German Army Corps.

Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified by way of defense that he ordered the fifteen American soldiers to be shot pursuant to the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 on commando operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and not taken prisoners of war, even after they had been interrogated. He also testified that he would have been subject to court martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler order.

The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler, as these findings and sentence appear in the original record of the trial and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy on 12 October 1945:

> "FINDINGS: General Dostler, as president of this commission it is my duty to inform you that the commission in closed session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all the members of the commission concurring in each finding of guilty, finds you of the specification and of the charge:
>
> GUILTY.

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SENTENCE: And again in closed session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all of the members of the commission concurring, sentences you:

TO BE SHOT TO DEATH BY MUSKETRY."

(Signed) Frederick W. Roche
FREDERICK W. ROCHE
Major, J.A.G.D.

Sworn to and subscribed before me, this the 7th day of November, 1945.

(Signed) Hardy W. Hollers
HARDY W. HOLLERS
Colonel, J.A.G.D.

H1145-0275

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT PS 3012
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

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/ 173

SPECIAL GROUP 4a

19 March 1943

SECRET

Personal

To all group leaders of the Security Service (SD)-Auxiliary groups.

It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security Service (SD) to discover all enemies of the Reich and fight against them in the interest of security, and in the zone of operations especially to guarantee the security of the army. Besides the annihilation of active opponents, all other elements who, by virtue of their opinions or their past, may appear active as enemies under favorable conditions, are to be eliminated (sind.. auszumerzen) through preventive measures. The Security Police carries out this task according to the general directives of the Führer with all the required toughness. Energetic measures are especially necessary in territories endangered by the activity of hostile gangs. The competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations is based on the Barbarossa-decrees. I deem the measures of the Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:

1) The situation at the front in my sector had become so serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and Italians, who streamed back in chaotic condition, took openly position against us.

2) The strong expeditions of hostile gangs, who came especially from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that, other revolutionary groups, formed by the population, appeared suddenly in all districts. The providing of arms evidently provided no difficulties at all. It would have been irresponsible, if we had observed this whole activity without acting against it. It is obvious that all such measures bring about some harshness. I want to take up the significant points of harsh measures:

1) The shooting of Hungarian Jews

2) The shooting of Agronoms

3) The shooting of children

4) The total burning down of villages

5) The "shooting, while trying to escape," (?) (Flüchten) of Security Service (SD) prisoners

Chief of Committment Group C confirmed once more the correctness of the measures taken, and expressed his recognition for the energetic actions.

ith regard to the current political situation, especially in he armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the ecurity Police have to be subordinated to the greatest extent o the recruiting of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible ime, the Ukraine has to put at the disposal of the armament ndustry 1 million orkers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our erritory daily.

he work of the field groups has therefore to be changed as of

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now. The following orders are given:

1) Special treatment is to be limited to a minimum

2) The listing of communist functionaries, activists and so on, is to take place by roster only for the time being, without arresting anybody. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to arrest all the close relatives of a member of the communist party. Although, members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested only, if they were active in a leading position.

3) The activity of the labor offices, respective of recruiting commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible. It will not be possible always to refrain from using force. During a conference with the Chief of the Labor Commitment Staffs, an agreement was reached stating that wherever prisoners can be released, they should be put at the disposal of the Commissioner of the Labor Office. When searching (Uberholung) villages, resp. when it has become necessary to burn down a village, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the Commissioner by force.

4) As a rule, no more children will be shot.

5) The reporting of hostile gangs as well as drives against them is not affected hereby. All drives against these hostile gangs can only take place after my approval has been obtained.

6) The prisons have to be kept empty, as a rule. We have to be aware of the fact, that the Slavs will interpret all soft treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act accordingly right away. If we limit our harsh measures of security police through above orders for the time being, that is only done for the following reason. The most important thing is the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into the Reich will be made. No written certificates of political reliability check or similar things will be issued.

True copy
(signed): Bender
KVR

(signed): Christiansen
SS Major and C.O.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT NO. PS 3012

I, S/Sgt Paul W. Freedman, 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German Languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. PS 3012.

S/Sgt Paul W. Freedman
33799122

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H1145-0278

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No.R-95
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Copy

Army High Command

H.Q., Army High Command, 30th March 1941

Army Gen. Staff, Dept. Ops. (I)
No. 540/41 top secret, chiefs only

9000664

Deployment Instructions for "Action 25"
and supplementary instruction for action "Marita"

1.) The political situation in the Balkans having changed by reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be considered as an enemy even should it make declarations of loyalty at first.

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible.
For camouflaging purposes the operation shall be called "Action 25".

2.) The intentions of the Army High Command are to break into Yugoslavia by means of a concentric operation emerging from the area Klagenfurt - Graz and near N.Kanizsa on one side (2nd Army) and from the area near Sofia on the other side (12th Army). General direction should be Belgrade and south of it. By these operations the Yugoslav Army should be destroyed and the southern part of Yugoslavia should be captured as early as possible, so that communications to the Italian army group in Albania can be opened and a basis be created for the continuation of the German-Italian offensive against Greece.

An early opening of traffic on the Danube river and the capture of the copper mines at Bor are of importance for the military economy.

3.) Enemy situation:
In northern Yugoslavia defensive conduct of war may be expected. The fact that the races there are in opposition to each other may even induce the Yugoslav Command to defend only the Serbian crown lands. In this case numerous efficient bolt-positions may be expected both in Slovene and Croation parts of the country.

It is presumed that the enemy will defend the Eastern border in southern Yugoslavia by means of numerous bolt positions. At the same time he will try to keep his rear free by invading Albania in cooperation with Greek-British forces.

When the German attack succeeds in severing the coherence of the Yugoslav defence by capturing the main roads of communication, the Yugoslav army may be expected to defend itself strongly in the mountain area so long as sufficient ammunition and food are available. The problem of nationalities may play a decisive part with regard to duration and toughness of this resistance.

Details with regard to the enemy situation see enclosure 1.

4.) The orders issued with regard to the operations against Greece remain valid so far as not affected by this order. This applies especially to the capture of the islands in the North Aegean sea though the Fuehrer has reserved for himself the issuing of the order to capture the island of Lemnos. The protection of the Turkish border is left to the

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Bulgarians for the time being. One armored division has to be put in readiness as support.

5.) Timetable for the operations.

a) On 5th April as soon as sufficient forces of the Air Force are available and weather permitting, the Air Forces shall attack continuously by day and night the Yugoslav ground organisation and Belgrade.

Simultaneously - by no means earlier - the attack of the 12th Army (except for the North Group, i.e., Armored Group 1) begins against Yugoslavia and Greece.

It should be assured that in case of unfavorable weather the Army High Command (AOK) is able to stop the attack at least 10 hours before the time of the planned air attack.

8.) Cooperation of other States:

a) Cooperation by Italy:

* * * * * * * * * * *

b) Cooperation by Hungary:

Hungary will participate in the invasion of Yugoslavia.

* * * * * * * * * * *

Dividing Lines:

c) Cooperation of Rumania:

Active participation of Rumania in the attack on Yugoslavia may not be expected. The Rumanians, however, will strengthen their border protection forces. - The Main duty of Rumania will be the protection against Russia.

d) Cooperation of Bulgaria:

Should Bulgarian forces participate actively in the attack on Yugoslavia, Army High Command 12 has to make the necessary arrangements with the Bulgarian Army Command. Bulgarian forces to be deployed against Yugoslavia are to be subordinated to the German military authorities.

9.) Cooperation of the Air Force

No air raids should be made against Croat areas, unless Yugoslav forces in this area are the targets.

Army High Command 12 shall cooperate with VIII Air Corps,
Army High Command 2 with Air Fleet 4,
High Command Air Force will send sufficient anti-aircraft protection from Graz, Klagenfurt, Villach, and Leoben, and from Vienna.

signed von Brauchtisch

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. R-95

I, ERNEST M. COHN, Pfc, No. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. R-95.

ERNEST M. COHN
Pfc, 33925738.

(Rubber Stamp)

TOP SECRET

(GEHEIME REICHSACHE)

100 copies

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H1145-0281

ACTIVITY AND SITUATION REPORT NO. 6.
OF THE TASK FORCES (EINSATZGRUPPEN)
OF THE SECURITY POLICE AND THE SD IN THE U.S.S.R.

(Time covered by report: 1-31 October 1941)

H1145-0282

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(Page 1 to Page 2 - line 5)

I. STATIONS.

During the period covered by this report the stations of the Task Forces of the Security Police and the SD have changed only in the Northern Sector.

The present stations are:

Task Force A: since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk.
Task Force B: continues in Smolensk.
Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew.
Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.

The Action and Special Commandos (Einsatz und Sonder Commandos) which are attached to the Task Force continue on the march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been assigned to them.

II. ACTIVITIES.

A. Eastern Territory (i.e. Baltic area)

a) Partisan activity and counteraction.

The activity of the Bolshevist partisans in area of task force A has quietened down somewhat. Nevertheless, Intelligence work has been further extended through the dispatching civilian agents, and the enlistment of the village elders and of the population. The results of the preliminary intelligence work served as a basis for several actions in the active combatting of the partisans. From a captured activity report of a partisan group it can be ascertained that the partisans anticipate in view of the approaching winter season that they will not be able to hold out longer than the middle of November.

****

(Page 7 line 7 to Page 14 line 14)

c) Jews. In 1940 there were in Estonia approximately 4,500 Jews almost exclusively in Reval, Dorpat, Narwa and Pernau. There were only a few Jews in the country districts. After the occupation of the Eastern territory by German troops there were still approximately 2000 Jews. The larger part had left the country in an easterly direction together with the Soviet authorities and the Red Army.

Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not been recorded, on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination.

However, the Estonian Protective Corps (Selbtschutz), formed at the time of the entry of the Wehrmacht, immediately started a comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action was under the direction of the task force of the Security Police and the SD.

The measures taken were:

1. Arrest of all male Jews over sixteen.

2. Arrest of all Jewesses from 16-20 years, who lived in Reval and environs and were fit for work; these were employed in peat cutting.

3. Comprehensive detention in the synagogue of all Jewesses living in Dorpot and its environs.

4. Arrest of the Jews and Jewesses fit for work in Pernau and environs.

5. Registration of all Jews according to age, sex, and capacity for work for the purpose of their detention in a camp is being prepared.

The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still in progress. After completion of this action there will remain only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern territory.

As an immediate action the following has been ordered by the task force of the Security Police and the SD:

1. Identification of all Jews.

2. The prohibition to carry on a public trade.

3. Prohibition of use of sidewalks and public transportation as well as of visits to theaters, cinemas and restaurants.

4. Prohibition of attendance at schools.

5. Seizure of all Jewish property.

B. WHITE RUTHENIA

a) Partisan activity and Counteraction.

Contrary to the situation in the North sector the activity of the partisans in the area of task force B has increased slightly. In Welikij Luki alone 19 reports of attacks by partisans were received. However, the main weight of partisan activity lately has been shifting over to the perpetration of acts of sabotage. It has been noted that the strongest groups divide themselves into smaller ones. This results in a better camouflage and mobility. How far this camouflage goes, is shown by three cases where partisans married into three villages in order to appear unsuspected. Furthermore Red Army men were unmasked as partisans; they had obtained certificates surreptitiously from units of the Wehrmacht showing them to be unsuspected as political prisoners who were to be left at large. When interrogated by the Action Commandos of the Security Police and the SD, they admitted after long denials that they had received the order to pass themselves off as political prisoners or as forced laborers and to take up the fight again as partisans behind the front.

Again and again it can be observed that the population refuses to support the partisans and in several instances they have even acted actively against the partisans if by this action the destruction of their property could be prevented.

In several actions against smaller partisan groups, a number of partisans would be shot.

At Choslawitschi 4 partisans who had shot at a German soldier were apprehended and liquidated.

Southeast of Demidow, five partisans were captured after a search of the forests; they admitted to have killed 14 German soldiers. They were liquidated.

In several actions northwest of Welish 27 partisans were apprehended and shot.

In the village Michalowo, after careful reconnaissance through civilian agents, 8 partisans were surprised in a house by the same Commando of the Security Police and the SD, they were arrested and hanged the next day

in this particularly partisan-infested village.

The president of the District Region Soviets in Tarenitsch and his secretary were shot because of their connections with partisans.

During an action approximately 70 kilometers south of Mogilew, 25 Armenians, Kirghizs and Mongols were apprehended with false identification papers with which they tried to conceal the fact that they belonged to a partisan group. They were liquidated.

In the same district two partisan leaders were captured and shot.

An Action Commando of the Security Police and the SD shot 3 partisans at Iwniki who shortly before capture had thrown their weapons into a brook.

In Wultschina 8 juveniles were arrested as partisans and shot. They were inmates of a children's home. They had collected weapons which they hid in the woods. Upon search the following were found: 3 heavy machine guns, 15 rifles, several thousand rounds of ammunition, several hand grenades, and several packages of poison gas Ebrit.

b) Arrests and executions of Communists, Officials and Criminals.

A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was devoted to the combatting of Communists and criminals. A special Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63 officials, NKVD agents and agitators.

In the vicinity of the Tytschinino railway station 4 girls were shot because they attempted to derail a train by loosening the fish-plates.

Three communist officials and one Politruk were liquidated at Gorodnia.

18 persons were executed at Mogilew; they had acted as political officials and Politruks. Weapons were found in their possession.

An Action Commando convicted a member of the Supreme Council of the White Russian Soviet Republic of arson in Witsbsk. He was shot.

Blood-Cellar in Tschernigow — In the NKVD building in Tschernigow a blood cellar was discovered. It was soundproof and lightproof. One room served as the place for executions. The wall was covered with boards serving as butts with sawdust strewn in front of it which was completely soaked with blood.

Lunatics — The Red Troops had opened the insane asylum at their departure and had armed some of the inmates. 21 insane persons were apprehended in the meantime and liquidated. In Minsk 632 and in Mogliew 836 persons were shot.

In Mogilew in addition 33 looters were executed.

The liquidations for the period covered by this report have reached a total of 37,180 persons.

c) Jews.

Now as ever it is to be noted that the population on their own part refrains from any action against Jews. It is true that the population reports collectively of the terror of the Jews to which they were exposed during the time of the Soviet regime, or they complain about new enroachments of the Jews, but nevertheless, they are not prepared to take part in any pogroms.

All the more vigorous are the actions of the task forces of the Sec-

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urity Police and the SD against the Jews who make it necessary that steps be taken against them in different spheres.

In Gorodnia 165 Jewish terrorists and in Tschenrigow 19 Jewish Communists were liquidated. 8 more Jewish communists were shot at Beresna.

It was experienced repeatedly that the Jewish women showed an especially obstinate behaviour. For this reason 28 Jewesses had to be shot in Krugoje and 337 at Mogilew.

In Borissow 321 Jewish saboteurs and 118 Jewish looters were executed.

In Bobruisk 380 Jews were shot who had engaged to the last in incitment and horror propaganda (Hetz-und Greuelpropaganda)against the German army of occupation.

In Tatarsk the Jews had left the Ghetto of their own accord and returned to their old home quarters, attempting to expel the Russians who had been quartered there in the meantime. All male Jews as well as 3 Jewesses were shot.

In Sadrudubs the Jews offered some resistance against the establishment of a Ghetto so that 272 Jews and Jewesses had to be shot. Among them was a political Commissar.

Mogilew

In Mogilew too, the Jews attempted to sabotage their removal to the Ghetto. 113 Jews were liquidated.

Moreover four Jews were shot on account of refusal to work and 2 Jews Wit were shot because they had illtreated wounded German soldiers and because they did not wear the prescribed markings.

In Talka 222 Jews were shot for anti-German propaganda and in Marina Gorka 996 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged orders issued by the German occupation authorities.

At Schklow 627 more Jews were shot, because they had participated in acts of sabotage.

Witebsk On account of the extreme danger of an epidemic, a beginning was made to liquidate the Jews in the ghetto at Witebsk. This involved approximately 3000 Jews.

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(Page 16 line 7 to page 19 line 10)

c. UKRAINE.

a) Partisan activity and counteraction.

Although partisan activity in the south sector is very strong too, there is nevertheless the impression that spreading and effective partisan activity are strongly affected by the flight of higher partisan leaders and by the lack of initiative of the subordinate leaders who have remained behind. Only in one case a commando of the Security Police and the SD succeeded in a fight with partisans in shooting the Secretary of the Communist Party for the administration district of Nikolajew-Cherson, who was at the time Commissar of a partisan group for the district Nikolajew-Cherson-Krim.

The leader of a partisan group of five was captured after an exchange of shots near Odessa. He had the task of spotting artillery positions and of reporting them to a Soviet command post.

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An action against partisans near Kostromka resulted in the arrest of 16 persons, among them a Politruk, a Unit leader of an anihilation brigade as well as 3 communist revolutionaries.

The Jew Herschko Salomon, who had belonged to a parachute Defense-Assault battalion, was located at the city hospital in Nikolajew. The screening of PWs resulted in the discovery of 3 Jews who were members of a partisan company.

In Belabanowka the former president of the village soviet, who had attempted to form a partisan group of his own, was arrested.

Furthermore a member of the Polit Bureau and president of a workers union, at present organiser of partisan groups, was arrested and liquidated.

14 partisans were shot at Kiew.

In the course of an action at Cherson 2 persons were apprehended who attempted to carry information behind the Bolschevik lines. At the same time the leader of a band of partisans was shot after a lengthy fight.

b) Arrests and Executions of Communists and Officials.

The search for leading communists resulted in the arrest of Kaminski, former GPU chief of Cherson. In the years 1919/21 he had carried out the liquidation of the Czarist officers. The head of the prison work shops of the NKVD was also caught.

In Kiew a number of NKVD officials and political commissars were rendered innocuous.

c) Jews.

The embitterment of the Ukrainian population against the Jews is extremely great because they are thought responsible for the explosions in Kiew. They are also regarded as informers and agents of the NKVD, who started the terror against the Ukrainian people. As a measure of retaliation for the arson at Kiew, all Jews were arrested and altogether 33,771 Jews were executed on the 29th and the 30th September. Money, valuables and clothing were secured and put at the disposal of the National-Socialist League for Public Welfare (NSV) for the equipment of the National Germans (Volksdeutschen) and partly put at the disposal of the provisional city administration for distribution to the needy population.

Shitomir

In Shitomir 3145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propaganda and saboteurs.

Oherson

In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of retaliation for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area east of the Dnjepr the solution of the Jewish question has been taken up energetically by the task forces of the Security Police and the SD. The areas newly occupied by the Commandos were purged of Jews. In the course of this action 4891 Jews were liquidated. At other places the Jews were marked and registered. This rendered it possible to put at the disposal of the Wehrmacht for urgent labor, Jewish worker groups up to 1000 persons.

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H1145-0287

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. R-102

22 November 1945.

I, MARTIN L. LOWENTHAL, Tec 5, 33378374, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct and true translation (Partial) of Document No. R-102.

MARTIN L. LOWENTHAL,
Tec 5, 33378374.

H1145-0288

TRANSLATION IN FULL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1475-PS and R-135
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Copy

The Reich Commissar
for the Eastland
Diary No. 3628/43 secret

(Der Reichs Kommissar Für
dans Ostland)

stamp: Personal Staff-
Reichsfuhrer SS

Documents-Administration

File No. Secret/227

Riga, 18 June 1943

SECRET

To the
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territory
Berlin

The attached secret reports received from General Commissar KUBE deserve special consideration.

The fact that Jews receive special treatment requires no further discussion. However it appears hardly believable that this is done in the way described in the report of the General Commissar of 1 June 1943. What is Katyn against that? Imagine only that these occurrences would become known to the other side and exploited by them! Most likely such propaganda would have no effect only because people who hear and read about it, simply would not be ready to believe it.

The fight against bands also is taking on forms which are highly questionable if pacification and exploitation of the several territories are the aims of our policy. Thus, the dead who were suspected of belonging to bands and whose number was indicated in the report of 5 June 1943 about the "Cottbus" project to have amounted to 5,000, in my opinion, with few exceptions would have been suitable for forced labor in the Reich.

It should not be ignored in this connection that in view of the difficulties of making oneself understood, as generally in such clean-up operations, it is very hard to distinguish friend from foe. Nevertheless, it should be possible to avoid atrocities and to bury those who have been liquidated. To lock men, women and children into barns and to set fire to these, does not appear to be a suitable method of combatting bands, even if it is desired to exterminate the population. This method is not worthy of the German cause and hurts our reputation severely.

I am asking that you take the necessary action.

(signed:) signature

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
DOCUMENT NO. 1475-PS AND R-135

I, PAUL W. FREEDMAN, S/SGT., 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1475-PS and R-135.

PAUL W. FREEDMAN,
S/Sgt., 33799122.

H1145-0289

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1475-PS and R-135 (continued).

(stamp) Personal Staff Reichsführer SS
Document Administration
File No. Secret/227

The General Commissar
for White Ruthenia

Minsk, 1 June 1943

Gauleiter/Wu.
Diary No. 414/43 secret.

Secret

To the
Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories
Berlin

through the Reich Commissioner
for the Eastland
Riga

Subject: Actions against Jews in the Prison of Minsk.

The enclosed official report from the warden of the prison in Minsk is submitted to the Reich Minister and the Reich Commissar for information.

The General Commissar in Minsk
(signed:) signature.

Enclosure
ad. I/1168/43 secret.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1475-PS AND R-135

I, PAUL W. FREEDMAN, S/Sgt., 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1475-PS and R-135.

PAUL W. FREEDMAN
S/Sgt., 33799122

H1145-0290

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1475-PS and R-135 (continued).

(stamp) Personal Staff Reichsführer SS
Document Administration
File No: Secret/227

The General Commissar
for White Ruthenia

Minsk 5 June 1943

Gauleiter /BA
Diary No. 428/43 secret

Secret

To the
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
Berlin

through the Reich Commissioner for the Eastland
Riga

Subject: Results of police operation "Cottbus" as reported so far for the period of 22 June to 3 July 1943.

SS Brigadeführer, Major General of Police von Gottberg reports that the operation "Cottbus" had the following result during the period mentioned:

Enemy dead	4 500
Dead suspected of belonging to banks	5 000
German dead	59
German wounded	267
Dead of foreign racial stock	22
Wounded of foreign racial stock	120
Captured members of bands	250
Destroyed enemy camps	57
Destroyed enemy positions	261
Apprehended male labor	2 062
Apprehended female labor	450
Sunk larger boats	4
Sunk floats	22

Booty consisted of:

1 airplane, 12 tow-gliders, 10 15 cm guns, 2 anti-tank guns, 9 grenade throwers, 23 heavy machine guns, 28 light machine guns, 28 machine pistols, 492 rifles, 1 028 grenades and bombs, 1 000 mines, 31 300 rounds rifle ammunition, 7 300 rounds pistol ammunition, 1 200 kg explosives, 2 complete radio installations with transmitter, 1 picture establishment, 30 parachutes, 67 wagons, 530 horses, i field kitchen, 430 sleighs, great amounts of medical drugs and propaganda material.

The operation affects the territory of the General District White Ruthenia in the area of Borissow. It concerns in particular the two counties Begomie and Pleschtschamizy. At present the police troops together with the army have advanced to Lake Palik and have reached the whole front of the Beresina. The continuance of the battles takes place in the rear zone of the Army.

The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492 rifles are taken from 4 500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from the country. The battalion Dirlewanger especially has a reputation for destroying many human lives. Among the 5 000 people suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and children.

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By order of the Chief of Band-Combatting, SS Obergruppenführer von dem Bach, units of the armed forces have also participated in the operation. SS Standartenführer Kunze was in command of the armed forces detachments, among whom there were also 90 members from my office and from the District-Commissariat Minsk-City. Our men returned from the operation yesterday without losses. I decline the use of officials and Reich employees of the General Commissariat in the rear zone of the army. The men who work for me were not deferred from army service in order to actively participate in combat against bands in the place of the armed forces and of the police.

Of the armed forces personnel, 1 railroader has been wounded (shot in lungs). The political effect of this large-scale operation upon the peaceful population is simply dreadful in view of the many shootings of women and children. In December, the town of Begomic was evacuated by the armed forces and the police. At that time, the population of Begomic was preponderantly on our side. In the course of the fighting, Begomic, which was built up as a strong point by the partisans, has been destroyed by German air attacks.

The General Commissar in Minsk

(signed:) signature

H1145-0292

(stamp) Personal Staff Reichsführer SS
Document Administration
File No. Secret/227

Court Prison

Minsk 31 May 1943

To the General Commissar
for White Ruthenia
Minsk

Subject: Actions against Jews.
Reference: Oral report on 31 May 1943.

On 13 April 1943 the former German dentist Ernst Israel Tichauer and his wife, Elisa Sara Tichauer, nee Rosenthal, were committed to the court prison by the Security Service (SD) (Hauptscharführer Rübe). Since that time all German and Russian Jews who were turned over to us, had their golden bridgework, crowns and fillings pulled or broken out. This happens always 1 to 2 hours before the respective action.

Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews have been finished off. On the basis of a definite investigation, gold was taken only in two actions, on 14 April 1943 from 172, and on 27 April 1943 from 164 Jews. About 50% of the Jews had gold teeth, bridgework or fillings. Hauptscharführer Rübe of the Security Service (SD) was always personally present and he took the gold along too.

Before 13 April 1943 this was not done.

(signed) Gunther
Prison Warden

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF
DOCUMENT NO. 1475-PS and R-135

I, PAUL W. FREEMAN, S/Sgt., 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1475-PS and R-135.

PAUL W. FREEDMAN,
S/Sgt., 33799122.

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File Copy.

Filed Jan. 4, 1946

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Vol. III

GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND GROUP

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H1145-0294